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Abstract 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis has been estimated to have resulted in losses of $4.3 trillion dollars to 
global banking institutions (Castells et al. 2012). The crisis placed the spotlight on banking culture (Moore 
2012, 2013; Peston; 2013; Smith 2012; Salz 2013 Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; CIPD 2013;) with 
claims that the causes of the crisis transpired from the ‘very heart of its [banking industry’s] culture’ 
(FT.com 2014). In the aftermath banks have attempted to introduce cultural change programs to 
encourage the right behaviours and conduct in an attempt to reduce wrongdoing and misbehaviour. 
This thesis critically explores mainstream perspectives of organisational culture (Peter and Waterman 
1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982) in the context of the banking industry. Mainstream perspectives on culture 
were encapsulated by the idea that culture can be shaped and modified by management to produce a 
‘strong culture’, which would in turn increase commitment, productivity and profitability (Wiener 1988; 
Parker 2000; Kilmann 1985; Du Gay 1996). Thirty years on since cultural engineering’s initial introduction, 
practitioners and industry ‘experts’ continue to buy into the virtues of strong culture management, 
portraying it as a panacea to the banking industry’s problems (PwC 2016; Salz 2013; CIPD 2013). 
Therefore, this thesis aims to revisit the topic of organisational culture in order to look at how the banking 
industry has approached culture management post-crisis. This thesis will draw on Foucault’s work on 
power, discipline and discourse (1977; 1978; 1980) to provide a framework that allows for an exploration 
into the complexity and ambiguity of culture, arguing that organisational culture is mutually constructed 
through contesting power relations and the interactions of organisational members. In order to interpret 
and analyse the empirical data, this thesis developed the concept of performance discourse. This thesis 
argues that performance discourse influences conduct and behaviour at a taken for granted routine level. 
It is predicated on competition, financialization of the individual, internalising responsibility and the 
intensification of work and elitism. Performance discourse goes beyond the dualism that views culture as 
either a thing or as a metaphor discussed in previous studies. In so doing, it helps us to make sense of 
why the idea that culture is still a ‘thing’ and a tool for managerial manipulation still dominates industry 
perceptions, fuelling the continuing, widespread belief that culture is installed top-down.
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The financial crisis which began to unfold in 2008 has been estimated to have 
resulted in losses of $4.3 trillion dollars to global financial institutions (Castells et al. 
2012). The crisis transpired from the proliferation of securitised assets, which were 
often mis-sold as triple-A rated investments to investors around the world giving the 
illusion that the risks had been eliminated (Castells et al. 2012; Roubini and Mihm 
2011). The crisis resulted in the collapse of a number of large global banking 
institutions and brought about the worst recession in eighty years (Economist 2013). 
Since the financial crisis, the industry has been involved in a number of high-profile 
scandals, including LIBOR rigging and Forex. The banking industry has paid out 
fines totalling £197 billion, including fines for mis-selling (Castells et al. 2012). It is 
claimed that widespread wrongdoing and potential corruption within the banking 
sector played a significant role in the demise of the global financial markets, which 
many have come to describe as banking culture (Moore 2012, 2013; Peston 2013; 
Salz 2013; CIPD 2013; Treanor 2014a; Tadeo 2014; Ho 2009). The term culture 
has been used a lot but with little contemplation of what it means and how it is 
constructed, maintained disseminated, understood, rethought or refused. Banking 
culture has been blamed for much of the behaviours and conduct that led to the 
financial crisis (CIPD 2013; Salz 2013). In response, the industry has attempted to 
initiate cultural change programs to improve ethical behaviour, remedy the 
existence of toxic cultures and encourage employees to ‘do the right thing’ (Banking 
Standards Board 2016). 
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This thesis will provide a critical exploration of banking culture in the context of the 
financial crisis. Drawing on the writings of Foucault (1977; 1978; 1980), the thesis 
develops the concept of performance discourse which will be used to provide a 
framework that allows for an exploration of the complexity, ambiguity and 
contradictions that exist within organisational culture. Foucault’s work on power, 
discipline and discourse provide the foundations of analysis, which understands that 
the development of organisational culture occurs through competing power relations 
and discourses. The thesis will argue that using the concept of performance 
discourse allows us to move beyond the dualism of understanding organisational 
culture either as a thing or a metaphor, allowing instead for an exploration of how 
organisational culture is mutually constructed through the interaction of 
organisational members. 
 
1.2 Culture in Crisis 
 
The 2008 financial crisis firmly placed the spotlight on banking culture (Moore 2012, 
2013; Peston; 2013; Smith 2012; Kerr and Robinson 2012; Salz 2013), bringing the 
virtue of organisational cultures and their management back into question. 
Commentators (Moore 2012, 2013; Peston; 2013; Smith 2012; Kerr and Robinson 
2012; Salz 2013; Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; CIPD 2013) have suggested that 
causes for the crisis were at the ‘very heart of its culture’ (FT.com 2014) and that 
toxic and dysfunctional (Smith 2012; Moore 2012) cultures consume many of the 
large banking institutions. Additionally, research conducted by the Chartered 
Institute of Personnel & Development (CIPD) revealed that bad behaviour and 
bullying is prevalent within the banks. It was found that two-thirds of the participants 
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agreed that bad behaviour is rewarded (CIPD 2013; Moore 2012, 2013). 
Furthermore, an independent review into the Barclays’ Libor-rigging scandal 
indicated that ‘cultural shortcomings’ were to blame (Salz 2013: 6) going on to 
suggest that the inappropriate business practices of the bank were predominantly 
shaped by its culture. The review also claimed that Barclays possessed a strong 
culture of ‘winning’ to the detriment of clients and ethical business practices (Salz 
2013: 7). 
 
In the years following the crisis, banks have attempted to initiate cultural change 
programs to imbue the ‘right’ behaviours through the introduction of new mission 
statements or a new set of values (Banking Standards Board 2016). The banks have 
formulated new core values communicating integrity, sustainable performance, 
client centricity, innovation and discipline; outlining the importance of behaving 
morally within the industry. These can be found written on the walls of the banks’ 
lobbies or on posters and leaflets with the aim of reinforcing and reminding 
employees of these values and principles. In addition to these more explicit cultural 
communications, the organisations implement internal and external communication 
protocols that may act to ‘indirectly’ reinforce the organisations’ cultural principles 
through certain practices in the way employees interact with various stakeholders 
and organisational members. 
 
The industry has attempted to reduce the wrongdoing and misbehaviour that has 
led to accusations of cultural toxicity (Banking Standards Board 2016). Examples of 
such attempts include the launching of training academies in conjunction with 
university business schools to train employees on integrity, morality and ‘what is 
compliance’. Furthermore, in attempts to rebuild trust and demonstrate integrity and 
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ethical behaviour, a number of banking institutions have expanded their corporate 
social responsibility initiatives. These bank led changes have been underlined by 
regulatory policy, with an overhaul of regulations including the abolishment of the 
Financial Services Authority, which has been replaced by the Financial Conduct 
Authority under the Financial Services Act (2012). This change is supposed to 
demonstrate a fostering of a regulatory ‘culture of judgment, expertise and proactive 
supervision’ (HM Treasury 2012). 
 
1.3 Corporate Culture 
 
The mainstream perspectives on culture centre around the notion that an 
organisation’s culture is a definable entity (Chatman 1991; Chatman and Jehn 
1994), which can be measured, shaped and modified by management in order to 
produce the right values and beliefs (Hofstede et al. 1990; Reynolds 1986; Quinn 
and Spreitzer 1991; Calori and Sarnin 1991; Schein 2004; Rohrbaugh 1981; Cooke 
and Lafferty (1989). Organisational culture is seen to be created from the top and 
disseminated through the organisation by senior management, ‘cultural engineering’ 
(Jackson and Carter 2000: 27) attempts to reduce the range of possible behaviours 
bringing them in line with what management has sanctioned with the aim of 
establishing a ‘strong’ culture, which was proclaimed to be a panacea (Peters and 
Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982). ‘strong’ cultures are supposed to 
engender employees to espouse their leadership’s beliefs, assumptions and vision 
(Martin 2002). It is claimed that a ‘good’ culture can provide ‘meaning, direction and 
mobilisation' (Kilman 1985: 354), leading to suggestions that it is an organisational 
imperative to be managed and controlled; not to be left alone for risk of it becoming 
dysfunctional (Peters and Waterman 1982). 
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Under corporate culturism, culture has been portrayed as a 'tool, social glue, need 
satisfier or regulator of social relations’ (Alvesson 2002: 44). This has led to 
proclamations that ‘strong’ cultures are ‘good', however as Foucault (1988) claimed 
few issues can be attributed the labels of good or bad, functional or dysfunctional. 
In the first instance strong cultures may sound positive, however, under closer 
analysis, they may lead to omnipotence, reluctance for reflection and 
imperviousness to criticism (Brown and Starkey 2000). Additionally, proponents of 
corporate cultures suggest that  'the strength of a culture influences the intensity of 
behaviour’ and a culture’s strength is determined by 'how many…how widely…[and] 
how clearly' important assumptions are shared (Sathe 1985: 236). Such 
proclamations then suggest that 'strong' cultures emerge through homogeneity, 
however, the critical literature on the topic would suggest otherwise, leading to 
suggestions that organisational culture has been oversimplified (Martin 2002) and 
reduced to a matter of organisational efficiency and competitive advantage and is 
deprived of any ‘analytical and interpretive capacity'  (Alvesson 2002: 49). 
 
Furthermore, the descriptions that are communicated of an organisation’s culture is 
often the ideas and visions described and prescribed by management (Alvesson 
1987; Westley and Jaeger 1985). Investigations of organisational culture are often 
carried out by interviews with top management, reducing culture to managerial 
ideology thus neglecting the complexity and variety of cultural descriptions and 
understandings that exist within an organisation. Managerial ideology and 
organisational culture are not synonymous, ideology lacks the depth and complexity 
that culture possesses, thus omitting the 'discrepancies between the top 
management and other groups' (Alvesson 2002: 46; Silver 1987; Soeters 1986; 
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Parker 2000; Bunting 2004). This means that the majority of research conducted in 
this field is founded upon a limited set of meanings, values, symbols and rituals. 
Such a narrow view of organisational culture detracts from the prospect of 
developing an in-depth analysis of culture. Saffold (1988) points out that 'strong' 
culture studies place emphasis on a single culture even though it should be 
acknowledged that multiple subcultures exist.  
 
Academics dismissed ’strong’ culture studies as managerialist and ideological (Grey 
2009), suggesting that corporate culturism was merely a short-lived management 
fad that would pass (Kunda 1992). The academic literature contended that culture 
management and its proclaimed benefits were unfounded and were an 
oversimplification of a complex phenomenon (Alvesson 2002; Barley and Kunda 
1992; Smircich and Morgan 1982; Martin 2002; Child 1988; Willmott 1993). Given 
that culture continues to be used in relation to the banking sector, it can be argued 
that there is value in revisiting the topic in a more textured and layered way. In order 
to do so, the writings of Foucault (1977; 1978; 1980) on the areas of power, 
discipline, resistance and discourse are utilised to explore the complexity, ambiguity 
and contradictions that exist within organisational culture. This helped to develop a 
context in which organisational culture management can be deconstructed, 
delayered and analysed from a critical perspective. In turn, this allowed for the 
exploration of taken for granted assumptions and normative frameworks that 
organisations attempt to instil. 
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1.4 Revisiting Culture with a Foucauldian Lens 
 
Foucault’s work allows for an exploration of the intricacies and shortcomings of the 
dominant perspectives within the industry of organisational culture helping to move 
beyond the established dualism that an organisation ‘is’ or ‘has’ a culture. Through 
a Foucauldian lens, this thesis will be attempting to analyse how the component 
parts of the industry relating to the managerially led cultural communications and 
the established industry imperatives of profit and competition are all contributory 
components in the construction of banking cultures. With the aim of developing a 
more nuanced perspective of banking culture, one that contributes to the existing 
critical literature on organisational culture.  
 
Foucault’s (1977) work can take this understanding of organisational culture further 
through the acknowledgement that culture management consists of more than just 
a unilateral imposition of power. Foucault postulates that power is not a perennial 
possession nor is it exclusively oppressive but instead it can be productive as 
employees are active members in the process of shaping themselves and others 
through social interaction; they possess the power to resist and rethink (Goffman 
1961; Kunda 1992; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; Ogbonna and Harris 1998; 
Alvesson et al. 2008). Therefore Foucault proposes a bottom-up model of power 
which concentrates on power’s permeation of all facets of society, its mundane 
presence, how it is enacted and contested every day. Under this understanding, 
power is no longer viewed as a possession. Power circulates non-discriminately 
through a web or network (Foucault 1980). Therefore any analysis must take into 
account competing power relations that exist within and upon banking institutions 
from individuals within the institutions, as well as individuals and groups outside of 
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it (Mills 2003). Under this understanding power relations have been levelled, 
allowing individuals to be viewed as active subjects who negotiate their relations 
with others and with institutions (Mills 2003; Schirato et al. 2012). 
 
In Discipline and Punish (1977) Foucault illustrates how the wielding of power has 
progressed to a more economic and cost-effective mass scale, through a migration 
of disciplinary power from sovereignty to panopticism. The inception of this kind of 
power is important as it symbolises the diffusion of power where control is observed 
not through confinement but through instant communication, continual training and 
monitoring (Nealon 2008). This employment of disciplinary power moulds 
individuals through regimes of training and surveillance. Disciplinary power is 
concerned with manifestations of power that are directed at control over the 
individual but a form of control that emanates internally, although the control 
emerges internally it is propagated by external mechanisms, which can form part of 
a discourse. 
 
A Foucauldian understanding of discourse moves past discourse as merely 
involving speech or writing, it focuses on the signification that these different forms 
of communication represent. On the face of it, one may come to the conclusion that 
such sentiments relate closely to the notion of ideology, where imbalances in power 
are masked through normalisation resulting in a ‘false consciousness’ (Schirato et 
al 2012: 34). Although the two are similar, ideology is concerned with inducing 
distortions so as to hide the ‘true state of things’, thus suggesting that ideology aims 
to mask an objective truth. Discourse, on the other hand, aims to analyse why we 
have arrived at the conclusion that something is true or that something is false, thus 
the exploration of the production of truths is at the heart of Foucault’s theory of 
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discourse (Foucault 1980; Schirato et al 2012), the difference is subtle but important 
nonetheless. Discourses are a complex set of practices that are sustained through 
the displacement of other practices through creating distinctions. The circulation of 
particular discourses are not constant but contestable and ever changing. 
Discourses can produce and oppose power relations, as well as conceal and reveal 
power (Foucault 1977). Discourses do not simply interpret the realities of existence, 
they provide the structure for the perceptions of reality, thus they can be perceived 
as a mechanism for regulating perceptions. Foucault (1978) outlines that discourses 
are produced through a prohibition of the proliferation of certain topics. The second 
being the distinction between the mad and the sane: the voice of those determined 
to be insane are disregarded and effectively silenced. Finally the division between 
true and false: created through the perception that experts and those with authority 
speak the truth.  
 
Foucault (1972; 1979) stresses we must not assume truths to be self-evident as 
practices and institutions such as universities, governments, corporations, media 
outlets and scientific bodies act to exclude statements that they do not sanction to 
be true. Therefore it is possible that truths could be spoken but without a platform 
for them to be heard (Foucault 1972; Mills 2003)– ‘our statements will only be judged 
to be true if they accord with…all of the other statements which are authorised within 
our society’ (Foucault 1972: 224). Often discourses are formulated and reinforced 
not on the knowledge that is circulated but often the knowledge that is excluded, as 
it may challenge the status quo. 
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When this is applied as a framework for interpreting organisational cultures and the 
discourses that flow through them, we are given a depth that is not accounted for 
within mainstream perspectives of the topic. Through applying a Foucauldian lens 
to organisational cultures, it has allowed us to explore the interrelated complexity of 
the construction, reconstruction and resistance of organisational culture within the 
banking industry. This coupled with Foucault’s work on power allowed for the 
exploration of how the component parts of the industry are all contributory factors in 
the construction of banking cultures. Through each claim to power or resistance to 
its imposition, discourses are developed which can lead to the construction of 
banking cultures through the productivity of power relations. Through the application 
of Foucault’s work a discourse of performance was developed to make sense of the 
empirical data; performance discourse emerges through established normative 
frameworks that exist within the industry, which centre around industry imperatives, 
resulting in the normalisation of certain forms of behaviour and conduct causing 
them to become natural and taken for granted (Candrian 2013) leading to the 
construction of a more capillary and mutually constructed banking culture. 
 
This section discussed the opportunity for revisiting organisational culture from a 
critical perspective, outlining the importance of engaging on a deeper level with 
organisational culture and the need to move beyond mainstream managerialist 
perspectives. This section proposed that a critical framework of analysis utilising 
Foucault’s theories of power and discourse as a context in which to delayer the 
complexities of organisational culture and contribute a perspective that 
encompasses a critical viewpoint. This section provided a general discussion of 
Foucault’s work on power and discourse that will be applied throughout this thesis. 
The concept of discourse provides a device for analysing the artefacts and rituals of 
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organisational culture, as discourses engage with more than just speech or writing 
but moves beyond ideology as a managerial tool as it does not assume the 
existence of an objective truth. Additionally, discourses can be seen as a 
mechanism for regulating perceptions, this relates to critical perspectives on culture 
such as Willmott’s (1993: 526) discussion of ‘reality control’ through ‘doublethink’. 
In addition to this, power is not viewed as something that is imposed top-down but 
is something that is constructed bottom-up, therefore organisational culture and 
attempts to manage it are viewed as a power relation between various 
organisational groups. Power can provide the provision for acknowledging the 
inherence of conflict and resistance within organisational culture. Furthermore, it 
accommodates and advances beyond the notion that organisational members are 
compliant automatons, subject to the will of management (Mills 2003). 
 
1.5 Enterprise Discourse Intensified 
 
To analyse the data, the concept of performance discourse was developed, drawing 
on some of the attributes of enterprise discourse which essentially aims to develop 
employees into self-regulating, productive individuals, ’who display initiative whilst 
embracing customer service, empowerment, flexibility, quality and teamwork’ 
(McCabe 2009: 1552; Russell and McCabe 2015). It is suggested that these 
discourses induce an identification with the goals and objectives of an organisation 
(Mangan 2009). Russell and McCabe (2015; Barratt, 2003) contend that the 2008 
global financial crisis’s roots can be traced back to the virtues of enterprise 
discourses that were introduced through deregulation and the promotion of 
neoliberal economics that was established during 1979 election of a Conservative 
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government. The embeddedness of enterprise discourses within the industry and 
its intensification (Nealon 2008) led to the discovery of performance discourse. 
 
This thesis argues that performance discourse relates to enterprise discourse 
(Barratt, 2003; McCabe 2016) in the way that it attempts to normalise behaviours of 
self-promotion and short-termism (McCabe 2009; Tempest et al. 2004). It also 
develops employees into self-regulating, productive individuals in the endeavour to 
produce responsible subjects (McCabe 2009: 1552; Russell and McCabe 2015) 
who identify with the goals and objectives of their organisation (Mangan 2009). 
Furthermore, the enterprise and performance discourses both require self-
regulation and adherence but without the promise of a long-term secure career. 
They can be ambiguous and sometimes contradictory; introducing the notion of the 
individual while simultaneously encouraging teamwork and cohesiveness (McCabe 
2009). Moreover, within the banking industry, the requirement of constant 
performance and the evocation of competition undermines the industry’s attempt to 
instil strong cohesive cultures. The thesis will show how discourses of enterprise 
continue to be perpetuated throughout the industry but have intensified (Nealon 
2008) the individual performance aspects of the discourse, thus developing what 
this thesis has termed performance discourse. 
 
1.6 Research Objectives 
 
The academic debate around organisational culture has moved on but as evidenced 
by the above discussion, managerial practices around culture management are still 
very prominent, meaning there is still cause for critical research to be conducted in 
this area. Through applying a Foucauldian lens to the analysis of organisational 
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culture there is renewed potential in the field to explore the intricacies of 
organisational cultures. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to revisit the topic of organisational culture to 
provide a critical exploration of banking culture within the context of the post-crisis 
aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. The financial crisis provides a 
contextually rich environment to examine the field, as culture has become central 
within the contentions surrounding the contributory causes leading up to the crisis, 
with the proposed investigation by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) into banks’ 
cultures and calls for a ‘cultural Big Bang’ (Economist 2016). Furthermore, the 
research aims to be the first critical exploration of this area within this context, 
utilising the work of Foucault in its analysis to contribute new avenues of exploration 
in culture management. The utilisation of Foucault’s (1977; 1980; 1990) work to 
facilitate the development of an analytical framework will aid in delayering the 
complexities of organisational culture and move beyond the confines of managerial 
orthodoxy in the area. It will also provide a more contextually and critically rich 
analysis, that is not reduced to the culture as a metaphor or culture as a thing 
dualism. This thesis will analyse the post-crisis cultural communications that draws 
upon the data from participants in the industry’s attempts at culture management, 
as well as how employees respond to these cultural communications. Additionally, 
the thesis will explore the contributory factors that led up to the crisis and the lived 
experiences of industry members to gain an insight of the normative behaviours and 
conducts that were prevalent within the industry pre and post crisis in order to 
understand how these factors played a part in the construction of the banking 
cultures. 
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The following research questions have been developed from the above objectives: 
 
• How has the banking industry attempted to manage organisational culture post-
crisis and how have employees engaged with these changes? 
 
• How does the application of the theoretical themes of power and discourse 
contribute to a critical examination of organisational culture? 
 
• What role do competing power relations play in the construction of cultural 
discourses? 
 
• How do normative behaviours and conduct contribute to the development of 
organisational culture? 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
 
This section will be outlining the main themes of this thesis on a chapter by chapter 
basis, beginning with the literature review, followed by the methodology chapter, 
context chapter, data chapters, analysis and conclusions. 
 
1.7.1 Culture, Culture and More Culture 
 
This literature review chapter will begin with an exploration of the context in which 
cultural engineering emerged during the 1980s. Discussing the socio-economic 
environment that ensured that corporate cultural engineering became a prominent 
tool amongst managers. This is important to discuss as it highlights how 
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organisational culture was positioned as a method for management that would 
facilitate economic and moral recovery by providing ‘meaning as well as money’ 
(Peters and Waterman 1982: 323). 
 
The chapter will also review the literature surrounding organisational culture 
management, beginning with an exploration and critique of mainstream 
perspectives, outlining the attributes of the ‘has’ perspective (Smircich 1983). This 
perspective understands culture to be an entity that can be shaped and modified by 
management in order to produce the right values and beliefs, controlling conduct 
and behaviours. Under this perspective, culture is created at the top by management 
and communicated down through the organisation, with the ultimate aim being to 
create a ‘strong’ culture where employees would share their leader's beliefs, 
assumptions and vision (Martin 2002). The chapter will critique such functionalist 
perspectives as they fail to acknowledge the existence of any resistance or dissent 
within the organisation of their disseminated ideology (Kenny et al. 2011). 
 
More critical perspectives will also be explored, which draw upon the idea that an 
organisation ‘is’ (Smircich 1983) a culture. This perspective asserts that culture is 
an ongoing social construction (Burrell and Morgan 1979); a set of common 
characteristics,  which are in a constant state of flux, eliminating totalising 
articulations of culture and preventing prescriptions. These critical themes inform 
the understanding of organisational culture adopted by this thesis, potentially 
moving towards a more holistic perspective of culture. 
 
The themes discussed within this chapter justify the need for the timely revisiting of 
organisational culture, additionally the banking industry’s continued preoccupation 
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with culture provides the opportunity for a renewed academic focus on the topic in 
order to explore how the field has evolved. The chapter discusses the work of 
Foucault as a method of re-examining organisational culture with a critical lens. This 
chapter includes a discussion of Foucault’s (1977) work on power and discourse 
that will be applied throughout this thesis. Discourses provide a device for analysing 
the artefacts and rituals of organisational culture, as discourses engage with more 
than just speech or writing and they move past ideology as a managerial tool 
because they do not assume the existence of an objective truth. Additionally, 
discourses can be seen as a mechanism for regulating perceptions. Furthermore, 
power from this perspective is not something that is imposed top-down but is 
constructed  bottom-up, therefore attempts to manage culture are viewed as a 
power relation between various groups, thus acknowledging the inherence of 
conflict and resistance within organisational culture. 
 
1.7.2 The Contextual Backdrop of Banking Culture 
 
This background chapter combines a number of different sections to provide a 
contextual mapping of the landscape of banking culture. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the 1986 deregulation of the financial services industry operating in 
the City of London, outlining the changes the industry underwent during this period: 
culturally, socially, economically, technologically, from a regulatory and structural 
standpoint. Existing commentaries of the financial crisis are confined to the 
immediate years preceding the crisis, however, through an exploration of the history 
of the industry, it can be suggested that the conduct, behaviours and cultures 
progressively developed over decades becoming ingrained within the industry 
culminating in the 2008 crisis. The acknowledgement of the existence of a plurality 
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of events can aid in our understanding of the crisis and how the history of the 
industry may compliment or conflict with current dominant narratives of the crisis. 
Through a Foucauldian lens, history is not a fixed entity but is in a state of ongoing 
construction and reconstruction meaning that multiple contradictory histories may 
exist, which may facilitate the interests of subsequent eras. Thus a Foucauldian 
understanding of history accommodates the existence of a plurality of events that 
can both complement and conflict with one another (Schirato et al 2012: 3): history 
is in a state of ongoing construction and reconstruction, facilitating the existence of 
multiple overlapping and contesting histories. 
 
The chapter also contains an outline of the contemporary events and circumstances 
in the years leading up to the financial crisis, exploring the range of financial 
products that have often been attributed with being a key element in bringing about 
the crisis. As well as looking at how governments and other organisations have been 
implicated in the crisis,  the chapter also includes a brief discussion of how the UK 
government and regulatory bodies attempted to deal with the crisis in the immediate 
aftermath. This chapter will discuss the research and reports conducted on banking 
culture, outlining and critiquing the findings and recommendations made by the 
researchers. The current research in this area is largely informed by a positivist 
perspective, viewing organisational culture as a definable entity that can be 
manipulated by management. Additionally, these types of research and reports take 
managerial orthodoxy as fact. It is important to acknowledge and discuss such 
research as it highlights the gap in the existing field for critical research into banking 
culture in the context of the financial crisis, which this thesis aims to make a 
contribution towards. 
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1.7.3 Methodology  
 
This chapter outlines the philosophical positions considered for this thesis, 
beginning with a discussion of the positivist tradition and its implications for social 
research. The chapter will then discuss the interpretive and critical perspectives that 
inform this research. These perspectives understand organisational culture to be an 
ongoing social construction rather than a social fact (Smircich 1983; Saunders et al. 
2009). This means that identities, groups, cultures and ideologies are in a 
permanent state of flux, and are not static observable objects (Kelemen and 
Rumens 2008; Saunders et al. 2009). Therefore it is possible that individuals hold 
different interpretations from one another based on their own worldview, thus 
facilitating the opportunity for multiple organisational definitions to exist (Kelemen 
and Rumens 2008; Denscombe 2007). The indeterminacy of the social world is 
acknowledged by understanding that people are not passively compliant to 
normative frameworks but are creative agents bringing order to their own existence 
(Denscombe 2007; Silverman 2013). Therefore these perspectives highlight the 
fluidity of organisational reality and acknowledge the inherence of ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of the social world. 
 
The chapter provides the rationale for the philosophical and theoretical choices 
made in this thesis, making considerations regarding knowledge, truth and the 
existence of external realities. This will be done by drawing upon the work of 
Foucault (1980) and, in particular, regimes of truth and the production of knowledge. 
This chapter also includes a discussion of the research approach of case studies 
that was used for this research, as it allows for the exploration of why certain 
outcomes transpire rather than just exploring what the outcomes are. Additionally, 
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case studies appreciate the interconnectedness of relationships and processes, 
facilitating the discovery how the many parts of the organisation, the wider industry 
and external pressures affect one another (Denscombe 2007; Saunders et al. 
2009). This will be followed by a discussion of interviews. As the primary data 
collection method, interviews provide the opportunity to uncover new clues and 
reveal new dimensions of a problem. The chapter will close with a reflection of my 
data collection and my developmental journey as a researcher during this period. 
 
1.7.4 Elements of Culture 
 
This chapter will be the first of two data chapters presenting data gathered from 
interviews with participants from various banking and investment institutions. The 
chapter will begin by discussing what methods the industry employs to communicate 
its values and beliefs to employees. The industry attempts to lead culture by setting 
the ‘tone from the top’, through the implementation of mission statements and core 
principles. These are continually communicated via paraphernalia, events and 
training, with the aim of reinforcing these management prescribed values and 
principles. The industry adopts a perspective of organisational culture which draws 
upon the cultural engineering texts of the 1980s in order to develop a ‘strong culture’. 
These approaches overlook the ambiguity and contestation that exists within 
cultural interpretations, which lead to a multiplicity of competing and contradicting 
interpretations. These interpretations are based on inferences from day-to-day 
conduct and behaviours of organisational actors. The industry consists of norms 
and rituals that could be described as dysfunctional or toxic, therefore the industry 
has introduced cultural change initiatives to reduce wrongdoing/misbehaviour and 
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promote cohesiveness and ethical behaviour in the hope of encouraging employees 
to ‘do the right thing’. 
 
1.7.5 Emerging Cultures  
 
This chapter begins with an examination of the cultures that exist within the banking 
industry, moving beyond managerially defined ‘strong cultures’ by investigating the 
cultures that emerge through the mutual interaction of organisational members that 
are informed by their interpretations of the artefacts, rituals and discourses 
presented to them. Money and profits are central to the industry, especially during 
the years preceding the crisis when due diligence and robust risk analysis were 
relaxed, favouring the pursuit of short-term revenue production. This meant that 
regulatory boundaries were stretched and loopholes exploited in order to sustain 
profits. The industry’s need for profits arises in part from the pressures applied by 
external groups. The application of external pressure can be seen to be part of an 
enactment of power (Foucault 1980) by competing groups such as governments, 
regulators, investors and the public. Building upon the discussion in chapter four, a 
complex web of competing interests and power relations is developed, contributing 
to the development of banking cultures and discourses. Elitism is an important 
theme which is founded on prestige, smartness and competition. The industry 
cultivates a culture of elites, formed on the normative attributes of smartness, 
ambition and hard work. The culture of elites is underpinned by what this thesis 
terms performance discourses, which is established through normative frameworks 
and the historicism of the industry, referred to in chapter four. 
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1.7.6 Culture is Still a ‘Thing’ 
 
This chapter will be the analysis of data gathered from participants’ interviews, 
drawing upon the literature discussed in chapter two and four, informed by the 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives explored in chapter three and focusing 
on discussions around power/knowledge and discursive regimes (Foucault 1977; 
1980; 1990). The chapter will begin with a discussion of the development of 
discourses of performance, which is established upon meritocracy and enterprise. 
These discourses lead individuals to believe they are the ‘smartest people in the 
world’ and that they possess a rare blend of intellect, ambition and ‘hard work’. 
 
The concept of discourses of performance, which is defined and developed in detail 
in the analysis chapter, builds on the foundations of enterprise discourse (Du Gay 
1996; McCabe 2008; 2009; Mangan 2009). The chapter will analyse the contributory 
elements of performance discourse, which is grounded in the cultural artefacts and 
rituals of the industry supported by the data discussed in chapter five and six. This 
will be followed by an analysis of post-crisis cultural discourses, drawing upon 
participants’ accounts of the industry’s attempts at culture management within a 
post-crisis context. This discussion will centre around cultural rituals and artefacts 
that are prevalent within the banking industry. The perpetuation of performance 
discourses results in the existence of tension and conflict between the post-crisis 
cultural discourses and the imperatives of performance discourses. The chapter will 
close with a discussion of how the industry continues to view organisational culture 
and its management in a prescriptive manner and the effect this has on the industry. 
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1.7.7 Conclusions  
 
The banking industry has been troubled with a number of issues following the 2008 
financial crisis and this has shifted the focus to culture. The industry has attempted 
to initiate cultural change programs to ensure ethical conduct and address claims of 
the existence of toxic cultures. However, the cultural climate of the industry post-
crisis continues to be influenced by the cultural management texts of the 1980’s. 
The notion that culture is a thing and a tool for managerial manipulation still 
dominates industry perceptions, therefore culture continues to be viewed as 
something that is introduced top-down. It could be argued that the industry is in need 
of a more textured and layered understanding of culture, one which understands 
that organisational culture develops organically through the mutual interaction of 
organisational actors, which in turn develops the organisation's cultural artefacts 
and rituals, which are then enacted and reinforced over time. 
 
This chapter will bring the thesis to a close by summarising the key themes that 
were discussed throughout this thesis. This being the first critical exploration of 
banking culture in the context of the financial crisis, the work of Foucault (1977; 
1980; 1990) has been utilised as a framework in which to decipher the complexities 
of organisational culture, through Foucault’s work on power, discipline and 
resistance. This chapter will explain how power relations within the industry have 
played a contributory role in the construction of performance discourses. Explaining 
that the 1986 ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the City of London led to the proliferation of 
enterprise discourses (McCabe 2009), which has evolved and become intensified 
(Nealon 2008) leading to the development of performance discourses, which 
contributes to the ongoing construction of the industry’s culture. The development 
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of the concept of performance discourse to analyse the industry forms a key 
contribution of this thesis. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review: Culture, Culture and More Culture 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is perceived that academic debate has become more interested in discussions 
surrounding organisational identity (Kenny et al. 2011). However, practitioners and 
industry ‘experts’ continue to market the virtues of strong culture management, 
painting it as a ‘managerial panacea’ (Brewis and Jack 2009: 234) that may resolve 
the shortcomings that have troubled the banking industry (Salz 2013; CIPD 2013). 
The following chapter aims to critique mainstream perspectives of culture 
management and provide an outline of a more holistic perspective of culture 
management through an exploration of the critical culture literature. 
 
These themes will be discussed in more detail beginning with an exploration of the 
context in which culture management emerged and became one of the dominant 
instruments of management. The chapter will then map the terrain of organisational 
culture starting with an exploration of the mainstream perspectives through a 
discussion of the influential texts in this area providing a critical analysis of these 
mainstream perspectives, moving on to a discussion of the critical perspectives on 
culture management. An extended exploration of the mainstream literature and 
critical discussions of organisational culture will establish the key themes that will 
inform this thesis, providing the rationale for why it is important to move beyond 
functionalist mainstream perspectives, developing a more critical perspective, one 
which takes into account the mutual social participation of actors that occurs in the 
construction of cultures.  
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The chapter will include a brief discussion of the purported revolutionary aspects of 
culture management. Finally, the chapter will close with a review of the literature 
regarding enterprise discourses. This is an important topic to explore in the context 
of this thesis as the development of enterprise discourses and enterprising subjects 
are subject to the forces of organisational culture (Kenny et al. 2011). Additionally, 
enterprise discourses inform much of the behaviour and conduct that became 
prevalent and intensified within the banking industry, much of which have been 
labelled as ‘banking culture’. 
 
2.2 Manage Culture? No Problem 
 
This section will be a review of the literature surrounding organisational culture 
management, beginning with an exploration and critique of mainstream 
perspectives. The section will outline the attributes of the often referred to ‘has’ 
perspective of culture (Smircich 1983), it will also discuss some of the contentions 
and contradictions that exist within this perspective. It is important to gain an 
understanding of these perspectives as it builds upon the context of managerial 
approaches to organisational culture upon which this thesis aims to critique and 
move beyond. The remainder of the chapter will develop upon the preceding critique 
of mainstream perspectives in order to outline a more critical perspective of culture 
management, one which views culture as a social construction (Burrell and Morgan 
1979) and in an ongoing state of development through the mutual participation of 
organisational members. 
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Mainstream perspectives on culture are encapsulated by the notion that 
organisational culture is a thing that is stable and is definable (Chatman 1991; 
Chatman and Jehn 1994). Under this understanding, organisational culture can be 
measured (Hofstede et al. 1990; Reynolds 1986; Quinn and Spreitzer 1991; Calori 
and Sarnin 1991) and in turn shaped, modified and changed (Schein 2004) by 
management in order to produce the right values and beliefs. Cooke and Lafferty 
(1989: 1299) suggest that cultural norms can ‘influence the thinking and behaviour 
of organizational members, their motivation and performance’. Corporate culture is 
seen to increase commitment, stability and flexibility of employees (Rohrbaugh 
1981; Chatman and Jehn 1994), ultimately leading to improved organisational 
performance and efficiency (Reynolds 1986; Schein 2004; Cameron and Quinn 
2011). This understanding of culture is seen to be created from the top and 
disseminated through the organisation by senior management. This ‘cultural 
engineering’ (Jackson and Carter  2000: 27) aims to reduce the range of behaviours 
and conduct within the organisation to align with those that management has 
espoused. 
 
One of the most prominent of these mainstream managerial texts was ‘In Search Of 
Excellence: Lessons From America’s Best-Run Companies' by Peters and 
Waterman (1982). The book outlined their research and findings gathered from 
forty-three U.S Fortune 500 companies, concluding that 'strong cultures’ cause 
success, weak ones failure. Therefore suggesting that employers must control their 
cultures in the pursuit of increasing productivity, employee involvement and 
commitment. Peters and Waterman’s (1982) book, along with Deal and Kennedy’s 
(1982), were the catalysts in stimulating the managerial preoccupation with 
organisation culture (Stanford 2010). Employers were told that if they controlled the 
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culture successfully then they would reap the rewards of higher productivity and 
employee involvement. Employees were led to believe that if they embraced the 
culture they were more likely to progress (Parker 2000). This is a sentiment also 
communicated in texts such as Ouchi’s ‘Theory Z’ (1981), where Ouchi suggested 
that in order for an organisation to succeed in the international marketplace and 
increase turnover, it needed to develop values that are passed on from generation 
to generation. If an individual wants to succeed they must internalise and espouse 
these values in every aspect of their working lives. 
 
These mainstream approaches to culture were packaged as products (Schein 2004; 
Martin 2002), something to be bought from management consultants and then 
incorporated into the organisation. This is alluded to in the much-repeated account 
of a chairman’s reaction to a talk on corporate culture delivered by Kennedy: ‘This 
corporate culture stuff is great’...then turning to his president, he demanded, ‘I want 
a culture by Monday.’ (Byrne 1990: 10-11). The selling of culture management 
techniques in itself became a lucrative business: Peters stated that culture 
consulting is ‘one of the more legalised ways of stealing’ (Sutcliffe 1993). The 
lucrativeness of corporate culturalism may be indicative of the reasons for its devout 
endorsement by its advocates. These practitioner texts have created likeable 
stories, that are easy to remember, containing quotable sound bites and memorable 
characters, like the ‘happy Japanese worker, the dry number crunching MBA 
graduate, the gritty American entrepreneur’ (Parker 2000:16). The authors of these 
texts have shrouded their work in hyperbole and abstraction to market their ideas 
and it can be argued that they have communicated their ideas in a way that is 
appealing and sellable. 
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During the cultural management movement of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
development and maintenance of a strong organisational culture was depicted as a 
central component to an organisation’s success (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal 
and Kennedy 1982) as mainstream texts associated strong cultures with excellent 
performance (Hofstede 1980). The proposition that organisational culture is a 
variable that can be managed meant that organisations were led to believe that they 
could develop a ‘strong’ culture where employees would share their leader's beliefs, 
assumptions and vision (Martin 2002). Advocates of the strong culture approach 
asserted that cultural homogeneity was key, where employees share a set of 
consistent values, developing a ‘way of doing things’ that is formulated into ‘creed 
or mission statements’ (Kotter and Heskett 1992: 15) and communicated throughout 
the organisation via training (Deal and Kennedy 1982). This is then reinforced by 
rituals which would ‘symbolize [the] culture’ and make employees ‘feel like they 
belong to an exclusive club’ (Kotter and Heskett 1992: 16). This functionalist 
approach promised companies increased commitment, productivity and profitability 
(Wiener 1988; Parker 2000; Grey 2009; Kilmann 1985; Du Gay 1996) as strong 
cultures were attributed with the ability to ‘create an unusual level of motivation in 
employees’ (Kotter and Heskett 1992: 16). 
 
The idea of creating a homogenous strong culture or finding the ‘best’ culture was 
criticised and regarded as ‘superficial’ (Schein 2004: 8; Dietz et al. 2004). Criticism 
of the strong culture perspective of organisational culture centred around how strong 
cultures may lead an organisation in the wrong direction, as they can contain 
dysfunctional elements (Kilmann et al. 1985; Boyatzis 1982). An example of this can 
be seen from the collapse of Enron (Sims and Brinkmann 2003).  Furthermore Kotter 
and Heskett (1992: 21) conducted some research to test the validity of the claims 
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made by advocates of strong cultures, concluding that ‘the statement “strong 
cultures create excellent performance” appears to be just plain wrong’, stating that 
it is possible that an organisation can have a ‘strong culture and poor performance 
or a weak culture and excellent performance’. 
 
Another approach to culture management is the contingency approach, which 
departs from the 'one best way’ approach in favour of a 'best fit' contingency 
approach, as it was held that organisations vary tremendously in terms of operating 
scale, ownership, industry and location (Handy 1985). Handy (1985) argues that 
what works successfully within one organisation is not necessarily going to be 
successful in another and management must attempt to select cultural attributes 
that are contingent on their situation or objectives. This approach to organisational 
culture associates performance with strategically and contextually appropriate 
culture (Gordon 1986), however, advocates of the contingency perspective do not 
clearly define what constitutes a ‘best fit’. Additionally, this approach assumes 
consistency amongst interpretations of various typologies of culture (Martin 2002), 
as well as continuing to assume that culture can be changed and led from the top-
down (Knights and McCabe 1997). 
 
A third perspective within the cultural management literature is one which focuses 
on adaptive cultures, where it is perceived that cultures that adapt in anticipation to 
environmental change can provide long-term performance. Kilmann (1985: 356) 
describes an adaptive culture as one which ‘entails risk-taking, trusting, and 
proactive approach to organisational as well as individual life’. However, such 
perspectives seem to view any endeavour towards organisational change as 
desirable, which could result in the initiation of excessive change or attempts to 
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change the wrong aspects of an organisation. However, Kotter (1990) argues that 
this is resolved when organisations focus on their constituencies, such as 
customers, shareholders and employees, suggesting that the relevant adaptation 
occurs through serving the needs of these interested parties.  
 
From these perspectives Kotter and Heskett (1992: 58-59) propose a model that 
combines aspects of all three perspectives, arguing that it is ‘more powerful than 
any of them separately’. They suggest that an organisation’s long-term performance 
will be enhanced if:  
 
‘managers care deeply about their customers, their stockholders, and their 
employees, as well as their leadership…With this value system, managers 
will pay close attention to their constituencies and then create and implement 
strategies that are sensible in light of constituency needs. Satisfied 
employees will be directed and encouraged to produce products (and 
services) that customers really want, and to do so using financial assets 
wisely’ (Kotter and Heskett 1992: 59).  
 
Kotter and Heskett (1992) are suggesting that if managers ‘care strongly’ about the 
various stakeholders of the organisation then this will develop a culture that can 
become ‘strong’ and contextually relevant to the organisation’s situation based on 
the needs of its stakeholders, as well as adapt to a changing environment. They 
propose that this is achieved through leadership which enacts behavioural norms 
that support the direction of desired change, creating ‘strategies and practices that 
maintain a good fit’.  
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Kotter and Heskett (1992) also suggest that management should train and promote 
individuals who behave in a similar way and share management’s core values. They 
propose that senior leadership at the very top of an organisation is an essential 
component in cultural change, they argue that cultural change cannot be a bottom-
up process due to the requirement of ‘great power’, which ‘only resides at the top’ 
of an organisation (ibid: 92). This introduces a contention that needs to be explored 
further, as a Foucauldian perspective on power that this thesis adopts, views power 
as neither static or a possession. Power is not totalising but is more fluid (Foucault 
1977), something that can permeate the entire organisation. It can be enacted by 
employees, middle management as well as leadership ‘at the very top’. Additionally, 
questions arise around whether such a balanced focus of constituents can be 
achieved by an organisation and its management, as well as how Kotter and 
Heskett’s (1992) cultural model and previous cultural perspectives have shaped the 
way culture management has been approached by the banking industry post-crisis. 
 
As mentioned earlier organisations may attempt to influence their culture through 
the espousal of shared values often described as ‘core values’ (Peters and 
Waterman 1982; Ouchi 1981; Hofstede et al. 1990; Kotter and Heskett 1992). These 
are understood to be common interpretations of underlying cultural manifestations 
(Schein 2004); they can be in the form of beliefs, assumptions or values (Martin 
2002). Such themes are used to reflect an image of the organisation upon both 
external and internal audiences (Hatch and Schultz 1997). However, it is suggested 
that deliberate attempts to change and manage an organisation's culture may, in 
fact, lead to organisational members interpreting the prescribed culture and 
behaving in ways that are contrary to senior management's intentions (Knights and 
McCabe 1997; 1998; Kunda 1992; Ogbonna and Harris 1998; Alvesson and 
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Willmott 2002). As employees may infer alternative interpretations deductively 
through their conduct, their day-to-day interactions and experiences, represent an 
alternative interpretation of organisational culture (Smircich 1983). Therefore it is 
possible that themes espoused by managers do not reflect the values and beliefs 
held by employees (Chreim 2006; Michel 2014; Knights and McCabe 1997) 
resulting in the potential for inconsistency and contradiction of espoused and 
inferred content themes (Martin 2002; Alvesson 2002), adding to the ambiguity and 
complexity of organisational culture.  
 
It is argued that organisations who engage with attempts to engineer their culture 
are intolerant of deviance from prescribed values and beliefs (Kunda 1992; 
Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; Willmott 1993): 'you either buy into their norms or 
you get out' (Peters and Waterman 1982: 77). The uncompromising stance of 
management may result in resigned behavioural compliance (Legge 1994) or 
instrumental compliance (Willmott 1993). Collinson (2003) describes such 
individuals as dramaturgists who have a more distant and cynical relationship with 
the organisation, where they project a self that does not necessarily represent the 
way they view themselves. However, this may induce individuals into a state of deep 
acting (Hochschild 1983), which over time can result in emotional dissonance 
(Abraham 1999) or self-alienation (Costas and Fleming 2009); blurring the actor’s 
distinction between the view they hold of themselves and their organisational 
character (Kunda 1992). These assertions may give weight to the notion of the total 
institution (Goffman 1961). This is a concept which seems relevant to contemporary 
organisations, where telecommunications has extended the realms of managerial 
influence beyond the workplace. 
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However, exponents of corporate culture would argue that they offer employees 
autonomy and emancipation from bureaucracy, not tyrannous control (Kunda 
1992).The importance of developing a sense of individuality and autonomy within 
mainstream cultural texts can be seen in Peter and Waterman's book (1982), where 
they stated ‘there was hardly a more pervasive theme in the excellent companies 
than the respect for the individual...These companies give people control over their 
destinies…' (cited in Willmott 1993: 526). However, others (Kunda 1992; Fleming 
and Stablein, 1999) suggest that corporate culture is a form of normative control, 
which can be described as a system of control that ‘works internally by engendering 
people with subjective attributes and dispositions, which are compatible with the 
maintenance of certain types of work organisation’ (Fleming and Stablein, 1999:3). 
Additionally, it can be argued that the bounds of an employee’s freedom are dictated 
to them by the organisation, thus organisations have redefined the meaning of 
autonomy (Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979; Willmott 1990; 1993). Willmott (1993: 
527; 1990) suggests that autonomy within corporate culturalism is reformulated and 
the bounds of employees freedom are dictated to them by the organisation, stating 
that ‘big corporations possess the resources with which to construct and market an 
entirely heteronomous meaning of autonomy’. This means that employees are told 
what autonomy is and anything outside the company’s definition of autonomy is 
regarded as deviance from the organisation’s culture (Braverman 1974; Edwards 
1979). By manufacturing and managing the espoused meaning of autonomy, 
organisations are able to extract high levels of commitment from employees, 
because human beings innately crave freedom and once this is attained, it can uplift 
and motivate an individual. It is this apparent desire for freedom that organisations 
acknowledge and cater for, imbuing a sense of gratitude from employees for 
facilitating autonomy. Therefore employees may feel that they owe a debt to the 
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company and have a responsibility to be committed (Brewis and Jack 2009), as they 
have the privilege of freedom in their job role. One of the ways they can repay this 
debt and show their commitment is through compliance with the values of the 
corporate culture and hard work. 
 
In addition to this reformulation of the meaning of autonomy, corporate culturalism 
can be seen to provide employees with a sacred canopy, which protects, stabilises, 
and gives meaning to their worldview (Berger 1967). A sacred canopy can provide 
individuals with common assumptions (Schein 2004) through a collective worldview 
or culture, giving order and meaning to life, sheltering them from the anxiety of 
possessing too much autonomy. Therefore corporate culturalism may provide 
individuals with structure and security from indeterminacy and ambivalence; the 
organisation deflects some of the responsibility from employees by supplying them 
with a set of core values and life goals, meaning employees no longer need to think 
for themselves. It is these aspects of cultural management that gave rise to the 
suggestion that corporate culturalism is concerned with winning the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of employees by ‘managing what they think and feel’ (Willmott 1993: 516). 
This aims to ‘create a highly valued sense of purpose’ which if executed correctly 
can have the effect of extracting extraordinary levels of effort from large numbers of 
‘ordinary’ employees (Peters and Waterman 1982: 51).   
 
It can be argued that the suppression of indeterminacy and ambivalence that 
corporate culturalism provides, it actually acts to emancipate employees by freeing 
them from the anxieties of responsibility. Although conversely, corporate cultures 
simultaneously encourage employees to recognise and take responsibility for the 
relationship between their job security and their contribution to the competitiveness 
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of the organisation (Willmott 1993). This proliferates the importance of meritocracy 
to the individual through the communication that career progression is contingent 
on performance, with the most efficient route to success being the espousal of 
organisational values and core beliefs. Du Gay (1996) suggests that the 
internalisation of these beliefs required employees to partake in intensive training 
and continuous learning. They are enrolled on a course of complex ‘social 
engineering’ where feelings of anxiety, shame and guilt are implanted within them 
so that they become self-disciplining (Foucault 1979) when they fail to meet the 
organisation’s objectives. Furthermore, although the onus for progression, 
development, learning and success is on the individual, a demonstration of a 
commitment to organisational objectives is necessary in order to ‘fit in’ and progress, 
even if this commitment is not reciprocated. 
 
In order to evoke these high levels of commitment, strong identification with the 
organisation is needed. Dutton et al. (1994) state that this can be achieved through 
membership of prestigious and distinctive organisations (Hatch and Schultz 1997; 
Ashforth and Mael 1989; Martin 2002). Hogg and Terry (2000) suggest that 
employees take pride in their organisation’s uniqueness and distinctiveness, 
causing individuals to incorporate this into their sense of self, and define themselves 
using the attributes of the organisation (Dutton et al. 1994; Ashforth et al. 2008; 
Ashforth and Mael 1989). These attributes may act to motivate the individual 
towards preserving the perceived prestige and distinctiveness of the organisation, 
thus causing them to engage in activities that promote the interests of the 
organisation and attempt to meet the organisation’s objectives (Van Maanen 2010; 
Dutton et al. 1994). If the individual fails to acknowledge the purported connection 
between their contribution and the organisation’s prestige and distinctiveness, then 
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management is on hand to clarify the causal link and where they fit within the 
organisation (Peters and Waterman 1982; Kunda 1992).  
 
However, some challenge these claims of uniqueness (Van Maanen and Barley 
1985), with Martin (1992) arguing that the attributes that cultural members often 
believe make their organisation’s culture unique are usually found in other 
organisations. This contradiction has been labelled the uniqueness paradox, where 
the use of stories and rituals are perceived to enhance an organisation’s 
uniqueness, but in fact, share common characteristics with other organisations. 
Furthermore, the values and principles that members of large organisations cite as 
evidence of their culture’s uniqueness, such as quality of services and customer 
focus are in fact commonplace amongst similar organisations (Siehl and Martin 
1988). The contentions surrounding an organisation’s perceived levels of 
distinctiveness and prestige, and their ability to imbue strong levels of identification 
and commitment need to be explored further to see whether there is any validity to 
such claims. 
 
It can be said that the conceptual foundations of culturalism contain some 
inconsistencies, however, inconsistencies aside, these texts allow their readers to 
‘symbolically participate in easy excellence’ (Conrad 1985: 428). The texts often 
omit any comprehensive discussions pertaining to the contentious practicalities 
involved in managing or changing culture. It seems then that the paradoxical content 
of these books is irrelevant, as they adequately, in the eyes of management at least, 
substantiate the premise that they can save you money, resolve problems and make 
you and your employees happier. 
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This section provided an overview of the literature and perspectives that occupy 
mainstream approaches to organisational culture. The approaches have been 
utilised by management since their introduction in the 1980s, there are a number of 
criticisms (Brewis and Jack 2009; Willmott 1993; Parker 2000; Kunda 1992; Martin 
2002; Smircich 1983b) that pertain to attempts to execute these cultural 
management techniques. These contentions include managerial assumptions 
surrounding the top-down nature of organisational culture resulting in a failure to 
acknowledge the potential for conflict and resistance. Furthermore, this section has 
outlined the contestations surrounding the purported benefits of cultural 
engineering, which includes proclamations around the desirability of strong cultures, 
as well as claims about the prevalence of autonomy and how the distinctiveness of 
an organisation’s culture will yield a competitive advantage. The next section will 
continue the critique of culture management by exploring whether corporate 
culturalism actually established a revolutionary management technique or was a 
recycling and repackaging of old ideas. 
 
2.3 Cultural Engineering/Management in Context 
 
This section will be exploring the context that cultural engineering emerged from, 
during the 1980s. The section will discuss the socio-economic environment in which 
corporate cultural engineering became prominent amongst managers, primarily 
focusing on the social context upon which organisational culture was introduced. It 
is important to explore the context that corporate culturalism emerged from as it can 
provide an insight into the mechanisms utilised by management in their attempts to 
inculcate employees into corporate cultures. 
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If we examine the economic and political context in which corporate culturalism was 
cultivated, then we see that it occurred at a time when the supremacy of the Anglo-
American corporation was being challenged by the industrialisation of the far east 
(Brewis and Jack (2009). The emergence of Japan as an economic superpower 
following the Second World War was seen as a threat to Western economic 
supremacy (Grey 2009), prompting Western management to seek new ways of 
organising to maintain their dominance. This coincided with a decay in traditional 
values and religion, and an increase in materialistic and individualistic sentiments; 
displacing god and religion at the centre of society and replacing it with the individual 
(Willmott 1993; Ezzy 2001; Grey 2009; Du Gay 1996). This was significant as it 
meant that achievement was a measure of an individual’s hard work and 
determination and not fate, thus bestowing individuals with new found 
responsibilities and anxieties (Grey 2009; Willmott 1993). 
 
The concepts of corporate culture were seen to advance the bureaucratic 
organisation and created new moral communities of people who were drawn 
together through a mutual advocacy of certain principles that construct a shared 
idea of a good life (Tole 1993). These shared perspectives were no longer founded 
within religious communities but are instead cultivated within organisations. It is 
suggested that ‘freedom, social mobility and individuality –– the American Dream –
– are bought through loyalty to the business corporation’ (Parker 2000: 15). This 
suggested that a strong culture defined through values and beliefs provided 
individuals with a mission that can be pursued via a bountiful organisation, an 
organisation that is rich with resources and support, which provides a source of 
guidance and motivation through its charismatic leaders. However, it can be argued 
that the idea of a strong value system constructing a cohesive moral collective that 
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would, in turn, provide self-fulfilment and belonging, was not a new or revolutionary 
concept (Stanford 2010). These principles have merely been written into a new 
context with organisations at the centre. The underlying principles have in fact been 
practised for thousands of years throughout civilisation in the form of religion 
(Jackson 2001; Grey 2009). Nonetheless these circumstances that led the way for 
the development of a prescriptive management theory, one which was proclaimed 
to provide both economic and moral recovery, filling the void by bestowing ‘meaning 
as well as money’ (Peters and Waterman 1982: 323) upon its legions of loyal 
employees by providing a source for values, identity and belonging (Grey 2009; 
Bunting 2004; Berger 1973; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Du Gay 1996).  
 
Du Gay (1991: 53) argued that corporate culturalism attempted to instil a ‘culture of 
excellence’ within employees reforming their sense of self, turning them into 
‘winners, champions, and everyday heroes’. This enterprising image of themselves 
is embedded within the organisation; they are a component of the organisation, their 
excellence is dependent on the organisation and without the organisation, they are 
unable to attain the success and self-fulfilment the organisation has told them they 
can accomplish. What this means is that they are led to believe their membership 
of the organisation is their gateway to success and in order to be a party to such a 
contract employees are required to ‘buy in’ (Peters and Waterman 1982: 77) and 
internalise the values of the organisation, cherishing them as their own. 
 
Additionally another contributing factor to the prominence of culture management is 
the Reagan and Thatcher era where a potent blend of neoliberalism and nationalism 
embedded a sense of loyalty to your country’s economic success, giving rise to the 
enterprising nation (Rose 1998; McCabe 2016), where we are all responsible, not 
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only for our own success but also the nation’s. This means individuals were no 
longer provided with stable long-term jobs, based on seniority in the public sector, 
but instead the proliferation of privatisation brought about a period of indeterminacy, 
where in order to survive one had to become enterprising. This theme of enterprise 
and the development of enterprising subjects will be explored later in the chapter. 
 
The above discussion briefly outlines the context that cultural engineering was 
developed in, allowing for its successful marketing and proliferation among 
management. The social context in which it emerged leads to an understanding of 
why it became so popular and the potential exploitation of an individual’s need for 
social membership. This section also introduced the themes surrounding enterprise 
discourses which will be discussed later in this chapter and will contribute to the 
analysis of banking culture. 
 
2.4 Culture Management as a Revolution? 
 
This section will discuss whether the themes introduced by cultural management 
texts actually introduced something new and revolutionary to management or are in 
fact a repackaging of old ideas. Corporate culturalism is viewed as a panacea to 
organisational issues (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982; Ouchi 
1981) this has continued despite examples where ‘strong cultures’ have been 
blamed for bringing about an organisational crisis (see Sims and Brinkmann 2003).  
 
Mainstream cultural texts attempted to claim that they spurred a revolutionary way 
of thinking about organisations (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 
1982; Ouchi 1981). However, Child (1988) suggests that it is nothing more than a 
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method of organisational design, which firstly emphasises the communication of and 
adherence to company values and objectives. It also prescribes areas of 
responsibility to be delegated between groups, who are encouraged to exercise 
autonomy and initiative in the fulfilment of their responsibilities, although their 
performance is continually reviewed, which acts to maintain central control of the 
organisation to a leaner management structure. Others argue that culturalism is an 
evolutionary advancement in management theory (Grey 2009). Kulrich (1982 cited 
in Stanford 2010: 9-10) argued that these texts provide nothing ‘new or startling’, 
they are the ‘same motivational techniques’ that can apply to not only ‘business but 
to most relationships’ and have been ‘trivialised into ugly little tricks’.  
 
Furthermore, the emphasis on employee commitment and flexibility through the 
evocation of meaning and esteem shares the sentiments of earlier post-Taylorist 
approaches, such as Human Relations Management (Grey 2009). Nonetheless, 
there are some clear departures from the previous methods of management, the 
most significant is the ‘systematizing and legitimizing of a mode of control that 
purposefully seeks to shape and regulate the practical consciousness and, 
arguably, the unconscious strivings, of employees’ (Willmott 1993: 523). Willmott 
(1993) argues that this is achieved through the systematic design, implementation 
and strengthening of a normative framework. It was acknowledged in earlier 
methods of management that social norms have a powerful influence over people. 
McGregor’s ‘theory Y’ (1960) is one such example. Theory Y argued that employees 
possessed the capacity to self-motivate and foster commitment in order to achieve 
organisational objectives deeming them a valuable asset, with it being 
management’s task to direct this purported self-control and motivation while 
acknowledging that the exercise of discretion could improve commitment and 
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performance. Grey (2009) argues that corporate culturalism has merged these 
ideas together through a meticulously selective recruitment process, strengthening 
core organisational values while simultaneously eliminating contamination from 
other values.  
 
It is here where we see the departure of corporate culturalism from ‘theory Y’. 
McGregor (1960) believed that an organisation’s productivity could be increased 
once a consensus of underlying values had been discovered. McGregor claimed 
that such a consensus existed innately within an organisation and just needed to be 
realised and directed towards the success of the organisation. Corporate 
culturalism, on the other hand, takes a less passive approach and views value 
conflict as an indication of cultural weakness that can be amended by manufacturing 
a state of value consensus (Grey 2009), as culturalism identifies values as a 
powerful under-utilised medium of control. 
 
Additionally, Taksa (1992) suggests Taylorism considered cultural issues through 
the alignment of management and worker interests. Thus Taylor attempted to 
establish a single organisational culture through the division of responsibilities and 
the requirement for one to disregard apparently dysfunctional counter cultures, to 
become individuals with common aims. All this was to be achieved through 
'selection, training and consensus management', which seems somewhat reflective 
of culturalism (Parker 2000: 31). These connections between Taylorism and 
culturalism disrupt the premise that organisational culturalism was new and distinct 
from previous attempts at engineering organisational control strategies. Culturalism 
is purported to take a softer approach, so as to ensure that compliance is gained 
wilfully, which in turn will conversely expand the realms of their freedom. However, 
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it can be argued that the deconstruction of bureaucratic control systems does not 
mean that hegemonic control does not exist. Burawoy (1979) asserts that this 
discretion gives the impression that no control is being exercised. Although the 
control may be perceived to have been internalised, a compliant workforce and a 
profitable company are achieved nonetheless. 
 
Scholars such as Kenny et al. (2011) and Willmott (1993) assert that culturalism 
goes beyond previous forms of control and management, as it is concerned with the 
manipulation of employee’s identities, attempting to assert the dominance of an 
individual’s organisational identity over their other identities (Grey 2009). This 
manipulation of identities can be seen as having a self-surveilling function. This self-
surveillance means that organisations will no longer need expensive external 
systems of surveillance and control, instead, attitudinal control and self-surveillance 
will take prominence (Parker 2000; Rose 1989; Foucault 1977). Thus as Willmott 
(1993) contends, freedom is slavery, as the discretion and autonomy that 
culturalism bestows on the individual are, in fact, a form of disciplinary power. 
Foucault’s (1977) theory of disciplinary power provides a suitable sense in which to 
understand this notion of internalised control, as culturalism’s influence on the 
individual emanates internally, guiding an individual conduct, linguistic expressions,  
behaviour, ambitions, desires and emotions (Nealon 2008). A gaze is inflicted upon 
the individual: 
 
‘…a gaze which each individual under its weight will end up interiorising it to 
the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this 
surveillance over, and against himself’ (Foucault 1972: 155).’ 
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From the themes discussed in this section, it can be suggested that the principles 
upon which corporate culturalism are founded were not new or revolutionary in the 
1980s and have not become revolutionary in the following decades. However, 
despite this, there is a continued focus within the industry on managing and 
changing culture, which seems to be renewed with each crisis or major event, with 
the latest being the global financial crisis. This continued preoccupation with culture 
management calls for a renewed academic focus on the subject in order to explore 
whether the area has evolved and provided it with the capacity to rectify the ‘cultural 
shortcomings’ of the banking industry or whether the industry has been sold yet 
another repackaging of past ideas by management gurus who claim they can 
‘design their own culture’ (PwC 2016). 
 
2.5 Culture Management Oversimplified 
 
The management practitioner texts discussed in the previous sections have been 
met with criticism due to their lack of academic rigour, with Brewis and Jack (2009: 
235) claiming that mainstream perspectives on organisational culture are 
‘methodologically deficient’ and that their claims ‘cannot be trusted’. Additionally, 
Parker (2000: 15) suggests that they are more like business self-help texts than 
academic literature: ‘standard academic conventions are avoided in favour of shock 
tactics, cultural and disciplinary eclecticism’. Child (1988: 218) points out some 
discrepancies in the methodology of these mainstream cultural practitioner texts. 
For example, there is a failure to provide any evidence that may suggest that strong 
cultures can exist in unsuccessful organisations or that weak cultures can exist in 
successful organisations. Instead, the authors only support a perspective where 
success is synonymous with strong cultures. Furthermore mainstream texts fail to 
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address the presence of conflict and resistance within an organisation (Knights and 
McCabe 1997; Chreim 2006), as conflict or fragmentation of normative beliefs are 
perceived to have a negative impact, instead mainstream perspectives present 
culture as unambiguous and homogenous. It is possible that if the difficulty and 
complexity of addressing the fragmentation and resistance in cultural 
change/management is more compressively explored in mainstream texts, their 
persuasiveness and marketability may be hindered. 
 
Many of the ‘strong’ culture  organisations praised in Peters and Waterman’s (1982) 
book suffered financial difficulties, with a Business Weekly article revealing that 14 
out of the 43 'excellent' companies experienced financial problems 3 years after the 
book was published (Stanford 2010), demonstrating that strong cultures do not 
necessarily lead to performance. Martin (2002: 3) claims that culture had been 
‘oversimplified— yet another managerial fad that failed to deliver on its promises’ as 
the prescribed cultural change initiatives were not straightforward to implement. 
Wilkins (1989: xi-xii) suggests that culture has been ‘trivialized’ without serious 
consideration of how ‘difficult it is to manipulate these complex social processes’. 
However, despite these contentions, the idea of a leader-centric, unified culture that 
is purported to provide increased financial performance has kept its allure, Martin 
(2002: 8) suggests it ‘is a Lazarus of an idea; it appears to die and then is 
resurrected’. When an organisation is prospering, its success is attributed to its 
strong culture and when an organisation is failing this is also attributing to its culture. 
No example demonstrates this better than the case of Enron (Sims and Brinkmann 
2003: 244), where Enron’s successes were purported to be down to its strong 
culture which was ‘actively cultivated’ by its heroic leader Jeff Skilling but ‘Enron's 
house of cards had been eroded by the very culture that had allowed it to be built’ 
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(ibid: 246). The functional perspective assumes that complete identification with an 
organisation is unequivocally beneficial (Kenny et al. 2011; Kunda 1992;) as it 
provides devoted and loyal employees (Peters and Waterman 1982). However, this 
fails to acknowledge the risk of ‘over-identifiers’ who will ‘engage in over-exuberant 
wrongdoing, or cover up corporate misdemeanours in their dedicated efforts to 
advance or to defend the organisation’ (Kenny et al. 2011: 120). This suggests that 
individuals may focus on the fulfilment of organisational goals or imperatives to the 
displacement of all else. Evidence of such behaviour can be found in the case of 
Enron (Sims and Brinkman 2003) more recent examples can be found in the global 
financial crisis (Buckley 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the instrumentality of strong cultures to the success of an organisation 
is somewhat undermined by the fact that the companies in question could afford to 
develop and maintain strong cultures and enforce them with cultural artefacts, 
rituals, personnel techniques and champions. As Parker (2000:16) notes, 'soft 
human resource management is something you can afford if your organisation is 
making money’, suggesting that culture management initiatives may be an 
expendable luxury and not an organisational imperative as claimed. Furthermore, 
the majority of the excellent companies discussed in Peters and Waterman’s (1982) 
book actually developed their cultures organically throughout their history and not 
from cultural change programmes (Stanford 2010). This is important as it may 
demonstrate that organisational culture is not a definable entity that can be changed 
but is something that is much more embedded within the organisation and is 
constructed over time through the mutual interaction of organisational members, 
shaped and directed by the history of the organisation. 
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The oversimplification of organisational culture stems from the fact managers often 
fail to acknowledge the existence of any resistance or dissent within the organisation 
of their disseminated ideology, assuming that hegemony and consistency exist 
amongst interpretations of cultural manifestations (Kenny et al. 2011). However, it 
is possible that inconsistency is inevitable (Dietz et al 2004) and even desirable 
(Martin 2002); such acknowledgements provide a basis for marginalised dissenting 
voices to communicate their perspectives (Kelemen and Papasolomou 2007). 
Furthermore, top-down management of organisational culture has been criticised 
for failing to acknowledge that management is an aspect of the organisation’s 
culture and not independent from it (Knights and McCabe 1998). Therefore 
management’s perceptions and behaviours are subject to the construction of the 
organisation’s culture; culture is understood to be a context rather than a 
manageable variable (Smircich 1983). 
 
A deficiency in the methods of culture management texts is that the opinions and 
views expressed are those of seniors managers (Brewis and Jack 2009) and not of 
rank and file employees, and therefore only provide one perspective of an 
organisation’s culture. This led to assertions that the 1980s cultural guru texts acted 
as a medium for marketing the companies they researched, with Alvesson (2002:43) 
arguing that mainstream authors attempted to impress practitioners through the use 
of 'highly positive sounding virtues, attitudes and behaviours’ that are proclaimed to 
be instrumental to successful management. Furthermore, the language used to 
describe the companies acts to romanticise them, by continuously referring to them 
as excellent and impressive. Therefore the selective accounts given of these 
organisations and the omission of any dissenting examples represents a reduction 
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of knowledge that falls outside of what these authors and management consultants 
communicate as the reality of culture management.  
 
Critical scholars such as Grey (2009) and Wilmott (1993) suggest that management 
attempts to invoke cultural discourses through the exercise of normative control. 
Management aims to manipulate an individual’s unconscious assumptions, by 
dictating symbolic action at a routine level, using specific language, understandings 
and sentiments thus constructing a social reality that management chooses. One 
which acts to reduce the ways in which organisational manifestations can be 
understood, through the construction of cultural norms and taken-for-granted 
assumptions (Alvesson 2002; Barley and Kunda 1992; Smircich and Morgan 1982; 
Deetz and Mumby 1986; Alvesson and Willmott 1992; Alvesson and Deetz 1996). 
This demonstrates a construction of a ‘regime of truth’ (Mills 2003:73), which is ‘a 
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
and operation of statements’ (Foucault, 1980: 133), where contradictory knowledge 
is not reproduced and is often marginalised and forgotten. Examples of this can be 
seen in the way organisations ignore the existence of sub-cultures or resistance. 
 
Critical perspectives of organisational culture critique the ontological perspective 
that underpins mainstream perspectives on organisational culture, arguing that it is 
instead a root metaphor (Smircich 1983) rather than a variable that has its own 
objective reality. Furthermore, critical perspectives assert that culture is an ongoing 
social construction (Burrell and Morgan 1979) and in order to understand this social 
endeavour, symbols, languages and actions must be studied. Here culture is 
understood to be a set of mutually constructed understandings and characteristics, 
which are constantly shifting and is at no point idle, preventing a totalising 
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articulation of an organisation’s culture. It is ‘organic, emergent and pluralistic, not 
imposed, static, or univocal’ (Brewis and Jack 2009: 236). This means that 
establishing through management a unified, clearly articulated culture is more 
challenging than cultural engineering texts suggest. 
 
Schein (2004) suggests that culture is inferred by examining cultural artefacts, which 
include: physical architecture, traditions, furniture, meeting rituals, organisational 
images, events, clothing and published values. The exploration of artefacts is also 
relevant within more critical perspectives of organisational culture, as Gagliardi 
(1990) suggests that exploring such artefacts can reflect the deepest aspects of 
organisational culture as they ‘teach employees dominant meanings, creating 
narrative to which they are encouraged to conform’ (Brewis and Jack 2009: 234). 
Similarly, Kunda (1992; 93) describes rituals as ‘mechanisms through which certain 
organizational members influence how other members are to think and feel’. 
 
Cultural forms such as stories and rituals ‘provide important clues to what 
employees are thinking, believing, and doing’ (Martin 2002: 65). Rituals are like 
dramas, they are events that are carried out within a social context that are carefully 
planned and executed with a defined beginning and an end, where members play 
particular roles. Critical perspectives would critique such efforts as managerial 
attempts to control the behaviours of employees (Alvesson and Willmott 1992; 
Alvesson and Deetz 1996). It is important to note there is an implicit assumption that 
employee’s interpretations of these rituals are unequivocally clear and stable, 
however, this is not necessarily the case as the meanings of a ritual can be more 
ambiguous than clear, even to participants (Kunda 1992; Meyerson 1994; Rosen 
1991). 
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An example of a cultural artefact is language, as it is central to all organisations, 
societies and individuals. Language can often have local meanings in the forms of 
slang and colloquialisms. Organisations can also have their own native language in 
the form of acronyms and abbreviations of technical words, all of these contribute 
to the formulation of a culture (Alvesson 2002; Barley and Kunda 1992; Smircich 
and Morgan 1982). However, language can often be overlooked and not recognised 
as a cultural artefact; participants will often take language for granted and not 
appreciate its significance within the architecture of culture (Alvesson 2002). What 
is interesting about language, is that it can often contradict the notion of a unitary 
culture within organisations, as different departments, different professions and 
offices can all have their own linguistic devices (Collinson 1988). 
 
Within academic circles corporate culturalism was seen as a short-lived 
management fad that would pass (Kunda 1992; Alvesson 2002), nonetheless its 
core ideas have been assimilated into the management armoury fashioning a multi-
million dollar industry with numerous management gurus ready to prescribe the 
rules of excellence (Stanford 2010; Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). However, this 
zealous endorsement of corporate culturalism should not be taken to mean that its 
benefits are absolute and that closer examination of its methods is unwarranted. It 
would be beneficial for an organisational study to delve beneath the surface in order 
to gain an understanding of how individuals interpret and add meaning to cultural 
manifestations and how these interpretations develop patterns of ‘clarity, 
inconsistency, and ambiguity’ that help us understand and characterise working 
lives (Martin 2002: 5). Culture offers us the opportunity to capture and understand 
the complexities central to life within organisations. 
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2.6 The Enterprising Self 
 
This chapter has discussed management attempts to engineer culture in order to 
direct conduct and behaviours. Kenny et al. (2011: 104) suggest that attempts to 
create and manage a ‘strong organisational culture’ can lead to the development of 
‘enterprise discourse’. This is because the objectives of establishing a ‘strong’ 
organisational culture relate to the attributes of enterprise discourse, by attempting 
to produce employees who will identify with the goals and objectives of their 
organisation (Mangan 2009). Therefore it is important to discuss the literature on 
this topic as it introduces a way of understanding the potential outcomes of culture 
management, particularly in the banking industry. Enterprise has been purported to 
be a necessity within modern organisations with it being contrasted with that of 
bureaucracy. Russell and McCabe (2015) suggest that the virtues of enterprise 
discourse became embedded in the banking industry (Barratt, 2003) during the ‘Big 
Bang’ deregulation of the financial sector under the 1979 Conservative government, 
which saw the intensification and promotion of neoliberal economics that potentially 
contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, however, we will return to this point in the 
next chapter. 
 
It is suggested that an aim of inculcating values and beliefs through cultural 
engineering is to imbue employees with a sense of responsibility and commitment 
to the firm (Grey 2009; Kenny et al. 2011; Rose 1990), turning them into self-
regulating and self-discipling individuals (Foucault 1979) or as Du Gay (1996) terms 
it ‘enterprising subjects’. Du Gay goes on to suggest that employees are encouraged 
to ‘act a bit more like they were in business for themselves’ (Du Gay 2000: 174), 
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thus employees no longer require the bureaucratic manager standing over them 
(Alvesson et al. 2008). 
 
Enterprise discourse aims to develop employees into self-regulating, productive 
individuals in the endeavour to produce responsible subjects ‘who display initiative 
whilst embracing customer service, empowerment, flexibility, quality and teamwork’ 
(McCabe 2009: 1552; Russell and McCabe 2015). Through enterprise discourse 
individuals are supposed to find self-fulfilment and motivation through the 
accomplishment of corporate goals (Du Gay and Salaman 1992; McCabe 2008). 
McCabe (2009) contends that these discourses attempt to reconstitute the 
subjectivity of the employees through the engendering of competition towards 
‘active responsibility’ leading them to believe they possess autonomy within their 
role, when in fact, they are exposed to an intensified form of control (Burchell 1991: 
276). The construction of enterprise discourse can be seen within mainstream 
management texts, such as Peters and Waterman (1982) where management are 
encouraged to allow for autonomous initiatives to develop. Employees are depicted 
as autonomous and empowered even though change is imposed top down (Doolin 
2002; McCabe 2009) by ‘experts (Mangan 2009). 
 
Enterprise discourses are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory; they introduce 
the notion of the individual while simultaneously encouraging teamwork and 
cohesiveness. Employees are required to behave in ‘a pleasant enthusiastic and 
helpful manner when working with colleagues’ by sharing ‘knowledge and 
experience with others’ (McCabe 2009: 1562). However, McCabe’s (2009: 1568) 
study of Westland Bank demonstrates how a focus on individual performance and 
a ‘focus on sales, to the neglect of all else’ detracts from the notion of teamwork, 
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with one of the participants stating: ‘the way they run the appraisal… actually, works 
against teamwork because it’s very much every man for himself. (1569). Such 
discussions are significant as they raise important themes that will be explored later 
in the data and analysis chapters, such as the requirement of constant performance 
and the evocation of competition which undermines the industry’s attempt to instil 
strong cohesive cultures. McCabe (2009: 1555) asserts that these inconsistencies 
within enterprise discourses may increase the potential for resistance and ‘for 
employees to turn the discourse back on management'. 
 
The individualism that is central to enterprise discourses is perceived to be an 
instrument of disciplinary power as individuals become focussed on ‘self-interest’ 
and in turn become self-disciplining, as they are ‘concerned with achieving and 
maintaining a certain lifestyle’ (Mangan 2009: 94; Rose 1990). Disciplinary power 
(Foucault 1977) is a form of power which emanates internally through self-
surveillance induced by the internalisation of behavioural norms constructed and 
perpetuated via instruments of surveillance, such as performance reviews and town 
hall meetings (Du Gay 1996; McCabe 2008; Mangan 2009). These forms of 
individualisation have been theorised as oppressive regimes due to the isolating 
effects they may have on an individual (Casey 1995; Knights and Willmott 1989; 
Ezzy 2001). However, through the productivity of power relations (Foucault 1977) 
the enterprising employee can be viewed as autonomous and self-fulfilled (Du Gay 
1996; Du Gay and Salaman 1992; Rose 1989). Developing on the discussion in 
section 2.3 regarding the contradictory status of autonomy, Rose (1989: xxiv) 
asserts that the apparent attainment of autonomy under the regime of enterprise 
discourses results in the loss of our social relations: ‘the ways of relating to 
ourselves and others that were encompassed in such terms as dependency, 
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mutuality, fraternity, self-sacrifice, commitment to others’. Furthermore, the 
development of the self has become a central focus for organisations (Mangan 
2009) in an attempt to reconstitute the meaning of work formulating it as an activity 
through which we ‘produce, discover, and experience ourselves’ (Rose 1989: 104). 
 
McKinlay (2002) outlines the development of the career discourse within the 
banking industry which enterprise discourse develops upon (McCabe 2009). 
McKinlay (2002; see also Tempest et al. 2004) describes how career discourses of 
adherence to a bank’s rules and traditions through self-management provided the 
individual with security and progression. Previously banking offered a job for life with 
a clearly structured career, where paternal bonds and loyalty were central (Augar 
2000; Storey et al. 1999). However, with the deregulation of the financial markets 
following the Financial Services Act 1986, which will be discussed in depth in the 
next chapter, the landscape of the banking industry significantly changed, spurring 
on a new competitiveness (Storey et al. 1999). These changes saw the emergence 
of an enterprise discourse that severed job security from career discourses; 
enterprise discourses require self-regulation and adherence but without the promise 
of a long-term secure career, while maintaining the career discourse traits of client 
centricity and self-improvement (McCabe 2009). 
 
Previous career discourses as outlined by McKinlay (2002) attempted to shape an 
employee over decades through obedience, reciprocal loyalty and paternalism. 
However, more recent discourses represent employees as ‘disposable 
commodities’ (McCabe 2009: 1558) that are ‘assessed, utilized and eliminated’ 
(Tempest et al. 2004: 1533), such representations bring into contention the apparent 
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imperatives of the committed and responsible individual who strongly identifies with 
their organisation. 
 
Tempest et al. (2004: 1524-25) argue that the notion of the career within the financial 
services went through a process of ‘social de-capitalization’ which is a ‘trend 
towards increasing individualization’, which occurred during the mid-1980s leading 
to ‘withered and estranged’ social capital. The delayering and dynamism of the 
industry meant that structured career paths became obsolete and were replaced by 
the navigation of opportunities across organisations. Such shifts emphasised the 
need for competitive performance and spurred ‘a shift from a long-term perspective 
to a short-term orientation’ (Tempest et al. 2004: 1531).  
 
This section discussed the development and impact of enterprise discourse, which 
forms a central theme to understanding the longitudinal development of banking 
culture and which is informed by the industry’s history, something which will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. Enterprise discourses act to form and maintain banking 
cultures but are simultaneously developed by it, potentially resulting in intensified 
variants of enterprise discourse, something that will be developed on in the analysis 
chapter. 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
The topics discussed within this chapter will provide a basis for the themes and 
topics that emerged from the data collected for this thesis. This chapter outlined how 
organisational culture and the construction of strong cultures has been presented 
as a remedy for organisational problems through the promise of increased 
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commitment, productivity and profitability. These claims have often been 
unfounded, with some organisations who are reported to have a ‘strong’ culture 
experiencing difficulties (Sims and Brinkmann 2003; Martin 2002; Parker 2000). 
This chapter discussed how this has not deterred management, as organisations 
continue to be convinced by corporate culturalism, persuaded by a repackaging of 
old ideas. The financial crisis has spurred a renewed preoccupation with 
organisational culture, as it has been depicted as the solution that will rectify the 
cultural shortcomings (Salz 2013) of the banking industry. 
 
The chapter discussed the context in which cultural engineering emerged during the 
1980s exploring the socio-economic environment that ensured the prominence of 
corporate cultural engineering amongst managers. This exploration of the economic 
and political context in which corporate culturalism was cultivated suggested that it 
was not only the threat of industrial uprising of the far east but also coincided with a 
shift in traditional values and religion towards materialistic and individualistic 
sentiments, thus providing both economic and moral recovery. This was significant 
as it discusses the sociological positioning of organisational culture, highlighting the 
rhetorical claims that it provides social benefits to the individual as well as economic 
benefits to the organisation. 
 
The chapter also provided a review of the literature surrounding organisational 
culture management, beginning with an exploration and critique of mainstream 
perspectives, outlining the attributes of the ‘has’ perspective. Here management is 
preoccupied with a top-down, homogenous idea of organisational culture resulting 
in a failure to acknowledge the potential for conflict and resistance. More critical 
perspectives on organisation culture were explored, asserting that culture is an 
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ongoing social construction (Burrell and Morgan 1979), viewing it as a set of 
common characteristics, which are in a constant state of flux thus preventing a 
totalising articulation of an organisation’s culture for the purpose of prescribing a 
remedy. The exploration of these critical themes was important as they inform the 
understanding of organisational culture that this thesis adopts, as critical 
perspectives can potentially provide a more holistic idea of organisational culture. 
 
Finally, the chapter examined the literature on enterprise discourse, particularly in 
banking culture. It is understood the objectives of establishing a ‘strong’ 
organisational culture relate to the attributes of enterprise discourse (Kenny et al. 
2011), in the way that they attempt to produce employees who will identify with the 
goals and objectives of their organisation (Mangan 2009). Additionally, enterprise 
discourses can be seen to develop and maintain banking cultures, while being 
simultaneously developed by it, potentially resulting in intensified variants of 
enterprise discourse, such as performance discourse, which this thesis developed. 
This thesis proposes that performance discourse relates to enterprise discourse 
(Barratt, 2003; McCabe 2016) in the way that it attempts to normalise behaviours of 
self-promotion and short-termism (McCabe 2009; Tempest et al. 2004). While also 
developing employees into self-regulating, productive and responsible individuals 
(McCabe 2009; Russell and McCabe 2015). 
 
There are assertions that the academic debate has moved on from organisational 
culture (Kenny et al. 2011), however, practitioners and industry ‘experts’ continue to 
buy into the virtues of strong culture management portraying it a panacea to the 
banking industry’s problems (Salz 2013; CIPD 2013). The themes discussed within 
this chapter justify the need for the timely revisiting of organisational culture, and 
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the banking industry’s continued preoccupation calls for a renewed academic focus 
on the topic in order to explore how the field has evolved. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Contextual Backdrop of Banking Culture 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter combines a number of different sections to provide a contextual 
backdrop of banking culture and the financial crisis. Much of this chapter explores 
the historical events of the banking industry that underpin not only the development 
of its cultures but also arguably contributed to the emergence of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The contestable nature of history and the acknowledgement of the 
plurality of events plays an important role in examining the contingent events of the 
industry and the crisis, meaning that it is important to explore what part they may or 
may not have played. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the 1986 deregulation of the financial 
services industry operating in the City of London, outlining the changes the industry 
underwent during this period: culturally, socially, economically, technologically, from 
a regulatory and structural standpoint. This section explores the influence the 
government had on the landscape of the industry during this period and how some 
of these principles continue to underpin the industry. 
 
The next section discusses the intricacies of the financial crisis, exploring the 
financial products that have often been attributed to being a key element in bringing 
about the crisis. The section also discusses how government and other 
organisations have been implicated in the crisis, as well as a brief discussion of how 
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the UK government and regulatory bodies attempted to deal with the crisis in its 
immediate aftermath, and how they and the banks attempted to displace blame and 
construct favourable narratives around their involvement. 
 
The chapter will finish with an exploration of recent research and reports on banking 
culture following the crisis, which are predominantly informed by positivist and 
managerial perspectives. This section outlines some of the findings and 
recommendations of these reports, as well as examining their shortcomings and 
limitations. This section aims to demonstrate the gap in the field for critical research 
on banking culture that this thesis aims to contribute to. 
 
3.2 ’Big Bang’ 
 
This section will explore the Big Bang deregulation that occurred in the City of 
London on 27th October 1986, discussing how the City changed during the period 
and what impact this had on the infrastructure and cultural landscape of the City. 
This section will discuss how the changes influenced the demographic of banking 
within the City of London and how it opened up the City to the American investment 
banks, providing a rationale to the assertion that much of the City’s current 
management techniques, working hours and remuneration structures were imported 
from Wall Street. Big Bang is important to understand as it is suggested that it laid 
down the foundations for the 2008 Global Financial Crisis with Pickard and 
Thompson (2014) suggesting that it was a ‘stepping stone towards the events that 
led to the rescue of big banks in 2008 during the global credit crunch’. Furthermore 
Russell and McCabe (2015) argue that the roots of enterprise discourse within the 
UK can be traced to the election of a Conservative government in 1979 and the 
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subsequent deregulation of the financial industry under the Financial Services Act, 
1986, leading to a more competitive, sales orientated and performance focused 
banking industry (McCabe 2009). 
 
3.2.1 Reforms 
 
In 1984 the plan for the new market was established setting 27th October 1986 as 
‘Big Bang’ day. In 1983 new rules introduced by the Stock Exchange were outlined, 
principally abolishing fixed minimum commissions as well as rules allowing 
members to trade in foreign securities. As part of this new City, the existing 
regulatory framework needed to be reformed, which ultimately gave rise to the 
Financial Services Act 1986 (Roberts 2008). In addition, the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB) was created with the primary function to oversee financial 
and investment operations within the UK through self-regulatory organisations that 
reported to the SIB. 
 
As the new regulatory framework developed, people in the City criticised many of 
the proposed plans as being overly bureaucratic, favouring a more self-regulatory 
approach to the reforms. This self-regulatory approach worked well in the old City 
which was smaller and more personal, where everyone knew everyone and deals 
were executed face-to-face. However, on a larger more complex scale, where 
institutions had become less defined and more complicated in structure, this soft-
touch regulation would encounter challenges (Roberts 2008). The lightly regulated 
regime was born on the premise that the industry would benefit from competition 
combined with minimum government interference (Treanor 2006). Norman Tebbit, 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry proclaimed that market forces should 
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be allowed to ‘operate responsibly without unnecessary constraints, in a way which 
promotes efficient and competitive business’ (Hayes and Hubbard 1990; 206). 
 
It was considered that these changes would create a level playing field where the 
City of London could continue to thrive and maintain its status as one of the world’s 
financial hubs and the financial capital of Europe. However, the reality was that Wall 
Street had undergone deregulation in 1975, allowing the American investment to 
gain over a decade of experience of operating in a deregulated market that London 
was now entering (Kynaston 2011). The Government and policy makers were so 
preoccupied with the idea that London might lose its status and foreign banks might 
set up a rival offshore market, that they overlooked the threat of foreign firms 
entering the City and dominating. 
 
The problems with the reduced approach to government intervention were 
compounded by a regulatory system that was flawed in its design and 
implementation. Regulators were not provided with the resources they needed to 
fully regulate and control the firms within their remit (Augar 2000). The SIB, for 
example, did not have the staffing, due to budget restrictions. This was contrasted 
by the regulatory regime of the US namely the Securities and Exchange 
Commission which oversaw the US deregulated financial markets. They were better 
funded and resourced, they had enough staff to be stringent in their operations 
(Augar 2000).   
 
3.2.2 Competition from US Banks 
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The 1986 Big Bang opened up the London market for US commercial and 
investment banks. Previously London was regarded as the ‘Siberia of investment 
banking, a place to banish those the firm wished to forget’ (Endlich 1999: 85). 
However, this changed once the Stock Exchange opened up to outside 
membership. Once the plans for deregulation were announced in 1986, American 
banks paid close attention to what was happening in London (Kynaston 2011). 
 
Following the US stock market crash of 1929, US Congress implemented a number 
of measures to protect bank deposits from volatile securities markets. This gave rise 
to the Glass-Steagall Act (1933), which acted to segregate commercial banks from 
investments banks meaning that deposit taking and lending activities had to be 
separate from dealing in or underwriting securities (Hamilton 1986). By the 1970s 
interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act became diluted allowing for increased 
activities in the securities markets by commercial banks (Roberts 2008). However, 
the existing investments banks had created a strong hold on the investment market 
due to the specialised experience they had gained through all those years of 
segregated banking. This meant that the commercial banks were at a significant 
disadvantage in their home territory in entering the arena of investment banking. 
Thus the newly deregulated landscape of London became an appealing prospect 
for international firms to develop a position in investment banking, mainly through 
the acquisition of existing brokering firms (Kynaston 2011; Roberts and Kynaston 
2002). 
 
The Glass-Steagall Act provided American Investment banks with a vital ‘incubation’ 
period that allowed them to develop and nurture their skills in this area. This 
apparently helped them develop a ‘deep-rooted culture’ (Augar 2000: 72) that 
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operated on a specific set of principles that included intellect and hard work (Ho 
2009) setting them in good stead to expand into the London market. However, unlike 
the commercial banks, the investment banks felt they had the managerial 
experience and talent to expand through organic growth strategies (Augar 2000). 
 
3.2.3 Cultural Tensions 
 
As the day of Big Bang approached many of the necessary preparations for the City 
had been made, mergers and acquisitions had been agreed, new offices occupied, 
workforces expanded and technology set up (Hamilton 1986; Courtney and 
Thompson 1996). However, major issues were not acknowledged or addressed and 
were present under the facade of the New City. These included ‘managerial 
weaknesses;…cultural tensions; strategic errors; and laissez-faire government’ 
(Augar 2000: 103). The management skills that were required to manage the small 
partnerships that had previously inhabited the City were very different to the 
managerial expertise required in the new landscape of integrated investment banks. 
These organisations were now ten times larger and made up of thousands of 
employees, created through the merger of multiple previously separate entities. 
 
The exponential growth in the size of the organisations through acquisition and 
mergers coupled with the introduction of telecommunications (Hamilton 1986), 
which reduced face-to-face communication and personal ties amongst employees 
and partners, left a cultural void. This void resulted in a breakdown of loyalty and 
commitment, where previously the paternalism that existed between employees and 
partners fostered cultural adhesion (Courtney and Thompson 1996). In addition to 
this, the partnership structure of the firms provided a clear career goal for most 
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brokers of becoming partner. By becoming partner successful brokers would share 
in the wealth and running of the firm, as well as accepting liability for the firm's 
dealings. The disintegration of traditional partnership structures and a move to a 
shareholding ownership structure (Treanor 2006; Hamilton 1986) meant that 
aspirations needed to be replaced and realigned. Directorships replaced 
partnerships, however, directors did not assume liability and thus the rigour upon 
which candidates were screened for directorships was not as stringent as under the 
previous structure, effectively devaluing its status –– ‘Status was dethroned and 
cash became King. Young brokers had nothing left to go for but a bigger bonus’ 
(Augar 2000:107). 
 
With the removal of partnership structures, efforts were made to manage incentives 
and create a cohesive culture to unite merged and acquired firms with separate 
histories and ways of doing things (Roberts and Kynaston 2002). However, the 
integrated banks faced resistance to values; subcultures and cliques began to 
emerge. Another area that caused cultural divides within the integrated banks 
particularly between the commercial bankers and the investment bankers was levels 
of remuneration, as the investment bankers got rewarded considerably more than 
their counterparts in the commercial divisions (Courtney and Thompson 1996). 
Other points of contention also included the processes followed for decision making. 
Within the commercial side, decisions were made as a collective through careful 
deliberation and subject to an approval process, with the ultimate aim of reducing 
risk. The investment side of the banks had a long standing tradition of making 
decisions ‘on the hoof’ (Augar 2000:110) with minimum deliberation and paperwork 
all in the name of entrepreneurial spirit. 
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This section aimed to explore the suggestion that the historicism of the industry 
played a role in the construction of banking cultures and the unravelling of the crisis. 
The 1986 deregulation of the UK financial markets under the Thatcher 
administration, saw the introduction of a more competitive banking sector emerge 
which championed meritocracy and enterprise (Kerr and Robinson 2012; Storey et 
al. 1999) themes that play a central role the industry today and contribute to the 
development of more intensified forms of these discourses (Nealon 2008). This also 
resulted in the intensification of working hours which has remained commonplace 
within the industry to this day (Ho 2000; Jacobs 2014; Treanor 2006; Lewis 2006). 
Furthermore, deregulation brought about the disintegration of the partnership 
structures (Treanor 2006) reducing the personal liability of bank leadership thus 
introducing the effects of moral hazard, which will be discussed below.  
 
The collapse of the partnership structures also meant the aspiration of making 
partner was replaced with the desire to earn bigger bonuses (Augar 2000), 
potentially fueling the notion of greed as a central element of the crisis, which will 
be discussed further in the following section, as well as being examined in the data 
and analysis chapters. Furthermore, the breakdown of partnerships coupled with 
the introduction of telecommunications spurred the collapse of paternal bonds, 
causing a reduction of loyalty and commitment, creating an environment where 
banks strived to engender loyalty and develop shared values through attempts at 
creating a cohesive culture (Augar 2000). These 1986 changes where competition 
and individualism were intensified arguably resulted in the emergence of enterprise 
discourse (Barratt, 2003; McCabe 2016) within the banking industry, which will be 
examined in the analysis chapter of this thesis. The next section will be outlining the 
context of the financial crisis and the events that led up to it, building upon the history 
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of the industry discussed in the last section moving to the years preceding the crisis, 
outlining the financial mechanisms, products and innovations that are attributed with 
causing the crisis. 
 
3.3 Financial Crisis 
 
The financial crisis which descended upon the world towards the end of 2008 has 
been estimated to have resulted in losses of $4.3 trillion dollars to global financial 
institutions (Castells et al. 2012). Stock markets began to crash, foreclosures 
escalated and consumer spending declined. Complex ponzi schemes were 
unearthed, exposing fraud and collusion within the global financial industry and 
some commentators have suggested that governments responded in a confused 
and uncoordinated manner (Roubini and Mihm 2011). Once the severity of the crisis 
was realised, national taxation funds and loans from global financial markets were 
injected into the banks to prevent them going bankrupt, leaving governments with 
public debts (Castells et al. 2012; Stiglitz 2010) and costing the UK government 
£850 billion. The crisis has been described as a black swan event (Taleb 2008), 
suggesting the crisis was ‘extraordinarily rare and well-nigh impossible to predict’ 
(Roubini and Mihm 2011: 16). However it can be suggested that the recent financial 
crisis did not occur spontaneously and without warning but was a predictable and 
even inevitable crash caused by the culmination of calculated actions by various 
interested groups, and which was also influenced by the historicism of the industry. 
 
Castells et al. (2012) contend that 1960s and 1970s saw a shift towards a ‘culture 
of freedom’, where entrepreneurialism became rooted in individuation (Giddens 
1991), therefore paving the way for mass financial deregulation, privatisation, and 
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liberalisation, changing the foundations of economic institutions (Castells et al. 
2012). This deregulation coupled with this individualism apparently spawned a new 
kind of financial corporate manager, who was focused on placing their own short 
term gain above all else, leading them to make increasingly risky decisions (Castells 
et al. 2012; McDonald and Robinson 2009; Sennet 2006). 
 
This has led some commentators (Randall 2012; Rojas and Mercer 2015; Fortado 
2015) to assert that a contributory cause of the global financial crisis was greed, 
suggesting that this generation of bankers are greedier than past generations. 
However, the distinction is not the amount of greed prevalent in Wall Street and 
other financial hubs around the world but instead the direction this lust for money 
has channelled into compensation structures. Compensation packages have 
become increasingly tied to short-term profits, which will be discussed further in the 
data chapters. This has incentivised bankers to ‘bet the entire bank on astonishingly 
reckless investment strategies’ (Roubini and Mihm 2011: 32; Kerr and Robinson 
2012; Tourish and Hargie 2012). Recently Tom Hayes, the banker at the heart of 
the LIBOR rigging scandal, declared:  
 
‘The point is, you are greedy, you want every little bit of money you can 
possibly get...that's how you are judged, that's your performance metric.’ 
(Rojas and Mercer 2015; Fortado 2015). 
 
Saville (1996: 808) asserts that prior to the 1980s, British banking was a traditional 
‘don’t bet the bank’ affair. However, the 1980s saw the introduction of a number of 
industry wide changes that drastically changed the way UK banks were operated. 
Saville argues that this saw the emergence of a more aggressive banking sector, 
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one which departed from the ethos of moderation and long-term strategies. This 
radical change transpired from the ideological revolution championed by the 
Thatcher administration, one which favoured meritocracy and enterprise (Kerr and 
Robinson 2012).  
 
This revolution included numerous reforms including mass deregulation of the 
financial industry, discussed above. An example of the shift from ‘old guard’ banking 
to a more seemingly ruthless and individualistic industry can be seen in the evolution 
of RBS where under the helm of George Mathewson, US management models were 
implanted into the bank in an attempt to modernise the organisation. This attempt 
at modernisation saw the bank’s name change from Royal Bank of Scotland to RBS 
in an effort to shift away from its local heritage in preparation for globalisation (Kerr 
and Robinson 2012; 2015).  
 
Mathewson, supported by his right-hand man Fred Goodwin, led RBS to 
successfully take over Natwest. Later when Goodwin took charge of RBS, he 
pursued an aggressive strategy of expansion through acquisition leading some to 
accuse him of megalomania (Kerr and Robinson 2012). Goodwin’s ambitions led 
him to defeat Barclays in a takeover bid for  ABN Amro, placing RBS as the leading 
bank in the UK banking sector (Martin 2013; Fraser 2014). However in his haste to 
assert his dominance, Goodwin ended up acquiring a bank that was overvalued and 
loaded with toxic debt. This coupled with RBS’s own overlooked toxic assets 
resulted in RBS posting a £24 billion loss, the largest in UK corporate history, placing 
it in dire need of government bailout (Kerr and Robinson 2011; 2015; Tourish and 
Hargie 2012; Martin 2013; Fraser 2014). Many commentators suggest that the 
reckless behaviour of senior executives was fuelled by competition between them 
   70 
for status and dominance (Elliott and Atkinson 2009; Kerr and Robinson 2012; 
Tourish and Hargie 2012). It could also be argued that they were exhibiting the kinds 
of enterprising behaviour discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Prior to the 1970s, the assets of UK banks grew in line with overall economic activity, 
remaining at a level which matched fifty percent of annual GDP. However by 2001 
assets had rocketed to more than 500 percent of the UK GDP (Alessandri and 
Haldane 2009: 3 cited from Castells et al. 2012). However, as a bank’s assets are 
in fact loans owed to the bank, the profits raised on this lending funded high dividend 
and bonus payments. This combined with the banks’ dwindling cash reserves, 
resulted in an arguably vulnerable banking system with precarious looking balance 
sheets, compounded by securitised assets. The situation has been characterised 
as ‘an asset bubble waiting to burst’ (Castells et al. 2012: 69). This growing portfolio 
of assets, which were placed into structured investment vehicles, registered 
offshore as separate entities, allowed the banks to exploit loopholes and evade 
regulation by UK authorities (Castells et al. 2012). Additionally these assets were 
‘sliced and diced, packaged and repackaged’ then sold on numerous times making 
the chain of liability so convoluted that it was no longer clear who carried the risk in 
the event of a default, giving the illusion that the risks had been eliminated (Castells 
et al. 2012: 70; Roubini and Mihm 2011), when in actual fact the risks had been 
exponentially amplified for the financial system as a whole. 
 
The premise behind these financial innovations was lenders trying to recoup their 
money sooner by selling off bonds of the debts they had originated. This was seen 
as a  “win-win” situation as mortgage lenders could make a healthy return without 
having to wait 30 years. The investment banks earned a large fee for assisting in 
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the sale of the securities and investors received a steady revenue stream over the 
period of the loan repayments. However as the consequences of bad loans and 
defaults no longer fell onto the banks, they no longer had the incentive to conduct 
due diligence and scrutinise the underlying risks when lending. This meant that ‘a 
bad mortgage is passed down the line like a hot potato’ (Roubini and Mihm 2011: 
65). This kind of securitisation became common practice for not only mortgages but 
for all kinds of commercial and consumer loans. The various rating agencies could 
have prevented such flippant behaviour but they too benefited handsomely from 
such short-term innovation, racking up large fees by turning ‘toxic loans into gold-
plated securities’ (Roubini and Mihm 2011: 33; Castells et al. 2012). In 2015 
Standard & Poor were fined 1.32 billion dollars for issuing ‘overly favourable ratings 
to boost demand for its services’ (The Economist 2015). 
 
Regulators around the world failed to rein in the proliferation of securitised financial 
products, which some have deemed as shortsighted and reckless, accusing 
regulators of being ‘asleep at the wheel’ (The Economist 2013). Regulators and 
Central Banks were persuaded by the rhetoric that the ‘markets know best and 
never fail’ (Roubini and Mihm 2011:33; The Economist 2013). This was a rhetoric 
that was pushed by prominent advocates such as Alan Greenspan: US Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve until 2006. Greenspan asserted that innovations such as 
subprime lending should not be of concern as lenders are able to efficiently and 
accurately assess risks and price that risk accordingly (Castells et al. 2012). 
However, it transpires that lenders were not that stringent with their risk 
assessments, as lenders were funnelling their portfolios of different loans to Wall 
Street and alike to be turned in complex securities and sold all around the world, 
meaning that the underlying risk was of no concern to them. 
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This type of behaviour was not isolated to bankers exclusively, as European 
governments (The Economist 2013) also participated in a financial game of hide 
and seek. Under the Maastricht Treaty, EU states had to keep their debt-to-GDP 
ratios at less than 60 percent (Castells et al. 2012). It emerged that investment 
bankers from firms such as Goldman Sachs instructed European Governments to 
utilise financial instruments that allowed increased borrowing, while appearing to 
comply with EU deficit laws (Armitage and Chu 2015). An example of this can be 
seen from the Greek debt crisis. Greece was advised by Goldman Sachs to engage 
in complex financial deals which disguised the extent of the country’s debt and 
allowed it to remain within Maastricht Treaty rules (Armitage and Chu 2015). When 
the extent of the debt that these EU states had accrued came to light, ratings 
agencies began to downgrade the status of national bonds causing interest rates 
on national debt to soar. Increasing the interest burden meant nations needed to 
raise more money, plummeting them into further debt and increasing the likelihood 
of default. 
 
This financial crisis rooted in the credit-debt structures of modern financial 
institutions, metamorphosised and shifted into social and political spheres. 
Governments are now implicated in the crisis through the use of public resources to 
bailout out the banks, effectively nationalising a number of banks. The anger and 
frustration that was felt towards the bankers at the heart of this meltdown are now 
redirected towards governments who are seen to have let the bankers off lightly 
(Smith 2016). Some argue that in the aftermath governments have done little to 
constrain the banks’ apparent reckless behaviour (White  2015) through re-
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regulation of the sector and dealing with remuneration structures (Castells et al. 
2012). 
 
However, more importantly, the bailouts and recession have exposed the fragility of 
a number of nations’ finances. In order for them to service their growing debts and 
increasing interest burdens, they have had to constrain public spending which is 
exacerbated by declining tax yields, which are themselves the result of a stagnate 
or declining economy (Castells et al. 2012; Roubini and Mihm 2011). Governments 
have claimed that they have no choice but to curtail spending on public services, 
reducing public sector employment, pay and pensions, restructuring of public 
assets, education and health institutions, and the increase of taxation (Emmerson 
and Tetlow 2015). The UK government initiated ‘dramatic austerity measures’ 
(Pimlott, Giles and Harding 2010) which saw £81 billion to be cut from public 
spending over the course of four years following its announcement in 2010.  This 
elicited feelings of anger and outrage from many sectors of society, who feel they 
have been cast into austerity to pay for the sins of bankers who are still living 
extravagantly with their big bonuses and private pensions (Castells et al. 2012; 
Tourish and Hargie 2012; Treanor 2014b; 2014c; 2014d; 2014e; 2014f). An example 
of this is RBS which is 81% publicly owned, but paid out £576 million in bonuses 
despite reporting a loss of £8.6 billion (Tadeo 2014), suggesting little has changed 
in the sector and it is business as usual. 
 
One rationale behind such behaviour is the concept of ‘moral hazard’, where an 
individual or entity is inclined to take excessive risk because they will not be the one 
who is ultimately responsible for any negative consequences.  For example, the 
mortgage broker presenting the bank with a ‘liar loan’, a loan upon which the 
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debtor’s creditworthiness has not been substantiated or is based on fabricated 
earnings or credit information, held no responsibility and earned their fee 
irrespective of any future defaults. Additionally, the bank or mortgage lender who 
originated the loan would pass the loan on as part of a portfolio to be sold on by 
investment banks, as mentioned earlier. Likewise, the trader who securitised and 
sold on these potentially toxic assets would be generously compensated and any 
repercussions would be shouldered by their employer. If it transpires that things 
have been pushed too far and are on the brink of catastrophic collapse then the 
banks can rely on the lender of last resort, namely the central banks to step in and 
bail them out. This is what occurred during the 2008 financial crisis where the RBS 
and Lloyds banking group were subject to a £66 billion bailout (Bowers et al. 2013). 
Although the concept of moral hazard is not new, its implications were intensified by 
the circumstances surrounding the financial sector during the years preceding the 
crisis. For example, the change in ownership structures of banks removed the 
partnership model, which saw the responsibility of lending risk carried by the 
partners, however, shareholder ownership diminished this proportioning of liabilities. 
Furthermore, innovation in the credit market introduced the development of 
securitised financial products which made it increasingly easy to shift risk and 
responsibility by selling it on to investors. Thus, ‘banks became loan processors, 
writing risk and selling it on’ (Bowers et al. 2013). This increased profitability and 
consequently the size of bonuses, resulting in an increasing focus on annual 
bonuses; by 2005 the top five investments firms paid out a total of $25 billion, 
growing to $36 billion in 2006 and rising further to $38 billion the year after (Roubini 
and Mihm 2011: 69). 
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The concept of moral hazard coupled with complex securitisation raises important 
questions that must be explored. Is this notion of remoteness from responsibility an 
underlying factor in the systemic wrongdoing that plagued the financial system? Do 
individuals feel that the negative consequences are so far away from their day to 
day lives that they feel no guilt or accountability for their actions? Is this a thought 
process that has transpired out of the structures of modern capitalist organisations 
that allow people to rationalise their wrongdoing as just part of the job and the 
destructive narrative that may unfold from their actions will not affect them and is 
therefore someone else's problem? These questions formed the background 
context to the set of interview questions that were developed for this thesis. Data 
collection will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
3.4 Banking Elite? 
 
It can be argued that the banks and their bankers held influence and authority over 
the global financial markets, investors and governments alike, through the 
knowledge they had produced (Foucault 1980) of the financial markets. Ho (2009) 
suggests that central to bankers’ perceived image of authority, persuasiveness and 
prowess is their culture of smartness. This projected image of being the smartest 
people in the world empowers bankers in Wall Street and other financial hubs 
around the world to view themselves as exemplars of the financial world: ‘a sense 
that must be embodied, believed in, and continually pumped up’ (Ho 2009:41). It is 
this self-affirmation of smartness that permits bankers to convey authority and 
legitimacy upon their assertion to be experts in the global financial markets 
sanctioning their own influence within the industry. The construction and 
maintenance of these purported cultural values are founded in hegemonic elitism. 
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For example, Ho (2009) claims that elitism is the substance upon which bankers 
view themselves, the world and what they do, something which will be returned to 
in the data and analysis chapters. 
 
Banks present themselves as being the route to prestige, wealth and a higher status, 
exclusive to the ranks of the banking profession (Ho 2009). It is claimed that the 
attainment of this membership is predicated on hard work (Kemp 2013), however, 
this is often exaggerated as this only accounts for a small part of the industry. The 
long hours that bankers are expected to work adds to the heroic picture they paint 
of themselves and internalise, something which furthers their own sense of 
exclusivity, as they believe only a select few can cope with their burden of work. 
They believe that they possess a particular blend of intellect, ambition and hard work 
(Ho 2009). 
 
The development of this theme begins at the stages of recruitment and orientation 
where banks recruit exclusively from world class universities, presenting investment 
banking as the only option to preserve and continue their sense of success and 
accomplishment from studying at such prestigious institutions (Peterson 2002; 
Hochman 1999). From their induction into the firm, recruits are immersed in the 
competitive and fast-moving nature of banking where 100 hour working weeks are 
normalised and even presented as positive. An example of this is captured by Right 
(2000), a summer intern at Whittards, where he claims to have averaged 90-100 
hours a week and did not sleep for the last three days of his internship; but 
nonetheless proclaims ‘these guys were awesome’ and without hesitation enrolled 
to the ranks of investment banking. It is claimed that one is not initiated into banking 
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life until they have experienced the relentless hours that investment banking entails; 
all nighters and 100 hour weeks are seen as a token of honour (Ho 2009). 
 
Ho (2009) in her ethnography of Wall Street discusses the segregation between the 
front and back office departments that are so embedded in the construction of Wall 
Street's culture of work and smartness. Ho goes on to discuss how those who do 
not hail from elite enough universities are placed in less prestigious and less well 
paid back office divisions of the bank: ‘for them, hard work was already severed 
from advancement and reward’ (Ho 2009: 77). This segregation is so ingrained into 
Wall Street that even the assortment of elevator bays represents this division of elite 
bankers from back office workers. An important question to explore is whether this 
institutionalised segregation that occurs with the segregation of investment bankers 
from the back office and less prestigious workers causes bankers to become 
detached from the impact of their actions. Constructing their own perspective that 
acts to accentuate their sense of self, ambition, smartness, and hardwork 
normalising their behaviour within their professional circles, potentially leading to 
detachment from the groups who may be negatively impacted by their actions.  
 
3.5 Struggle for Dominance 
 
Accounts of the financial crisis (Castells et al. 2012; Roubini and Mihm 2011; Elliott 
and Atkinson 2009; Banking Crisis Inquiry held by the House of Commons Treasury 
Committee 2009) present different groups and institutions as playing a role in the 
materialisation of the financial crisis through their competing interests and agendas. 
These include governments; regulators; investors; banks and the general public. 
This has meant that post-crisis there has been a struggle between some of these 
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groups to be the dominant voice in the articulation of the crisis in order to deflect 
blame and refute certain accounts of events. This can be seen to be what Foucault 
(1980; 133) calls a regime of truth where there is ‘a system of ordered procedures 
for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’. 
This means that certain accounts and statements pertaining to the crisis have been 
subjected to the agendas of various groups (Mills 2003) in an attempt to regulate 
perceptions and evade or shift blame.  
 
An example of this can be seen in the Banking Crisis inquiry held by the House of 
Commons Treasury Committee (2009). At the hearing where members of 
parliament quizzed the former CEOs of the UK’s major banks, persuasive devices 
were utilised by both the government and the bankers to construct a narrative of the 
event that serves their agenda (Schirato et al 2012). Whittle and Mueller’s (2011) 
analysis of the inquiry suggested that discursive devices were utilised by both the 
government and the banks to facilitate a persuasive argument. Although Whittle and 
Mueller’s use of discourses is not that of Foucault’s and the understanding of 
discourses that this thesis has adopted, their analysis nonetheless provides an 
insight into the contention that is at heart of the crisis; one narrative suggests that 
bankers are the ‘villains’ who brought the world down through the design of complex 
financial products that awarded them large bonuses while sacrificing long-term 
economic stability. Bankers can be seen to be self-serving amoral individuals who 
possess a flagrant disregard for other stakeholders. This portrayal of villainous 
bankers has become the dominant narration of the crisis perpetuated by the media 
and by politicians, resulting in what has been termed as a period of ‘banker bashing’ 
(Giles, Binham and Arnold 2015). The second narrative that emerged from the 
house of commons Treasury Committee hearing was one that portrayed bankers as 
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part of the victims who suffered this ‘financial tsunami’ suggesting that no individual 
group was at fault and it was a black swan event (Taleb 2008). The bankers claimed 
to be merely enacting practices and policies that were in the interests of economic 
growth and prosperity with the support of governments, regulators and shareholders 
(Whittle and Muellar 2011: 119; Tourish and Hargie 2012). 
 
The emergence of these two narratives occupies an important function within this 
thesis as they encapsulate a key contention that is at the heart of many portrayals 
and discussions of the financial crisis. On the one hand the banks and bankers are 
responsible for the crisis through their greed, selfishness and ‘toxic’ work practices. 
On the other hand bankers are equally victims of the crisis, who acted without malice 
and were just carrying out economic policies that were supported by the 
government, regulators and the public. 
 
Additionally, the way in which testimony is provided by the bankers at the inquiry is 
of interest as it was carefully calculated to ensure maximum PR efficiency, in the 
sense that they did not want to discredit the free market principles and ideals that 
their financial system is constructed upon. Yet the bankers did not want to direct the 
blame towards the human actors who oversee this system, which included 
themselves, regulators and the government. This is important as it highlights how 
statements and accounts of the crisis should be approached with scepticism, as 
knowledge is constructed utilising exclusionary practices in order to present ‘facts’ 
from interested parties. However, it can be argued that reports and accounts of the 
crisis produced by various outlets and groups, which are presented as ‘true’ and 
‘factual’, are in fact ‘mediated and stage-managed series of negations’ (Mills 2003: 
73), that are compiled, edited and selected. 
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The persuasive devices utilised by the bankers to account for the failure attempt to 
maintain faith in and the integrity of the banking system. This may indicate that the 
banks do not believe that the system itself needs to be radically changed or that the 
anyone acted unethically or recklessly and therefore should not be blamed or 
punished (Whittle and Mueller 2011). This postulation then places the industry in 
somewhat of a predicament, if neither system nor actor is to blame then changes to 
the industry become difficult to implement as there is no point of rupture to be 
remedied. By this admission then the bankers are suggesting that there is no 
specific area that needs to be addressed meaning that any attempts will be 
nebulous, in vain or unnecessary. This may explain the difficulties that the industry 
is experiencing since the crisis, with a constant stream of scandals and fines 
(Treanor 2014g). The regulatory reforms have not had a significant impact and since 
the focus has shifted to cultural reforms little progress has been made. This also 
raises questions regarding the industry’s sincerity to enact genuine changes as 
ultimately if the banks do not feel that their business processes, behaviours and 
cultural environment were not to blame then why make a change. 
 
From the above discussion, it can be suggested that the post-crisis environment has 
introduced a shift in power relations and the deconstructing of taken for granted 
assumptions (Whittle and Mueller 2011). For example, it could be argued that 
‘financial products and practices that were once assumed to be sustainable sources 
of economic growth and prosperity swiftly become de-legitimized’ (Johnson and 
Kwak 2010: 197). The Banking Crisis Inquiry showed how bankers now engaged in 
a struggle to be heard and assert their claims as a ‘truth’. Before the crisis this was 
not the case as they wielded influence, previously a power relation existed between 
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the banks, governments, regulators and wider economic stakeholders through the 
banks’ development of knowledge of the financial markets (Foucault 1975; 1978). 
 
3.6 Cultural Research 
 
This section will explore some of the recent research and reports conducted on the 
banking industry’s culture. The section will outline some of the main findings from 
this research, as well as the recommendations made by the researchers. Much of 
these types of research have been undertaken from a positivist perspective, thus 
viewing organisational culture as a definable entity that can be manipulated by 
management. Furthermore, these types of research and reports take managerial 
orthodoxy as fact and make multiple assumptions in an attempt to make prescriptive 
recommendations. However, it is important to acknowledge and discuss this body 
of work as it positions this thesis and its contribution to the field, highlighting the 
importance of critical research into banking culture in the context of the financial 
crisis. The chapter will end with an exploration of the challenges that the industry 
and regulators have faced in reforming the softer aspects of the industry, as well as 
a brief discussion of some of the mechanisms the industry has utilised in an attempt 
to revitalise the image of the industry to employees and wider stakeholders. 
 
Spicer et al. (2014) conducted a study on the culture of British retail banking. The 
research interviewed 26 senior representatives and 12 frontline employees from 11 
different banks, as well as 19 stakeholders from 16 different organisations, including 
regulators, policy makers and investors. The research found that an aggressive 
sales culture was a major driver of bank failure, and that aggressive tactics led 
banks to make risky loans and engage in poor practices, resulting in toxic loans and 
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exposure to fines. Additionally, the recent policy changes and new regulatory 
interventions address administrative and structural issues, but leaves softer cultural 
issues to the banks themselves. In response, the majority of banks have initiated 
cultural change processes to respond to regulatory and policy makers’ pressure. 
Their approach is to ‘set the tone from the top and then cascade cultural change 
down their organisations’ (Spicer et al. 2014: 9). However, the cultural change 
initiatives are fragile in their effectiveness particularly in larger institutions where the 
message is at risk of getting lost and having little tangible impact on the front line. 
Spicer et al. (2014) concluded that the top-down message is present within the 
industry but this alone is not sufficient to change the culture of the industry. There 
needs to be a sustainable message disseminated throughout all levels of the 
institutions. They suggest that this can be achieved through an exploration by the 
banks of how their culture is enacted on the front line.  
 
The research goes on to recommend that banks need to make a committed and 
ongoing effort to implement cultural change initiatives and to accept that ‘completely 
transforming the culture is likely to take a generation’ (ibid: 11). It argues that banks 
need to employ a number of metrics in order to gain a rich insight into their own 
culture and reduce senior managerial disconnect from the culture that is 
disseminated to the rest of the organisation. The postulation that metrics should be 
used to measure organisational culture overlooks the complexity of organisational 
culture as a social phenomenon and would act to oversimplify it (Martin 2002). The 
research also recommends that regulators should play a more hands on role in 
encouraging banks to confront the softer cultural issues on an industry level and not 
get distracted. Additionally, investors should be encouraged to recognise the steady 
pace that cultural change requires and to be patient, refraining from applying undue 
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pressure on the banks for other outcomes that will only act to reduce the 
effectiveness of the cultural changes implemented. 
 
The research carried out by Spicer et al (2014) very much adopts a top-down 
perspective to organisational culture. For example, the research paper includes a 
brief discussion of ‘what is culture’, with the literature confined to the cultural guru 
texts and other managerialist texts with no attempt to discuss alternative 
perspectives of organisational culture. Thus, from the outset, this research is 
confined by its managerialist tone and stance and makes no attempt to engage with 
the complex and fluid nature of organisational culture. Furthermore, from the brief 
discussion of the research above we can see that Spicer et al. (2014) perpetuate 
the notion that culture is something that can be changed by senior management and 
the research explores and makes suggestions as to the circumstances under which 
such change initiatives can be most effective. Additionally, the assertion to 
‘completely’ transform the culture would take a ‘generation’, not only reiterates the 
cultural engineering assumption that a culture can be ‘completely’ changed if at all, 
but demonstrates how taken for granted assumptions of calculability and 
predictability (Knights and McCabe 2015) inform attempts at post-crisis changes 
through placing a time frame on cultural reforms. The suggestion that cultural 
transformations would take a ‘generation’ implies that culture is predictable and 
calculable thus attempting to apply ‘technical rationality’ (Knights and McCabe 2015: 
199) to organisational culture. By doing this, culture is reduced to a rational variable 
which acts to deny and ignore the ‘social embeddedness’ while also detaching ‘the 
bodily, material and tangible aspects of lived experience’ (ibid). Knights and 
McCabe (2015) assert how both the causes and explanations of the crisis and the 
subsequent solutions are embedded within the same ontological and 
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epistemological assumptions. Therefore, it could be suggested that it would be 
timely and beneficial to seek out alternative perspectives that depart from those 
taken for granted assumptions and utilise a more critical perspective of culture and 
the industry.  
 
Deloitte (2013) also carried out some research into banking culture, interviewing 41 
senior bankers from around the world. They found that 65% of senior bankers 
believe that the industry suffers from significant cultural problems, and although this 
was never clearly defined, these bankers believe that within their organisations the 
problems are less extensive. Similarly, 76% felt that compensation levels 
contributed significantly to cultural problems, however only 26% believed they were 
a significant contributory factor within their own bank. Additionally, senior bankers 
expressed that it will take 3 to 4 years for the industry to inculcate the optimum 
culture, although their optimism increased markedly when discussing culture within 
their own organisation predicting it will only take one and a half to two and a half 
years to reach cultural goals. 
 
Deloitte’s (2013) research on banking culture reduces organisational culture to 
statistical data condensing participant responses to percentages, thus overlooking 
the complexity and breadth of available understandings, perspectives and definition 
of cultural artefacts and attributes. Furthermore, the research continues to show 
how embedded predictability and calculability are within the industry, with 
proclamations that ‘optimum’ culture will be achieved in 3 to 4 years. Additionally, 
the postulation that an optimum culture exists further demonstrates how there is a 
failure to view culture as organic and ongoing phenomena that does not have a 
destination or an end goal. 
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The majority of the participants felt that misaligned incentives and poor leadership 
were among the main causes of the cultural problem within the industry. 
Additionally, two-thirds felt that light-touch regulation and inadequate supervision 
were also to blame for cultural problems that manifested before the financial crisis. 
Respondents agreed that employee performance metrics and compensation 
structures were points of influence for changing culture within banks. Furthermore, 
90% of bankers surveyed asserted that senior leadership and the CEO are 
responsible for setting and changing the culture from the top, as they felt that 
regulation is ineffective at changing culture (Deloitte 2013). It is interesting that light-
touch regulation and inadequate supervision were to blame for cultural problems: 
this, coupled with claims that participants’ own organisations suffered fewer cultural 
problems, suggests that some industry actors are in denial regarding the extent of 
the problems, deferring the blame and sidestepping responsibility. Additionally, 
claims that senior leadership and CEOs are responsible for setting culture further 
highlights how the industry continues to adopt the 1980s cultural engineering 
prescriptions. 
 
One of the important causes to consider is ’speaking up’ or whistle-blowing as 62% 
of senior bankers discussed how a lack of upward communication to express 
concerns or problems was a significant cultural problem, with just 26% rating the 
industry as effective in encouraging whistle-blowing. A Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
expressed how due to the tight labour market junior employees may feel vulnerable 
in speaking out about wrongdoing. Additionally a senior executive at an international 
bank told Deloitte (2013:11) how whistle-blowing procedures often followed form 
over substance: ‘boards and organisations are just going through the motions. 
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There are insufficient consequences when poor behaviours are raised particularly if 
revenue is threatened’. Furthermore, individuals may be deterred from 
whistleblowing as there have been reports of employees being fired for doing so 
(Treanor 2015a). 
 
A respondent to Deloitte’s (2013: 14) research mentioned how ‘there is a societal, 
cultural problem around acceptance of norms of behaviour around greed and 
money’. Another participant, a CRO at a European bank, suggested that much of 
the egregious behaviour within the industry was not challenged by stakeholders or 
the broader public as it reflected changes in a society that enjoyed the prosperity 
that the capitalist system had brought. The Head of Compliance at another 
European bank stated ‘Banks and their employees are a mirror of society’ (ibid). 
Other participants expressed grievances about the way in which bankers had been 
proportioned the majority of the blame, pointing out that other parties played a part, 
not least politicians in their encouragement of home ownership through loose 
monetary policy: ‘they didn't take any steps to suppress the housing bubble, and 
neither did we.’ (ibid). This is an interesting prospect as it suggests the presence of 
competing forces that contributed to the emergence of the crisis, which can be seen 
in governmental policies on home ownership and support for sub-prime lending.  
This raises some important questions regarding the degree to which respondents 
feel the industry is responsible for the financial crisis. 
 
Additionally, governments were also advocates of the neoliberal rhetoric that 
believes that the markets are self-regulating and will never fail (Castells et al. 2012). 
Additionally, it can be argued that pressure from investors to receive above market 
returns on their investments was a contributory factor. Finally it has been argued 
   87 
that the general public necessitated the need for certain financial products and 
innovations in order to satisfy the demand for consumer credit. All this alludes to the 
existence of a complex web of power relations that play a contributory part in the 
conduct of banking institutions and constitute an interconnected web of actors and 
competing power relations with each exercise of power having a causal effect upon 
the other actors within the network. This is something that this thesis seeks to 
explore in the later chapters utilising critical frameworks to engage with the plurality 
of events (Foucault 1978; Schirato et al 2012). 
 
3.6.1 The Struggle for Culture 
 
Inquiries and discussions around the financial crisis have identified cultural failings 
as a root cause (Spicer et al. 2014; Salz 2013; Deloitte 2013; Chon 2014). The initial 
changes that took place within the financial industry centred around regulatory 
reforms which focused on structure through legislative change, however, culture has 
not been addressed through these changes as some believe it is difficult to regulate 
for the right culture (Spicer et al. 2014). That said, this contradicts some of the claims 
from the research discussed above, where it was suggested that light-touch 
regulation and inadequate supervision contributed to the industry’s cultural 
problems. 
 
This demonstrates that there is confusion surrounding the cultural issues that the 
industry faces due to a lack of understanding from regulators and policy makers 
about what culture is. Industry reports (Spicer et al. 2014; Salz 2013; Deloitte 2013) 
have discussed how cultural issues pertain to normative assumptions, beliefs and 
values, however on other occasions remuneration packages, work-life balance, 
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performance measurement and whistleblowing policies are regarded as cultural 
issues (Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; Salz 2013; House of Commons Treasury 
Committee 2011). There is consensus that culture is important but difficult to 
quantify, define and address, yet banks are intent on attempting to quantify and 
define their culture. The confusion over cultural change is further compounded by 
the fact that multiple points of transformation have been identified. These include 
leadership, governance, training, bonus structures, training, recruitment and 
diversity to name a few, making cultural change seemingly sporadic and 
overwhelming. To complicate matters further, points of transformation fall outside 
the prescribed methods of cultural change initiatives, which dictate that such 
programmes should utilise leadership, HR and symbolic activities as the tools for 
cultural change (Peters and Waterman 1982). However Spicer et al. (2014) assert 
that focussing on these functionalist levers will not be enough to really change the 
culture in a bank and the wider industry. 
 
The complexity of culture is further underestimated by many commentators and 
implementors, as a top-down perspective of culture is maintained with little 
consideration for the disconnect between those at the top and those on the frontline 
of the banks. Many of the organisations within the industry have mission statements, 
codes of conduct or other paraphernalia conveying the institution's values, however, 
much of this bears little significance to the practicalities of the organisation or how 
performance is measured. Therefore deeming many of the changes within the 
industry unproductive, which can only act to heighten the frustration of regulators, 
investors and wider stakeholders, as the changes made within the industry have not 
come to fruition, failing to ‘stop the banks behaving badly’ (Treanor 2014g). This 
demonstrates the importance of the day-to-day behaviours of management and staff 
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in cultural exploration. Spicer et al.’s (2014) research into banking culture found that 
a trigger for many banking institutions to initiate regimes of cultural change was the 
LIBOR rigging scandal due to the subsequent public outrage and government 
inquiries.  
 
The research discussed above discovered that the barriers to cultural change 
initiatives include the potential of a diminishing in the industry’s commitment to 
addressing cultural issues. This means that although senior executives within the 
industry seem to be expressing an interest in reforming the industry’s culture, this 
may change and their attentions may shift elsewhere, particularly if these changes 
are perceived to be taking too long. Another barrier and one which may have an 
impact on the first, is the industry’s seemingly eternal drive for profits, regulatory 
compliance and cultural change initiatives have been costly. This, factored in with 
the record fines the banks have had to settle, could potentially reduce profit margins. 
Therefore investors may begin to demand a return to focusing on returns on 
investments, thus risking a return to short-termism. In fact, such pressures can 
already be seen to be emerging, as evidenced by the recent ousting of Barclay’s 
CEO Antony Jenkins who was appointed in 2012 to ‘clean up the bank’s scandal-
plagued culture’ and was even dubbed ‘Saint Antony’ (Arnold 2015a). However, 
Jenkins’s conservatism and failure to rebuild return on equity at Barclay’s 
investment banking division (Arnold 2015b) caused tensions between himself and 
the Head of Barclay’s Investment Bank, Tom King, leading the board to unanimously 
vote to remove Jenkins (Arnold 2015c). 
 
These assertions bring into question the industry’s commitment and sincerity to 
bring about change within the industry as it can be argued that the industry’s focus 
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is easily displaced by profits. This is an important issue for the industry and is 
something that will be returned to in the data chapters. From these discussions 
surrounding the industry’s struggle for culture it may begin to seem that the culture 
is not the panacea that the industry was led to believe, and progress cannot be 
achieved in 3 to 4 years or even a generation. Furthermore, a more critical approach 
to research banking culture than that adopted by the above research and reports 
would indicate a wider range of barriers to culture change, largely centred around 
managerial assumptions and omissions, something which this thesis aims to 
explore further. 
 
3.6.2 Initiating Change  
 
Many banks have attempted to initiate culture change by introducing what they claim 
to be new mission statements or a new set of values, as they equate organisational 
culture with mission statements and values. A good example of this is Deutsche 
Bank who circulated a document internally that communicates the values and 
beliefs at Deutsche banks. The documents begin by explaining how these are the 
‘new values’ of the bank and that they are at the core of everything the bank does, 
which seems somewhat nonsensical as these are ‘new’ values that are supposed 
to initiate cultural change, illustrated by the closing statement which professes that 
‘cultural change’ begins with everyone.  
 
This document is representative of similar cultural paraphernalia released by banks 
to initiate cultural change. It communicates the bank’s core values with the 
headings: ‘integrity, sustainable performance, client centricity, innovation and 
discipline’. Other institutions have introduced or already had similar values and 
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beliefs thus demonstrating that illustrating that the notion of a strong culture 
underpinned by a unique set of values and beliefs is a falsehood and in actuality 
what is needed is a simple articulation of general values. If we take a closer look at 
the statements under the core values we can see that the bank communicates that 
they endeavour to do not only what is allowed but also what is right thus outlining 
the importance of behaving morally within the industry. This introduces an 
interesting theme namely ‘working in the grey’ where banks may attempt to exploit 
loopholes within regulatory frameworks through financial innovations with the aim of 
reaping above market returns. Something which had occurred in high levels leading 
up to the crisis which underpinned much of the apparent wrongdoing and illegal 
behaviour that contributed to the crisis.  
 
The banks are attempting to reduce misbehaviour through revamped cultural 
handbooks and mission statements (Banking Standards Board 2016), however 
arguably this has seen little effect on these types of behaviour. This can be seen in 
the recent tax evasion scandal that engulfed HSBC (Barrett 2015). Also a recent 
study of Wall Street and the City of London, conducted by the law firm Labaton 
Sucharow and Notre Dame University (Tenbrunsel and Thomas 2015; Paton 2015) 
found that illegal behaviour is still widespread and 32 percent of British participants 
stated they would engage in insider trading if there was no risk of prosecution. 
Respondents also reported that they felt under pressure from their organisations to 
skirt the law which is supported by the compensation packages awarded. 
 
Barclays launched a training academy in conjunction with Cambridge Judge 
Business School in order to train employees on integrity and ‘what is compliance’. 
Such initiatives are implemented in a manner which is reminiscent of the ‘strong 
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culture’ mantra of the 1980s with Michael Roemer, Head of Compliance at Barclays 
stating ‘Other people are hiring arms and legs. We're investing in brains’ (Treanor 
2014h). In spite of this and their £300 million annual investment in compliance, 
Barclays was recently fined £284.4 million by the FCA for forex ‘failings’ (FCA 2015). 
 
Furthermore, in attempts to regain public trust and demonstrate integrity and ethical 
behaviour, a number of banks have intensified their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) programmes. One example of this is where employees pledge a few days a 
year to a charitable cause and some institutions will match employee donations to 
approved charities. The leadership of these banks including James Dimon, the CEO 
of J.P. Morgan, and Bob Lewis, CEO of Bank of America, have proclaimed their 
companies’ philanthropic efforts as evidence of their good corporate citizenship, 
when accounting for the billions of bailout funding they received (Dobson 2012). 
However it was found in an independent report by the National Committee for 
Responsive Philanthropy that J.P Morgan had only donated 0.08% of revenue 
between 2006 and 2010, being described as ‘disappointing’; Bank of America faired 
slightly better with ‘mediocre’ philanthropic performance and Goldman Sachs 
donating 0.03% of revenue being described as ‘miserly’ (Dobson 2012: 5). As a 
result, the industry has been accused of lacking transparency in their philanthropic 
endeavours and instead utilising it as rhetoric to fool regulators into believing they 
are good corporate citizens and to rebuild their tarnished public image. 
 
It is not only the banks whose reforms have looked lacklustre under scrutiny. The 
industry has seen an overhaul in regulation including the abolishment of the 
Financial Services Authority to be replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority 
through the Financial Services Act (2012). This ‘empowers authorities to look 
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beyond ‘tick-box’ compliance and fosters a regulatory culture of judgment, expertise 
and proactive supervision’ (HM Treasury 2012). However one must question the 
material benefit in abolishing one authority to replace it with another, which 
ultimately has the same function as the previous authority albeit replacing the word 
‘services’ with ‘conduct’ could be regarded as ‘nothing more than a symbolic ritual, 
designed to act as a public facade and make the Government appear to be acting 
and mitigate public anxieties’ (Brown 2005; Whittle and Muellar 2011: 131). 
Conversely however the FCA, a key institution in creating ‘a strengthened regulatory 
architecture’ (The Financial Services Bill 2012) and restoring consumer trust and 
enhancing the integrity of the financial industry, has been heavily criticised in an 
independent inquiry (Davis 2014) for having a ‘poorly supervised and inadequately 
controlled’ briefing which had a detrimental impact on an organisation it regulates. 
This resulted in resignations and restructuring after only 18 months, as well as 
revoked bonuses (Arnold, Dunkley and Parker 2014). In addition to this, the FCA 
has seen a number of senior members leave to join Goldman Sachs, J.P Morgan 
and Barclays causing concerns over the relationship that regulators have with those 
who they are entrusted to regulate (Agnew 2015). 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter combined a number of different sections and discussed a variety of 
themes in order to provide an exploration of the contextual landscape of banking 
culture and the banking industry. The chapter began by outlining historical events 
in the banking industry notably the 1986 deregulation of the financial services 
industry operating in the City of London. The changes the industry underwent during 
this period: culturally, socially, economically, technologically were discussed with 
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regulatory and structural considerations. From this, we could see the level of 
influence the government wielded over shaping the industry and continues to do so. 
The deregulation of the industry had a profound impact on the demographic of the 
City, allowing US investment banks to trade within the City, influencing existing 
management techniques, working hours and remuneration structures. 
 
The 1986 deregulation of the UK financial markets that was championed by the 
Thatcher administration, spurred a more competitive banking sector which 
promoted meritocracy and enterprise (Kerr and Robinson 2012; Storey et al. 1999). 
These discourses of meritocracy and enterprise are central in the industry today but 
in a more intensified form (Nealon 2008), a theme which will be explored in the 
analysis chapter. Big Bang also saw the collapse of the partnership structures, 
replacing the aspiration of making partner with bonuses, potentially fuelling the 
notion of greed as a central element of the crisis, something which will be examined 
in the data and analysis chapters. These changes also caused a reduction of loyalty 
and commitment, establishing a need for banks to develop shared values and 
beliefs, creating a cohesive culture in an attempt to engender loyalty (Augar 2000). 
 
This chapter explored the intricacies of the financial crisis, exploring the financial 
products that have often been attributed to being a key element in bringing about 
the crisis. The section also discusses how government and other organisations have 
been implicated in the crisis, how the UK government and regulatory bodies 
attempted to deal with the crisis in the immediate aftermath, as well as how they 
and the banks attempted to displace blame and construct favourable narratives 
around their involvement. 
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This chapter also discussed the financial environment which contributed to the 
occurrence of the crisis, exploring the financial products that were traded in 
abundance, as well as the regulators and governments relationship with the industry 
before and after the crisis. Prior to the crisis power relations existed between 
bankers, governments, investors and the wider stakeholders of the financial markets 
through the knowledge (Foucault 1980) that bankers held of the financial markets. 
Within this set of power relations, bankers established their image of authority and 
smartness which allows them to convey legitimacy and assert themselves as 
‘experts’ of the financial world. 
 
However power relations are not solitary, as discussed in chapter one, multiple 
power relations can exist within the industry constructing an inter-related web of 
competing groups that are fluid and constantly changing. Post-crisis these 
competing groups and institutions have engaged in a struggle to be the presiding 
commentary on the crisis, in order to maintain their interests and deflect blame. 
From this struggle, two opposing narratives have transpired, one which presents the 
bankers as villainous culprits who caused the crisis due to their greed, selfishness 
and ‘toxic’ work practices. The other narrative suggests that bankers are part of the 
collective victims of the crisis and that they were merely fulfilling popular economic 
policy, mandated by government and regulators. These two opposing narratives 
form a key contention of the post-crisis representation, which will form an underlying 
theme within the participants’ accounts which are presented in the data chapters. 
 
As explored in this chapter, current cultural research into the financial crisis has 
employed a positivist perspective, one which views organisational culture as a 
definable entity and variable that can be manipulated by management. Additionally 
   96 
existing research and reports view managerial orthodoxy as fact, forming multiple 
assumptions for the purpose of developing prescriptive recommendations. 
However, from the research it emerges that there is confusion regarding the cultural 
issues that are facing the industry, as there seems to be a distinct lack of 
understanding from regulators and industry about what culture is (Spicer et al. 2014; 
Salz 2013; Deloitte 2013). There are suggestions that culture includes norms 
assumptions beliefs and values, while simultaneously it has been described to 
include remuneration packages, work-life balance, performance measurement and 
whistleblowing policies (Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; Salz 2013; House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2011). Such confusion surrounding organisational 
culture in spite of all the ‘experts’ consulting on the issue may suggest that that the 
industry culturist approach is incapable of addressing the complexity of 
organisational culture. Therefore providing the opportunity for alternative 
perspectives, the literature discussed in this chapter adequately positions the 
importance of the need for critical research into banking culture in the context of the 
financial crisis, that this thesis has undertaken. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis views organisational reality to be in a state of ongoing construction, 
meaning that identities, groups, cultures and ideologies are in a permanent state of 
flux, and are not static observable objects (Kelemen and Rumens 2008; Saunders 
et al. 2009). This makes it possible for individuals to hold different interpretations of 
their situation and environment from one another based on their own worldview, 
making it possible for multiple definitions of the organisation to exist (Kelemen and 
Rumens 2008; Denscombe 2007). These perspectives recognise the indeterminacy 
of the social world and see the world from different perspectives, acknowledging 
that people do not passively obey social rules nor do they fit neatly into external 
social structures but are instead creative agents bringing order to their own 
existence (Denscombe 2007; Silverman 2013), thus providing the opportunity to 
gain an insight into the contradictions and tensions that exist within contemporary 
organisations. 
 
This chapter will outline the philosophical approaches considered for this thesis, 
beginning with a brief discussion of the positivist tradition and its implications for 
social research, before moving on to a discussion of intepretivist and critical 
philosophies, which will inform the research decisions of this thesis, developing 
upon the social constructivist themes discussed above. The chapter will provide the 
rationale for why certain philosophical approaches have been utilised to inform this 
thesis, making considerations in regard to knowledge, what constitutes ‘truth’ and 
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the contentions around the existence of external realities. This will be done by 
drawing upon the work of Foucault (1980) in particular regimes of truth and how 
knowledge is constructed. 
 
The chapter will then move onto outlining the research approach of case studies 
that has been utilised for this research, providing justifications for why this method 
was adopted, the impacts of these methods and how these methods are informed 
by the assumptions inferred from the chosen research philosophy. This will be 
followed by a detailed discussion of the primary data collection method of interviews 
moving, through an account of how interviews were conducted and reflecting upon 
any concerns and difficulties encountered in their execution. The chapter will include 
reflections of my data collection, ethics and my developmental journey as a 
researcher during this period. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
This section aims to establish the methodological standpoint of the research to be 
undertaken. This will be done by exploring the theoretical perspectives that will 
underpin the research, as well as outline the processes that will be utilised for this 
research project. This section will also attempt to test the strength of the research 
design by discussing the rationale behind why specific approaches to the research 
were chosen over alternative methods. 
 
The doctrine of positivism contends that research of the social world should utilise 
the methods and principles of those used to explore the natural sciences (Denzin 
and Lincoln 1998; Saunders et al. 2009; Bryman and Bell 2003). Under positivism 
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only phenomena that are observable can produce knowledge, therefore to be 
‘considered genuinely scientific; they must be susceptible to the rigours of [scientific] 
observation’ (Bryman and Bell 2003: 14).  
 
This prompts some ontological considerations; ontology is understood to be the 
consideration of the question of whether social entities possess a reality that is 
external to the social actors who exist and engage with the entity. Positivism 
espouses the ontological perspective of objectivism, which views reality as external 
and objective. Here an organisation is discussed as a tangible object, which has 
rules, regulations and standardised procedures. It has a reality which is external to 
the individuals who inhabit it (Bryman and Bell 2003). The organisation provides a 
social order which acts to constrain its members, exerting a pressure to conform. 
The central theme of this thesis is culture, where a similar view transpires from the 
positivist philosophy, viewing culture as ‘repositories of widely shared values and 
customs into which people are socialised so that that they can function as good 
citizens’ (Bryman and Bell 2003: 19). Under positivism, both organisations and 
culture are entities external to the actor with the characteristics of an object. 
 
Additionally, positivism makes the epistemological assumption that scientifically 
valid knowledge can only be produced through the value free observation of a social 
phenomena’s external reality. The proposition of value-freedom is central to the 
positivist tradition emphasising that research must be determined by objective 
criteria and not grounded in human beliefs or interests (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). 
Pugh (1983: 48) contends that under positivism there must be a distinction between 
facts and values and that research must pivot around the facts of the data in order 
to test theories and hypothesis. This will in turn produce generalizable knowledge, 
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allowing one to infer conclusions regarding the ‘structure and functioning of 
organisations’ and those within them.  
 
The generalisability of research is a key tenet of positivism, which denotes that 
research samples should be of sufficient enough size so as to provide inferences 
that can be applied to a wider population. Additionally, positivism contends that 
phenomena or problems should be reduced to their simplest elements, which will 
also aid in the generalisability of deductions. Positivism then acts to reduce the 
complexity of organisational existence to a set of variables that can be tested 
through observable means in the endeavour to produce universal laws. 
 
4.3 Post-positivism 
 
The above approaches to the scientific observation and research of organisations 
are at risk of overlooking the complexity of social situations, such as organising 
human labour and behaviours (Yin 2003). It fails to account for an individual’s 
interpretation of their environment, self-reflection (Mangan 2009) and resistance. 
Due to the shortcomings of the positivist application to social sciences, many 
researchers moved beyond positivism resulting in a paradigmatic shift towards more 
interpretive and critical philosophies (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991). These alternatives suggest that social entities should instead be 
viewed as a socially constructed space in which the perceptions, actions and 
experiences of social actors contribute to its construction (Berger and Luckmann 
1966). 
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Under these perspectives, the differences between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences are acknowledged through the ‘empathic understanding of human 
action’ (Bryman and Bell 2003: 16).  An important aspect of the interpretivist 
philosophy is to empathise with research participants, allowing one to understand 
the world from their perspectives (Saunders et al. 2009; Collis and Hussey 2003), 
although a critical perspective would assert that there are intrinsic limitations of 
understanding and explaining participants’ accounts of the status quo (Fairclough 
1993). This is an important factor when researching organisational culture, as the 
organisation and its employees are shrouded in a cultural rhetoric, making it 
essential for the researchers to investigate the lived experience of employees 
(Knights 1995). An example of this can be seen in Grint’s (2000) work on leadership, 
which demonstrates the subjectivities that exist within organisational structures. 
Grint explains that definitions of ‘good’ leadership cannot exist externally but in order 
to understand its concept, meaning must be taken from interpretations of the 
organisational members who partake in this form of social action. Grint concludes 
that leadership is a social phenomenon that is hinged upon the subjective 
interpretations of followers. 
 
Ontologically such philosophies are grounded in the notion that reality is neither 
objective nor exterior but is instead given meaning from the individuals who partake 
in its construction. This developed the concept of social constructionism (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966), which focuses on understanding how people make sense of the 
world through their shared experiences. The ontological position of constructionism 
asserts that social phenomena and their attached meanings are constantly being 
negotiated by social actors (Strauss et al. 1973). This means that they are in a 
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constant state of change as they are ‘continually being established, renewed, 
reviewed, revoked revised’ (Strauss et al. 1973:  316). 
 
Interpretive and critical perspectives address doubts regarding the legitimisation of 
research by focusing on capturing and exploring the richness and complexity of a 
social phenomenon with an emphasis on the depth and quality of data presented in 
an open and reflexive manner (Kelemen and Rumens 2008; Saunders et al. 2009; 
Collis and Hussey 2003). Furthermore, due to the continual evolution and 
reformation of the business landscape, it is asserted that generalisability should not 
be of great significance to this methodology, as it is likely that the situation 
researched will likely change (Saunders et al. 2009; Collis and Hussey 2003). 
 
Constructionism translates to a perspective on culture that acknowledges its 
complexity, one which informs the research for this thesis. Here culture can be taken 
to be an emergent reality which is in a continual process of construction and 
reconstruction and at no point is this construction complete or unitary (Becker 1982; 
Saunders et al. 2009). Becker acknowledges that culture can provide a point of 
reference to certain individuals but that it is always being formed. The meanings 
attached to social situations can be ‘highly ephemeral’ (Bryman and Bell 2003: 21) 
as they can shift within time and place as certain discourses are engaged to create 
and present categories of knowledge in certain ways. These categories, however, 
are not external to us but are constituted through interaction, as individuals construct 
a shared reality through mutual interaction. It is neither stable nor coherent as 
different groups and individuals engage in a struggle for salience (Kelemen and 
Rumens 2008; Martin 2002). Furthermore, employees may possess different 
interpretations of the situations and the environment in which they are in, based on 
   103 
their own view of the world. This variety of different interpretations will result in 
different actions and responses to organisational culture, as employees not only 
interact with the corporate environment and its prescribed culture but they also 
attempt to understand and add meaning to these situations (Ogbonna and Harris 
1998).  
 
These perspectives understand organisational culture to be an ongoing social 
construction rather than a social fact (Smircich 1983; Saunders et al. 2009). 
Management theory and practice understand organisational culture to be a variable 
that can be manipulated into a desired state (Peters and Waterman 1982). However 
these post-positivist perspectives such as interpretivism reject this notion as too 
simplistic (Kelemen and Rumens 2008; Smircich 1983) and instead suggest ‘that 
culture is something that is created and re-created through a complex array of 
phenomena which includes social interactions and physical factors...to which 
individuals attach certain meanings, rituals and myths’ (Saunders et al. 2009: 111). 
Post-positive perspectives, particularly those of a critical nature, highlight the fluidity 
of organisational reality where organisations are not seen as static, stable and 
observable entities, but are inherently ambiguous and indeterminate. 
 
Critical perspectives are informed by a variety of theoretical approaches including 
that of Foucault (Knights 1995; Knights 2002). Foucault contends that the 
constitution of knowledge is discursive in nature formed through language and 
founded upon the discovery of truth. Foucault suggests that the production of 
knowledge occurs through the operation of disciplinary power. For Foucault, the 
examination of power is not established in its properties or source but instead in its 
‘modus operandi, how it produces compliance or resistance’ (Dick 2004; 203). 
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Power’s operation resides in the realms of discipling individuals which is enacted 
through discourse and occurs through normalising judgements (Foucault, 1977). 
This means that discourses attempt to prescribe and regulate behaviours that are 
deemed to be appropriate across a range of social domains and it is through the 
examination of these social domains that discourses are revealed (Dick 2004). 
However as mentioned above the social world is fluid, ambiguous and unpredictable 
therefore discourses are never unitary. This means that disciplinary power can 
never secure complete compliance as there are ‘always alternative discourses 
available that enable different individuals and groups to resist the regulatory norms 
in any specific social domain’ (Dick 2004: 204). 
 
Such perspectives depart from the positivist assumption that production of 
knowledge constitutes a pursuit of truth. Instead, knowledge is a construction which 
utilises exclusionary practices in order to present ‘facts’ that have been stipulated 
and ratified by authorised agencies. For example, news reports presented to us by 
certain media outlets are assumed to be ‘true’ and ‘factual’, when in fact, what we 
are presented with, is a ‘mediated and stage-managed series of negotiations’ (Mills 
2003:73), which have undergone a process of compilation, editing and exclusion.  
 
Knowledge is not produced in a vacuum but is subjected to various external forces 
which include the agenda of the author or researcher and the facilitating institution. 
These exclusionary practices that are enacted upon knowledge production, aims to 
further establish the distinction between true and false. The statements that are 
categorised as true are then reproduced and circulated until they become ‘common 
sense knowledge’ creating a ‘regime of truth’ (Mills 2003: 73). A regime of truth is ‘a 
system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation 
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and operation of statements’ (Foucault 1980: 133). Knowledge that falls outside the 
remit of what is considered ‘truth’ is not reproduced and is often forgotten and 
marginalised. Thus power, knowledge and truth are intricately linked (Knights 2004). 
Knowledge is not produced value free and objectively but is constructed, maintained 
and circulated by authors, institutions and groups, utilising it for their interests (Mills 
2003). 
 
Therefore, this thesis acknowledges there is no such thing as value-free research. 
Researchers interact and empathise with participants to be able to decipher the 
social meanings that exist, while acknowledging that the researcher has become 
part of the environment in which they are researching and are ‘one of the many 
voices contributing to the construction of theory’ (Kelemen and Rumens 2008: 35; 
Saunders et al. 2009; Collis and Hussey 2003; Denscombe 2007). The observers 
and those being observed partake in the construction of a social situation (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966) as Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 24) note that our experiences 
are ‘filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race, and 
ethnicity’. Therefore, knowledge generated from research cannot be regarded as 
definitely true or objective. 
 
4.4 Research Approach and Methods 
 
It is important to understand the research approach adopted, as this can have a 
fundamental impact on research design, in turn influencing data collection and 
analysis techniques (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). It is often assumed that 
quantitative data is superior and must take precedence over qualitative data, 
however, by purely focussing on the quantitative, the richness and quality of data 
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can be degraded or lost altogether (Dey 1993). For example, if educational 
qualifications are measured strictly on a quantitative basis, therefore focusing on 
percentages and grades, we lose information about the quality of the education, the 
skills learnt and the realistic value of the qualifications (Dey 1993). 
 
There are no standardised units of measurement in qualitative data, instead, it is a 
measure of relative value assessed on the general character or intrinsic nature of 
the thing being evaluated, thus inferences made from qualitative data can often be 
subjective (Dey 1993). Meanings within qualitative data are conveyed through 
language and action. Here language is perceived to be inter-subjective because we 
as actors construct the meaning of words and phrases, thus the meaning of words 
and phrases are constantly shifting: ‘meanings reside in social practices, and not 
just in the heads of individuals’ (Dey 1993: 11). It is for these reasons that this study 
will be utilising qualitative methods as it allows for an exploration of the complexities 
of culture, which keep in line with the ontological and the epistemological 
assumptions discussed above that have been chosen for this thesis. 
 
The thesis research will draw heavily upon the inductive approach as it allows for 
the exploration of an individual’s interpretation of their work and their perception of 
the organisation. Instead of viewing participants as research objects that respond to 
their environment in a specified manner, thus allowing for the development of 
alternative explanations (Bryman 2012; Saunders et al. 2009); inductive research 
focuses on the context in which the phenomenon occurs, meaning a smaller sample 
size is more appropriate. This means that the data gathered can be richer and more 
comprehensive, resulting in a deeper and more thorough analysis to be carried out. 
This is reflected in the use of interviews adopted for this research (Easterby-Smith 
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et al. 2002; Saunders et al. 2009). For this reason, the research was conducted 
primarily using one hour, one to one semi-structured interviews with 25 participants. 
Furthermore, inductive work is appropriate for the research of a topic which is the 
subject of much debate, such as organisational culture; this is because it enables 
theoretical themes to emerge through the generation, analysis and reflection of data 
(Creswell 1994). 
 
A case study approach to the banking industry has been chosen as it ‘involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context’ (Robson 2002: 178). Although the primary source of data collection was via 
interviews, other sources such as documentary evidence in the form of media 
sources, regulatory and governmental papers, as well as industry papers on the 
topic of banking culture were also utilised. This approach allows me to gain a rich 
understanding of the contexts and processes being enacted, which seems well 
suited to explore the complexities of organisational culture (Morris and Wood 1991). 
 
Denscombe (2007: 35) asserts that a case study focuses on just one aspect ‘of the 
thing that is to be investigated’. In this case, the focus is on banking culture in the 
wider context of the financial crisis and the banking industry. Furthermore, 
Denscombe contends that the value of a case study is that it allows for an 
exploration of why certain outcomes transpire rather than merely finding out what 
those outcomes are. The case study approach appreciates the interconnectedness 
of relationships and processes, allowing us to discover how the many parts of the 
organisation and the wider industry and external pressures affect one another 
(Denscombe 2007; Saunders et al. 2009), therefore providing a perspective of the 
interconnected relationships between the different manifestations of an 
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organisation’s culture. This can be achieved through exploring the ‘intricate details 
of the recruitment policy, staff development, nature of the work, levels of pay, the 
background of the workers, etc., and how all these are interrelated’ (Denscombe 
2007: 36). 
 
Often research conducted using a case study approach has been subject to 
criticisms surrounding the premise of generalisability, as well as questions regarding 
scientific reliability and validity (Bryman and Bell 2003) of such research. These 
criticisms often arise from the positivist legacy, which results in reducing non-
positivist research to questions regarding claims to scientific legitimacy (Knights 
1995). This misses the fundamental premises of conducting such research, which 
is to depart from a preoccupation with ‘representing an authoritative account of 
empirical reality’ (Knights 1995: 232). Instead the case study benefits from 
embracing its divergence from previous doctrines and mobilising under the ability to 
provide alternative accounts through a deconstruction and disruption of existing 
narratives that aim to produce totalising representations of organisational reality 
(Knights 1995). 
 
Silverman and Marvasti (2008) contend that when undertaking qualitative research 
there is no perfect model of research design and practical contingencies such as 
access are going to effect the design and execution of research. The practicalities 
of the real world which impact the conduct of research, such as time, resources and 
access, often result in the selection of cases and sources being dependent on 
convenience or availability (Silverman and Marvasti 2008; Yuan 2014). Such 
practicalities had consequences for this thesis as initially the research was meant 
to be carried out as a study of a single UK banking institution. However due to the 
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difficulty of gaining access to participants at a single institution the case study was 
broadened to a range of banking and investment institutions, a total of ten different 
institutions within the industry. 
 
It is claimed (Brewis and Jack 2009; Parker 2000) that culture management texts 
are dominated by the opinions and views of seniors managers, providing only one 
perspective of an organisation’s culture. Therefore, it was decided that it would be 
beneficial to ensure the research included participants from non-managerial roles. 
However, apart from this, there were no strict criteria on departments or specific job 
roles. The research aimed to gain an insight into perspectives of an organisation’s 
culture from throughout the organisations, providing a voice to those who may not 
always get the chance to share their perspectives. The rationale behind the decision 
to emphasise the importance of speaking to non-managerial staff is that 
organisational culture research often focuses on the perspectives of management, 
who will often provide an organisationally biased account (Kunda 1992; Parker 
2000; Alvesson 2002; Willmott 1993; Martin 2002). This being said, in order to gain 
the perspectives of organisational members involved in the construction of 
organisational culture it was also important to gain insight from a managerial 
perspective; therefore the research also included participants from managerial 
roles. 
 
Challenges in gaining access resulted in a reduced sample size of 25 participants, 
however, best efforts were employed to gain a larger sample, with roughly 1500 
prospective participants being individually contacted via email. From this pool of 
1500 potential participants, 45 positive responses were received, with potential 
participants agreeing to take part. However, only 25 of these responses resulted in 
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interviews, as the remaining 20 positive responses failed to respond to later 
communications from myself, with 3 opting to withdraw from the research, due to 
time constraints. The sample size is not large however, a large volume of cases 
does not guarantee credibility of a study, ‘since we can never define all possible 
readings of a text, and no one reading should be ‘privileged’ over another’ (King 
2004:16) 
 
Initially, I had planned to utilise personal contacts of friends or family based in 
Birmingham to gain access to participants working within the banking industry to 
explore organisational culture (Yuan 2014). However, as my PhD progressed and I 
developed my understanding of the global financial crisis, I felt that conducting 
interviews with participants based in Birmingham, who would predominantly be from 
back office support roles or from one of the bank’s call centres, would be too remote 
from the UK’s financial capital and one of the global financial crisis’s epicentres. 
Therefore, I decided to seek participants whose roles had a tangible impact on the 
unfolding of the financial crisis. I redirected my efforts to gaining access to 
participants from front, middle and back office roles based in London from some of 
the industry’s biggest institutions. 
 
However, I had not fully considered the difficulty in gaining access to such 
participants, given that I was now attempting to contact individuals in a city 120 miles 
from where I was based with no contacts or potential gatekeepers. This combined 
with the fact that the industry as a whole had become very reluctant to discuss 
matters with industry outsiders for fear that they may be journalists and it would 
result in further bad publicity for the industry. This was something that I later found 
out from a number of participants, was heavily enforced by institutions who regularly 
   111 
sent reminders to employees outlining how they are required to gain permission 
from the company before speaking to the media or other external parties and if such 
procedures are not followed it may result in their dismissal.  
 
Having no obvious access to a gatekeeper I felt that gaining access through the 
“front door” would be my best chance of gaining participants. Through the use of 
internet search engines such as Google, company websites and the website 
ceoemail.com I was able to acquire the direct email addresses of a number of senior 
executives and CEOs at a number of UK based banking institutions. I sent tailored 
emails to each of these senior executives as Morgan and Symon (2004) suggest 
that utilising forms of electric communication can reduce barriers to access. I 
received a number of responses, all of which kindly declined my request for access 
and wished me all the best with my studies.   
 
Having been unsuccessful in gaining leads through official channels I decided that 
it would be best to contact participants outside of their organisations. However, the 
difficulty with this was that I had no way of gaining the contact details of individual 
employees. I came across a marketing website that provided me with a small 
number of contact details for employees at specified banking institutions for a small 
fee. I sent out a number of emails outlining my research and what I wanted to talk 
to them about but failed to receive a single response. There were some ethical 
considerations that needed to be made when opting to pay for data access. 
However, as there was no financial incentive offered to participants then there would 
be no coercion or corruption of judgement should individuals choose to participate 
(Grant and Sugarman 2004). Nor would it impact on their responses during 
interviewing as the payment was made to a website or LinkedIn as discussed below, 
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in order to lawfully gain contact details. Furthermore, as part of the procedure of 
informed consent (Saunders et al. 2009) participants would be made aware of how 
I gained their contact details. 
 
I then turned to the professional networking site LinkedIn where a large number of 
employees of various banking and investment institutions are members who can 
easily be found using the site’s search facilities. However, getting in contact with 
members is restricted unless they are part of your network or you have a LinkedIn 
Premium account which requires a monthly fee. Initially, I became a premium 
member in order to contact potential participants but quickly discovered that 
premium members were restricted to sending out ten messages to members outside 
of their network. Such a small number of messages would not provide me with a 
sufficient volume of contacts in order to get a suitable response rate; this became 
evident when I did not receive any responses either negative or positive. 
 
However, through joining LinkedIn and becoming increasingly active on the site I 
began to reconnect with university classmates, some of whom happened to be 
working in the banking and investment sector. As I had a pre-existing rapport (Yuan 
2014) with these contacts I was able to quickly arrange a couple of interviews and 
received a tour of a bank’s Canary Wharf headquarters, which for the purposes of 
this research will be referred to as Cross Continent Bank. Through a discussion with 
one of my participants regarding my difficulty in gaining access, they suggested 
joining banking and finance groups on LinkedIn in order to advertise my research 
on the main page of these groups.  
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Upon further exploration of LinkedIn groups I discovered that once I was a member 
of these groups, I was able to contact an unlimited number of members directly 
using the private message facility. This allowed me to contact potential participants 
in a sufficient volume. I proceeded to send out 100-200 messages to potential 
participants however over the coming days I received no responses. During this 
period I presented the preliminary data that I had gathered from my two interviewees 
at The 11th International Conference on Organisational Discourse, where I 
discussed the continued difficulty I was experiencing in gaining participants. The 
chair of the stream suggested that I highlight within my communications to potential 
participants what they would gain from participating and how this research would 
provide them with an opportunity to express their opinions and tell their side of the 
story.  
 
After further discussions with my supervisors, I decided to alter the research 
invitation that I had been previously sending to potential participants simply adding 
the line: ‘since the financial crisis there has been a lot of media attention surrounding 
banking and I want to hear your views’. By making this simple alteration I began to 
receive responses and soon developed a pipeline of willing participants including 
Managing Directors, Executive Directors, Vice Presidents and Associates. The 
success of my participant invitations was rather sudden and the impact that the 
phrase ‘I want to hear your views’ which also became the subject heading for the 
messages I sent out was quite interesting. Upon reflection, I think that banking 
employees possibly felt victimised by the abundance of ‘banker bashing’ (Dunkley 
2015a) that was common amongst media outlets, regulators and the government. 
Additionally, many people enjoy talking about their work ‘whether to share 
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enthusiasm or to air complaints’ but often fail to find an interested audience (King 
2004: 21).  
 
The utilisation of LinkedIn worked exceptionally well allowing me to contact a large 
number of participants quickly and effectively. The initial research invitation was 
sent to potential participants on an individual basis, addressed directly to them 
rather than using generic terms that may reduce the effectiveness of the invitations, 
making it seem like a bulk message (Morgan and Symon 2004). I ensured that a 
formal salutation and complimentary close was maintained in correspondence. 
Once participants began to use more informal salutations and letter closes I mirrored 
this language and then the general tone of correspondence, in an attempt to make 
the participants feel at ease and more comfortable in communicating with me. This 
was something I had learned during my previous work experience. 
 
Additionally, through the development of my contextual understanding of the 
financial crisis and the industry in the years following the crisis through the reading 
of various texts, media articles and watching documentaries, I came across certain 
inside figures who had appeared in these various mediums providing a commentary 
on the crisis. Due to the prevalence of social media, I was able to contact many of 
these individuals through LinkedIn with a small number agreeing to participate in my 
research, some of whom were at the heart of the functions that contributed to the 
unravelling of the crisis. 
 
Upon making the decision to utilise social media as a method of gaining access to 
participants in the banking industry, I attempted to find literature on the topic of using 
social media to gain access. However, much of the academic literature on social 
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media centered around the actual exploration of social media as phenomena 
making it the central subject of inquiry (Markham and Stavrova 2016) or discussing 
social media as a method of data collection, as in gathering data from social media 
sites (Branthwaite and Patterson 2011; Snelson 2016; Unger, Wodak and 
Khosravinik 2016). Therefore, it seems that there is not a body of work addressing 
the topic of utilising social media as a method of gaining access, particularly within 
the field of management studies. This indicates that this is not only the first critical 
exploration of banking culture in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but this thesis 
is also making a contribution to research methods as it is an early adopter of utilising 
social media as a tool for gaining access of which the benefits are numerous. It 
allows researchers to quickly and efficiently contact large pools of prospective 
participants for potentially very low costs. In addition, such methods can aid 
researchers in gaining access to a wide range of industries or organisations that are 
difficult to gain access to, an example of this being the banking industry. 
Furthermore, with the utilisation of sites such as LinkedIn researchers can contact 
participants that fit their specific research requirements, as searches can be tailored 
to location, job title, industry, current and past organisations and experience level to 
name a few. Therefore, the use of social media to gain access can be a valuable 
tool, thus making it an important contribution to the area. 
 
4.5 Interviews 
 
The primary data collection method for this research was semi-structured 
interviews. Kvale asserts that an interview’s ‘purpose is to gather descriptions of the 
life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretations of the meaning of the 
described phenomena’ (Kvale, 1983: 174). Therefore, interviews conducted within 
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qualitative research should view the research topic from the perspectives of the 
interviewee (King 2004). The data collection method of interviews was chosen 
because it provides the opportunity to uncover new clues and reveal new 
dimensions of a problem, as well as establish ‘vivid’ and inclusive accounts ‘that are 
based on personal experience’ (Burgess 1982: 107 cited in Easterby-Smith et al. 
2002: 86; May 2001; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Furthermore, interviews allow us to 
understand how individuals construct the reality of their situation based on their 
beliefs and values (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). This is an important prospect for 
this research, as understanding what beliefs and values participants hold may 
provide an insight into how they identify with their organisation.  
 
Additionally, this method allows interviewees to expand and explain their answers 
through effective probing and entering into a dialogue with the interviewer (May 
2001). This adds depth to the data collected by adding meaning to the words used 
and ideas expressed by interviewees. Semi-structured interviews provide the 
opportunity for discussions to progress into areas that had previously not been 
considered. It also provides interviewees with a stage upon which they can think out 
loud and deliberate about things they may not have considered previously, all of 
which contributes to the richness and detail of the data (Saunders et al. 2009; May 
2001; Silverman and Marvasti 2008). 
 
A more structured quantitative interview approach was not adopted as in such an 
approach participants are viewed as ‘subjects’ in the endeavour to extract ‘accurate 
information’ which is ‘untainted by relationship factors’ between the interviewer and 
participant (King 2004: 2). However as discussed above qualitative research 
conducted under the research philosophy adopted by this thesis acknowledges that 
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there is no such thing as value free research (Knights 1995) or relationship free 
interviews. Instead, relationships are accepted as part of the research process and 
not detracting from it. Additionally, interviewees are active participants in shaping 
the course of the interview process resulting in negotiated and contextually based 
data (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; King 2004). 
 
For this reason, the reflexivity of the researcher is important, as the researcher is 
not detached from the situation they are researching. Therefore the existence of 
interviewer biases must be acknowledged and reflected upon as interviewer 
comments, tones or non-verbal behaviour can impact the responses given by 
interviewees (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; May 2001). Additionally, it is important 
that the existence of participant biases are reflected upon as the interviewer's 
presence and the impression they make on the interviewee can influence the data 
given (Kelemen and Rumens 2008; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Knights 1995). 
 
There are a number of data quality issues that must be considered. For example, 
there is a lack of standardisation of interviews which can cause concerns regarding 
reliability, which is understood to mean whether other researchers would report 
similar findings (Easterby- Smith et al. 2008; Healey and Rawlinson 1994; Silverman 
2005). However, it is argued that research conducted utilising non-standardised 
methods is not expressly intended to be repeatable as the focus is on depicting the 
situation at the time the data was collected (Saunders et al. 2009). The primary 
value of using such methods is the flexibility to explore the complexities of 
organisational culture in as much detail as possible, which would be undermined 
and be unrealistic if there was a strict requirement for ease of replication (Marshall 
and Rossman 1999). 
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It is understood that people are the focus of inquiry in interviewing thus it is essential 
that extreme care is taken to avoid causing harm; the very process of engaging in 
dialogue about one’s experiences and perceptions of their work and organisation 
can have negative cognitive effects on a person (Saunders et al. 2009: May 2001; 
Alvesson et al. 2008; Denzin and Lincoln 2000). In order to address this informed 
consent was provided (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Israel and Hay; 2006; Silverman 
2013; Flick 2009; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). Furthermore, it must be taken into 
consideration that the information shared by participants about their organisation 
could be sensitive and therefore have negative implications on their employment. 
For this reason, all participation in the research has been anonymised as well as 
the organisations being discussed (Saunders et al. 2009; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; 
Israel and Hay; 2006; Silverman 2013; Flick 2009; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). 
 
Additionally, the location of interviews can also have adverse effects on the data 
gathered, as individuals may feel uncomfortable or uncertain of the confidentiality of 
what they say if the interviews take place within the organisation they work for 
(Saunders et al. 2009; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). Participants may feel distressed 
or uncomfortable if the interviews take place at work, as there may be concerns that 
if they speak negatively about the company or its culture, there is the risk of being 
overheard or the information will be reported to their superiors. However, in reality 
this was something that was hard to manage as the majority of early interviews were 
conducted during participants lunch breaks and therefore had to remain in close 
proximity to their workplaces but not at work. Also with corporate complexes such 
as Canary Wharf, it was difficult to find a location that was remote from other industry 
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personnel, although the location was less of an issue during telephone interviews, 
where participants were mainly contacted at home. 
 
It was important that I developed a rapport between me and participants in order to 
gain a rich reflection of a participant’s perspectives, instead of participants providing 
guarded and official responses, which may have described ‘how the organisation 
ought to appear in terms of the rhetoric of its own image’ (May 2001: 130; Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002). Although it should be noted that such responses are still 
indicative of their relationship and identification with the organisation and should 
therefore not be discarded. In order to develop rapport, a process of ‘descriptive 
questioning’ was used, helping participants ease into the interview process (Whyte 
1984; Spradley 1979; May 2001; Flick 2009) by asking them what their job role is, 
what it involves and how long they have been in the industry. 
 
Once I began to receive responses to my invitations I then needed to convert these 
contacts into interviews, which proved challenging given the very busy nature of 
banking employees schedules and their notoriously long working hours. It was often 
the case that two to three weeks went by from their initial responses and my request 
for their email addresses so that I could provide them with further information and 
consent forms before I would receive their required details. Often a further couple 
of weeks would pass before we arranged a date and time to conduct the interviews. 
On a number of occasions where I had not been in contact with a participant for a 
while they had relocated to the US or changed organisations in the few weeks I had 
not spoken to them, illustrating the fast moving pace of the industry. 
 
   120 
Frequently interviews had to be rescheduled last minute. This happened multiple 
times due to participants having to deal with unexpected workloads or dealing with 
last minute client requests. On some occasions, interviews were rescheduled three 
or four times with only a few minutes notice prior to the scheduled interview. On a 
few occasions where interviews had to be rescheduled at short notice I would 
receive an unexpected telephone call from participants requesting to conduct the 
interviews at that moment. On these occasions, I was completely unprepared to 
conduct the interviews but felt that this may be the only opportunity to interview the 
respective participant and therefore had to adapt to the situation and conduct the 
interview the best I could, given the circumstances.  
 
Due to the difficulty in gaining access to participants, I made it a particular point to 
be as flexible as possible when arranging interviews by agreeing to schedule 
interviews late in the evening and also on weekends and often clearing my schedule 
in order to accommodate an interview. I think this worked well in the success of my 
data collection as many of my participants worked long hours and often travelled 
abroad at short notice. Therefore, by demonstrating my flexibility in accommodating 
a time that suited them, this aided in developing a rapport with them and illustrating 
that I was genuinely interested in hearing their perspectives. 
 
Initially, I made arrangements to travel down to London to conduct interviews face 
to face as I felt that this would allow me to develop a rapport with interviewees 
(Creswell 1998), which would lead to them divulging key information for my 
research. The majority of these interviews were carried out in coffee shops and 
similar venues close to the participant's workplace but at a distance where they felt 
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comfortable divulging information. A couple of interviews were conducted in the 
lobby of their workplaces.  
 
When conducting the interviews a list of broad questions and themes to be 
discussed was given to respondents, to provide a loose structure to the interviews 
(Flick 2009; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). The interview guide was developed 
utilising a combination of the reviewed literature and research questions. The 
interview guide did not remain static but became a living document which evolved 
with each interview resulting in the development of potential areas for probing or the 
inclusion of new topics (King 2004). 
 
All interviews were audio recorded using a audio recorder as it aided the listening 
process, allowing full attention to be paid to the responses of the interviewees, as 
well as keeping a record of the conversation allowing for accurate transcripts (May 
2001; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; Saunders et al. 2009; Silverman 2013). During 
the interviews, I also made notes of key points to focus my later analysis on or to 
develop my questioning in a particular area which I could return to later on in the 
interview. I also took note of contextual information relating to the way things were 
said including pauses, emphasis or facial expressions (Silverman 2013). I also took 
note of descriptive observations such as notes on the location and how interviewees 
responded to the interview questions (Creswell 1998).  
 
It was interesting to note when conducting the face to face interviews how participant 
behaviours altered slightly once the recording device had been introduced. Prior to 
the audio recorder being turned on conversations were more casual and sociable, 
once the recorder was turned on and I began to ask questions interviewees tones 
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of voice became more professional and many seemed to be talking to the recorder. 
Interestingly this was even the case when conducting interviews with the two 
participants who were personal contacts. 
 
After six face to face interviews, I began to find that it was an inefficient way of 
conducting the interviews given the cost and time of traveling down to and around 
London (King 2004). Additionally, the time it took me to travel from one interview to 
the next, as they were often spread across central London, meant that it was very 
difficult to arrange more than three interviews in a day. Added to this, many of the 
scheduled interviews would frequently need to be rescheduled last minute often 
meant I had only conducted one interview in a day.  
 
For me to continue in this manner would have meant significantly extending my 
intended data collection timeframe. Instead, I opted to begin conducting interviews 
over the telephone which proved to be cheaper and more efficient (Denscombe 
2007). Initially, a few concerns arose from conducting interviews over the telephone; 
Kvale (1996) asserts that an intrinsic component of interviewing is the relationship 
between researcher and participant and this relationship may become 
‘disembodied’ – distanced by time and space – and de-contextualized’ (Morgan and 
Symon 2004: 28). This could have a significant impact on my ability to build a rapport 
and trust between me and my participants, to the detriment of my data quality. I was 
concerned that participants would feel uneasy divulging information to someone 
who had contacted them via a social networking site and that they had never met in 
person. However, Denscombe (2007: 11) contends that people can be as ‘honest 
in telephone interviews as they are with face-to-face type interviews’. 
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Ultimately these concerns proved to be a non-issue as the subsequent interviews 
were conducted without issue and participants seemed comfortable and relaxed. In 
actual fact conducting the interviews over the phone produced comparable data and 
made the interview seem less formal. Additionally, the audio recorder was no longer 
visible although still disclosed. This meant that participants feel they were airing their 
opinions to their telephones in an environment they felt comfortable in, often in the 
privacy of their own home where there was no risk of them bumping into someone 
from work.  
 
Conducting the interviews over the phone reduced the amount of contextual and 
descriptive data that could be recorded but nonetheless I attempted to make notes 
regarding changes of tone in participant’s voices when discussing a particular topic 
and any pauses or laughs. All interviewees were reminded at the beginning of the 
interviews that the call would be recorded, all of them seemed comfortable with this 
but often wanted reconfirmation that anything they say will be anonymised. Some 
participants were comfortable in stating names of organisations that they had 
worked for in the past or currently worked for, however, some refrained from 
referencing company names and opted to describe them in generic terms, for 
example ‘New York based investment bank’. This seemed to be predominant in 
more junior banking employees, whereas more senior employees often of Managing 
Director or Executive Director status seemed more comfortable in talking to me and 
disclosing more information freely. They were often less guarded about discussing 
their organisations in a negative light. 
 
The majority of participants were happy to be recorded with only one participant 
requesting not be recorded, so instead I made notes of their responses. This 
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particular participant seemed to be rather nervous about talking to me and seemed 
to regret their decision to participate once I had met them in the lobby of their office, 
they cut the interview short due to having to rush back to work. The location they 
selected to carry out the interview seemed to add to their hesitation in participating, 
as it was in a public space just outside their offices in Canary Wharf during a sunny 
afternoon, where there were park benches and a lot of people having their lunch 
breaks nearby. Upon reflection, the participant’s hesitation may have stemmed from 
the fact that they had only recently been appointed their position at a new firm.  
 
Interviews lasted one hour with some falling just short of the one hour mark and 
some falling just beyond one hour. Two interviews lasted 30 minutes. This was 
either due to the participants providing rather short answers and one participant 
having to rush back to work. The longest interview lasted two hours. The questions 
posed to each interviewee varied and were often based upon their previous and 
current roles, as well as developed from the responses they gave. The majority of 
the interviews took the form of a general discussion centred around key themes, 
meaning that the interview schedule was not implemented rigidly. Most participants 
were encouraged to freely discuss points regarding the financial crisis and their 
organisation’s culture, some interviewees required very little prompting from me and 
often covered most of the key topics through their own train of thought. Interestingly 
most participants had formulated a pre-conceived idea of what they understood their 
firm’s organisational culture to be and how it is implemented in the banking industry. 
 
Interviews were listened back upon multiple times and notes made in order to 
develop key areas of questioning for later interviews, as well as making notes of 
themes that seemed to be emerging in the data (Bryman and Bell 2003). The 
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interview schedule evolved throughout the data collection phase of the research, 
with questions developed from interviewee responses as well as from contextual 
data regarding the industry. This included banking scandals that were unravelling 
during data collection such as the forex trading scandal and the subsequent fines. 
 
4.6 Analysis 
 
Within this thesis it is understood that the processes of data collection, analysis and 
the development of findings are interrelated processes, therefore preliminary 
analysis was implemented throughout the data collection phase without impeding 
the interview schedule. This allowed the analysis to provide direction to the data 
collection assisting in acknowledging significant themes, patterns and relationships 
as the data was gathered, that may not have been previously considered (Kvale 
1996; Saunders et al 2009; Miles and Huberman 1994). Once data collection had 
begun it was important for it to be intelligibly interpreted by developing a conceptual 
framework, providing a foundation to understanding and adding meaning to the vast 
amounts of data that was collected.  
 
This was achieved by categorising the data so that I could understand what themes 
I was looking at (Dey 1993; Saunders et al 2009). Codes were created, categorising 
clusters and segments of data that related to particular themes and research 
questions (Miles and Huberman 1994). To ensure that the coding process does not 
cause selective biases of data that fits neatly into the codes or intentional 
decontextualisation of the data so that it conforms to the established categories, an 
inductive approach to coding was implemented. Codes were not developed prior to 
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data collection, allowing for the generation of codes to be moulded by the data, 
resulting in a more context sensitive approach (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
Interviews were transcribed in full (Silverman, 2013), producing verbatim transcripts 
of the interviews as I felt that idiomatic expression and repetitions or emphasis on 
particular words would aid in a rich analysis of the data, allowing one to dig deeper 
beyond the language used. I read through the transcripts making notes of key 
themes that seemed prevalent and making notes and annotations (Bryman and Bell 
2003) as I went along. This provided me with ‘descriptive codes’ (Miles and 
Huberman 1994, which involved attributing a label to a phenomena or to a particular 
segment of text. For example, codes such as ‘MONEY’, ‘ELITES and 
‘WRONGDOING’ were attached to segments of participant transcripts that 
incorporated these themes. This was followed by more interpretative coding which 
developed on the initial themes identified to explore them further and identify 
patterns amongst the data, which resulted in the generation of codes such as 
‘GREED’, ‘PRESTIGE; and ‘RESPONSIBILITY’. As Saunders et al. (2009) note; it 
was important to revise codes throughout the data collection and analysis due to 
the discovery of events and themes previously unconsidered or because certain 
codes did not work. In some cases, codes became saturated with attached data and 
therefore required fragmentation and sub-coding, although it was important to 
maintain a structure and relate codes to one another in a coherent manner. 
 
Initially, I utilised the coding aspects of the quantitative data analysis software 
NVIVO. My use of NVIVO was strictly limited to the use of its coding capabilities as 
it provided the ability to quickly fragment the data into coded categories that could 
then be grouped across multiple interview transcripts to be viewed at the same time, 
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I found this particularly useful. However, when attempting to begin a more 
comprehensive analysis of the data and present it in a coherent manner, I found 
that the ease of coding facilitated by the software had in fact resulted in an over 
fragmentation of the data, which meant that data became decontextualised. I had 
ended up with too many categories and with too many pieces of data attached to 
these various categories with a lot of the same data overlapping across the different 
categories. This made presenting the data and structuring an analysis very difficult. 
I felt that this may have detracted from the narrative flow of the data (Bryman and 
Bell 2003). I then switched to coding within the transcript documents themselves, 
with a reduced number of categories. This seemed to work better and focused my 
coding on providing data fragments that retained their context (Bryman and Bell 
2003).  
 
Once I had clustered sections of the data into themes or codes, I then began to 
consider why these themes were relevant to my wider thesis and what they implied 
beyond being interesting quotes. I utilised Foucault’s (1977; 1981; 1990) work to 
provide a context in which the data could be analysed allowing for insights into 
banking culture that had not previously been explored. Foucault’s work on power, 
subjectivity and discourses were significant as it allowed my analysis to 
acknowledge and explore the shortcomings of the dominant perspectives within the 
industry of organisational culture. These perspectives view culture as an objective 
entity, that can be clearly defined and managed through the implementation and 
adjustment of controlled variables leading to defined outcomes. Through Foucault’s 
writings, I was able to analyse how the component parts of the industry both relating 
to operational processes and the ‘cultural’ aspects, as well as the history of the 
industry and the events of the financial crisis are all contributory components in the 
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construction of banking cultures. To move beyond the established dualisms of 
organisational culture and provide a more nuanced perspective of banking culture, 
one that contributes to the existing critical literature, an understanding of the inter-
related and complex web of power relations that exists within the industry was key. 
Therefore, with each claim to power or resistance to its imposition, discourses were 
developed which lead to the construction of banking cultures through the 
productivity of power relations. The application of Foucault’s work led to the 
development of the concept of performance discourse, which is both constructed 
through the power relations between a number of actors and the historicism of the 
banking industry. Performance discourse, which was developed under this thesis 
and is a key contribution, is an extension and intensification of the enterprise 
discourse (Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1989, Nealon 2008). This will be discussed 
further in the analysis and conclusion chapters. 
 
4.7 Reflections and Ethics 
 
Before I could approach potential participants I had to gain ethical approval, 
something which took look longer than expected but which was an important journey 
in my research. The ethics process developed my knowledge of relevant ethical 
principles and guidelines, as well as my awareness of issues and concerns relating 
to the rights of research participants and others who may be affected by my 
research. I attended an ethics workshop at Keele University titled ‘Speed Bumps, 
Wrong Turns, and Head-On Collisions: Avoiding Ethical Catastrophe on the Road 
to Your Thesis’. The ethics workshop was particularly useful in changing the way I 
viewed my research participants, helping me understand that my participants are 
not faceless subjects and that I owe them a responsibility to ensure that any 
   129 
information they divulge is presented in a way that does not cause them harm or 
distress. Prior to attending the workshop I had given little thought to my responsibility 
as a researcher to my participants. I think in some way I held the common perception 
of bankers being ‘corporate machines in suits’ who were paid lots of money and that 
it was their greed that resulted in one of the worst financial downturns for a 
generation, resulting in an economic recession, where the impact on society was 
visible to me through family and friends.  
 
Additionally, as a recent graduate after the crisis, I felt its repercussions in the job 
market, where there was a distinct lack of graduate opportunities. All this had an 
impact on the perspectives I held prior to my research of the industry and ‘bankers’. 
However, upon attending the workshop and having discussions with other PhD 
students whom the majority of whom were conducting research in the health and 
social care disciplines, where many of their participants were classed as vulnerable. 
They expressed a very caring and empathetic view of their participants, where they 
felt they had a responsibility to protect their participants but also give them 
something in return. I had only viewed my duty as ensuring anonymity for my 
participants but I had not really contemplated why maintaining their anonymity would 
be important and how they could be detrimentally effected if this anonymity was 
breached. Furthermore, I had not really thought about my responsibility to 
communicate their perspectives through my thesis in the manner they had intended 
and to ensure that their perspectives were portrayed.  
 
This realisation of responsibility towards my participants was enhanced once I had 
begun collecting data and began to actually meet these ‘bankers’. My perspectives 
of the industry began to change and I began to appreciate the complexities of the 
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crisis, the role that banking employees played and how they were not necessarily 
the villains they had been portrayed as in the vast majority of media coverage. I 
began to really appreciate the time all of my participants had taken out of their very 
busy schedules to talk to me. They were all very helpful and likeable individuals, 
something which contradicted my initial pre-conceptions as bankers being arrogant 
and egotistical. This rapport and appreciation that I had developed towards my 
participants began to become a sense of indebtedness, where I almost felt an 
obligation to not be critical of their roles or their industry. In some way, I began to 
over identify with their perspectives and agree with some participants’ arguments 
that they were just doing their jobs and that the public and governments had a part 
to play in the crisis. However upon finishing my data collection, I began preliminary 
analysis of my data with fresh eyes and upon having numerous discussions with my 
supervisors I took a step back and saw the data with a much more balanced 
perspective, one where my previous prejudices had been ameliorated and my over 
identification and sense of indebtedness had been reduced to allow me to analyse 
the data in a contextually informed manner, even though my biases and 
perspectives will always be present in my commentary of my data (Bryman and Bell 
2003; Knights 1995). 
 
4.8 Limitations 
 
The critical exploration of organisational culture within the context of the financial 
crisis posed a number of challenges given the complexity of both organisational 
culture and the financial crisis. There were attempts to engage with as much of the 
different layers and facets of organisational culture as possible, however, under a 
critical understanding culture can encompass a wide range of themes and issues. 
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This meant that the themes discussed and analysed in this thesis had to be done 
on a selective basis due to the size and time frames of this type of research. There 
were a number of themes that would have added further depth and richness to the 
data discussed, these include gender and ethnic diversity. Although they are briefly 
mentioned in the data and analysis chapters, these two themes may have benefitted 
from further exploration. 
 
As mentioned above, the chosen data collection methods of interviews were 
restricted by challenges surrounding access. It could be suggested that a more 
ethnographic approach to data collection, including observations, may have 
provided even more richness and depth to the data. However, in the instance of this 
research, access issues restricted the utilisation of such methods. Therefore there 
may be scope for future critical explorations of banking culture to include 
observations. Observations may provide further perspectives that move past 
managerial dominance of accounts of the area, as well as providing the scope for a 
further exploration of norms and behaviours at a routine level. They might reveal 
where practices become taken for granted and commonsensical, where choices are 
no longer seen as ‘value-laden, political and contestable’ and become ‘invisible, 
natural and normal’ (Candrian 2013: 57; Schirato et al 2012). This being said the 
chosen methods provided great richness and insight into the topic. Furthermore, the 
access gained and the way in which access was gained, through the use of social 
media, as discussed, is in itself a valuable contribution. 
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4.9 Summary 
 
The aim of this thesis is to revisit the topic of organisational culture to be the first 
critical exploration of banking culture in the context of the financial crisis, in order to 
explore the contributory factors that led up to the event and how these factors played 
a part in the construction of the banking cultures that have often been described as 
‘toxic’ (Treanor 2014a) and utilising the work of Foucault in its analysis to contribute 
new avenues of exploration in culture management. Using Foucault’s work allows 
the thesis to facilitate in the development of an analytical framework that will aid in 
delayering the complexities of organisational culture and to move past mainstream 
perspectives of organisational culture and engage with the more critical theorising 
of organisational culture that is informed by constructionist literature. Additionally 
this thesis aims to explore how managements’ approach to the field of culture 
management has changed since its introduction into western management 
philosophy during the 1980s. 
 
This thesis understands culture to be something an organisation ‘is’ (Smircich 
1983), something which does not possess an external objective reality that is remote 
from the conduct and behaviours of the social actors that exist within it. This 
perspective of organisational culture is moved forward through the utilisation of the 
work of Foucault (1977) allowing for an exploration of the often overlooked power 
relations that exist within the industry. This provides a context for the multiple often 
conflicting interpretations of the industry and its cultures, all of which contribute to 
the construction of multiple organisational cultures. This chapter has outlined the 
philosophical and theoretical considerations that were undertaken as part of this 
research, as well as providing a rationale for the research methods chosen. 
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Additionally, the chapter discussed the challenges that were encountered in gaining 
access collecting data, as well as the processes used to analyse the data. The next 
two chapters will explore the data that was gathered during the interviews with 
participants.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Elements of Culture 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will be the first of two data chapters presenting data gathered from 
interviews with participants from various banking and investment institutions. The 
chapter aims to present data that relates to how the banks have attempted to 
manage their cultures and how these various elements of culture come together. 
The chapter explores some of the complications of these attempts such as the 
historicism of a firm, the existence of subcultures and how employees respond to 
managerial attempts to manage their organisation’s culture. It also discusses how 
cultural communications can be ignored and result in misbehaviour and wrongdoing. 
 
The chapter will begin by discussing how the industry has attempted to initiate 
cultural change following the 2008 financial crisis, moving on to look at what 
methods the industry employs to communicate its values and beliefs to employees. 
This will include a discussion of the various artefacts and rituals used by banking 
institutions, including cultural paraphernalia, training and events. This will outline 
what approach the industry adopts and whether concepts of organisational culture 
have moved beyond the cultural engineering texts of the 1980s or whether they are 
still utilising methods prescribed by cultural gurus to create ‘strong cultures’. 
 
This chapter will then show how employees respond to cultural communications 
from management to see whether cultural communications are adhered to or 
ignored. This will be done by exploring the lived experiences of employees’ conduct 
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and behaviours that emerge from the data. This will help us to understand if these 
cultural communications actually foster a strong and cohesive culture and meet the 
objectives of reforming the banking industry. It is important to explore accounts of 
how cultural communications are received, because a core element of culturism is 
the workforce’s embodiment of the espoused values and beliefs. This is seen as 
indicative of a ‘strong culture’, therefore, any deviance from this would undermine 
claims made by advocates for cultural engineering. 
 
The next sections will discuss themes that may complicate managerial attempts at 
cultural change. Firstly, it discusses the role the history of a firm plays in the 
development and sustainment of an organisation’s culture. The suggestion that 
culture is historically embedded may undermine the assertion that culture can be 
changed. This is followed by a discussion of the existence of subcultures. The 
chapter will then move on to explore how the combination of top-down cultural 
communication, the misalignment of day-to-day cultural enactments and the 
industry’s operational imperatives may have resulted in the development of toxic 
cultures. The section will build upon the previous section's discussion of how the 
lived experiences of organisational members result in alternative cultural artefacts 
and rituals, shaping conduct and behaviours. The section will explore how these 
alternatives can, in turn, become the dominant experience for organisational life 
causing them to become organisational norms, ingrained in the fabric of the 
organisation, becoming invisible and taken for granted. 
 
The next section will be exploring the intent behind such forms of conduct and 
behaviour. Many analysts have commented on the banking industry’s aversion to 
accepting responsibility for the events that lead to the crisis (Tourish and Hargie 
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2012; Whittle and Mueller 2011). The following section will be exploring these 
discussions potentially providing an alternative unravelling of events, thereby adding 
to the narrative of the financial crisis. Additionally, we will begin to explore how these 
narratives may have perpetuated forms of bad behaviour and wrongdoing 
potentially substantiating claims as to the systemic toxicity of banking culture. 
 
This will be followed by a brief discussion of whether the changes introduced post-
crisis are carefully executed PR tools to improve the public image of the banks and 
convince regulators and governments that they are responsible corporate citizens 
or whether these changes are fleeting and shorted lived, suggesting that the 
unfavourable pre-crisis behaviours will inevitably return. All participants and their 
organisations have been given pseudonyms to protect their identities. 
 
5.2 Banking Culture Post-Crisis 
 
Participants explained how since the financial crisis the industry has undergone a 
multitude of reforms through the introduction of a number of regulatory frameworks. 
These include Basel III, The Senior Managers Regime and The Certification Regime 
(FCA 2015). A number of participants explained how many of the initial changes 
focused on regulation and compliance, requiring banks to expand their compliance 
departments and initiate stricter safeguards to prevent insider trading and rogue 
trading. Such structural changes have often been in the form of Chinese walls and 
whistleblowing policies. However, the majority of participants explained that in light 
of a number of banking scandals, such as LIBOR and Forex, there has been 
renewed pressure from regulators to resolve such behaviours. 
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Sam, who has spent 12 years in equity sales including managing director positions, 
stated: 
 
‘The last few years there has been an acceleration in the importance 
internally and in management ensuring that everyone adheres to the values 
as opposed to being more self-regulating’. 
 
Nico, who has 25 years experience working in investment management, managing 
portfolios for high net worth individuals and small institutions at managing director 
and chief investment officer level, discussed the recent shift in focus for the industry: 
 
‘The FCA in the UK has really put a very strong emphasis on culture as the 
CEO's responsibility and to have a compliant culture. Before the crisis, 
compliance was about ticking boxes or about not breaching any rules and 
post the crisis they have said that’s not enough. You need to have firms who 
ensure their culture is geared to doing the right thing, and I think that has 
been effective, I think I have noticed that across many more firms, the 
problem is it’s very expensive’.  
 
This quote illustrates how regulators and the individuals within the industry 
acknowledge that the regulatory frameworks are not enough to generate 
compliance above and beyond box ticking. What has been made clear from 
regulators is that the industry needed to become more concerned about ‘doing the 
right thing’. The term ‘doing the right thing’ was used by a number of participants 
when discussing their organisation’s principles and values. However sometimes its 
use seemed somewhat vague and ambiguous; in some situations, it was taken to 
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mean doing the right thing for clients, with Yusuf an investment management 
analyst, stating how they are ‘constantly reminded’ of his firm’s credo of ‘putting 
clients first, then your firm, then yourself’. While on other occasions it could also 
mean acting in the interests of the firm and shareholders, with Jacob a former 
derivatives analyst at Goliath Bank, explaining how he has witnessed instances 
where management have said ‘I know your client got screwed over but we took the 
decision because it’s the right thing for the firm’. The financial crisis demonstrated 
that shareholders’ and the firm’s interests are not necessarily aligned with what is 
best for the client. Examples such as Goldman Sachs’ Timberwolf CDO scandal 
demonstrated this, where toxic assets were unloaded to clients in order to minimise 
the firm’s exposure. 
 
Many of the banks have invested a lot of money in an attempt to cultivate a client 
centric culture. They communicate this as the client being at the centre of decisions 
and that the firms need to understand their clients better. Roger who has been 
working in the financial sector for 13 years and is currently working at Iron Bank as 
a business analyst stated: 
 
‘Iron Bank as of last year, they rebranded all of those values, behaviours etc. 
Their goal now is to become the go to bank, they are very much with Sir 
Mervyn King, in 2012 he made a speech about banking culture, and what he 
said was that you don't just need to understand your clients, you need to 
understand who you are selling your products to and what their needs are’. 
 
Roger’s statement that his bank has ‘rebranded’ all of its values and behaviours 
could indicate that his bank views these values and behaviours as commercial 
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commodities that form part of the organisation’s commercial brand. This then 
suggests that values and employees’ behaviours can be managed and changed in 
a similar way to other marketing communications. 
 
Toby a graduate analyst at Dressler Bank stated that ‘there’s been quite a few 
communications by email making sure that the culture of the firm is being upheld 
and that it's very much a client centric culture’. This notion of doing the right thing or 
being client centric was repeated by a number of participants. Jack from Goliath 
Bank, who previously worked at Whittards Bank, stated that: 
 
‘they are meticulous in trying to articulate “do the right thing”, likewise 
Whittards has it transcribed in murals as you enter the building, do right by 
the client, do right by the communities we’re involved in’. 
 
Adrian an executive director in the non-core division at Ryman Bank discussed the 
changes that his organisation has undergone in the last couple of years: 
 
‘There has been a huge initiative over the last 18 months or so, ﬁrstly to 
deﬁne a new set of values and cultural standards. It has been communicated 
extensively and widely so you cannot escape it. It is constantly by Intranet, 
presentations, written documentation, workshops for management and staff, 
lead by senior and middle management. It’s talked about in every single 
presentation we had and we also have a company magazine which comes 
out, it’s always one of the key themes in there. 
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We have a massive cultural drive and cultural shift internally being driven top 
down, throughout the entire bank just trying to transform the culture… Trying 
to drive the culture of the bank to the behaviours and values, that they believe 
now in this current environment are appropriate and are what we should be 
working towards.’ 
 
Adrian outlines the softer changes the industry is making, giving Barclays as an 
example. Adrian also discusses how some banks have made structural changes 
including an alteration to their senior management, which the industry is employing 
as a way to underpin the cultural shifts: 
 
‘If you look at the way in which some institutions have responded, take 
Barclays for example, it was run by an investment banker, the investment 
bank was driving a massive proportion of the bank’s success and then they 
were obviously one of a number of institutions who were identiﬁed by the 
regulators as having operated with practices which were not acceptable. For 
example, around their LIBOR setting process and as a result the chief 
executive had to resign. A lot of people have left, the bank is now run by a 
more conservative retail banker, they are closing down a lot of their 
investment banking business, you are seeing the swing away from the areas 
of the bank that were more susceptible to that culture and that way of 
working.’ 
 
Adrian’s discussion of the wider banking scandals included the example of Barclays, 
which was in the news at the time the interview took place. Adrian refers to the 
recent changes that Barclays have employed in order to combat the ‘cultural 
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shortcomings’ that had led to inappropriate business practices (Salz 2013: 6) 
leading to the appointment of Anthony Jenkins as CEO. However Jenkins inability 
to boost big enough returns from Barclays’ investment banking division has seen 
him ousted as CEO (Arnold 2015b; 2015c) being replaced by an American 
investment banker, thereby suggesting a shift back to the bank’s ‘bullish strategy of 
the pre-financial crisis era’ (Arnold et al. 2015) and a potential retrenchment of 
Barclay’s cultural change programs. This raises important questions surrounding 
the sincerity of the industry’s attempts to resolve its cultural issues, but also how 
industry operational imperatives of profits and competition may conflict with these 
seemingly industry wide cultural communications. 
 
On a similar note Norbert, a managing director of the quantitative strategy 
department at Quartz Bank, discusses the recent training he received in his capacity 
as a managing director which focused on cultural reforms within Quartz Bank: 
 
‘We have frequent training on it, just recently we had a course, I think for 
most institutions, I think it’s a top-down exercise in the sense that if 
management acts in an ethical way then chances are that employees will 
also follow so certainly we had a lunch to talk about the business principles 
of Quartz Bank. There was a drive and I am sure that similar drives are 
present across the industry at the moment.’ 
 
The notion of values and beliefs being communicated top-down was repeated by a 
number of participants. Participants thought that if cultural change was consistently 
communicated by management then this would have a more significant impact on 
the organisation as a whole and instil these values and beliefs within the 
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organisation at a deeper level. Roger stated ‘I think it’s really key to deploying belief 
and vision, if the line management and those above cannot communicate the beliefs 
and values it’s simply not going to work’. Roger held the belief that in order for 
genuine change to take effect within the industry it must come from internal sources. 
In his view he stressed the importance of a drive coming from regulators and 
receiving expertise from external consultants, but ultimately the enactment of these 
values and beliefs need to be demonstrated internally from management: ‘if you can 
get everyone to deliver it consistently that is where you are going to get the best 
results, people will actually uphold those values’. 
 
5.3 Communicating Culture 
 
Top-down cultural communications within the banking industry often begin by 
utilising the lobby as a place where employees and clients can be reminded of the 
organisation’s mission statements and core principles, such as ‘team spirit’ and 
‘client centricity’ which are written on the walls or on posters and leaflets around the 
lobby. The expression of organisational values and principles continues within the 
elevators and around the office spaces. They are printed on various forms of cultural 
paraphernalia which act to reinforce and remind employees of these values and 
principles.  
 
Such paraphernalia comes in various forms including leaflets, handbooks, mouse 
mats and screen savers which are made available to all employees and contractors 
at the firms. Victor, a management consultant who has been working in the industry 
for nine years, explained: ‘there are banners and posters in lifts and lobbies and 
reception and also in the workspaces on the floors, where they communicate the 
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brand and the values of the organisation’. The values communicated by these 
cultural communications centre around trust, integrity, honesty and putting clients 
ﬁrst. Victor also stated how senior leadership ‘directly or indirectly allude to the 
culture within the organisation, what they expect from people’ and the way 
employees ‘interact with various stakeholders, your peers, managers, senior 
stakeholders, when you go into meetings, how you draft your emails, how you 
communicate’. Julian, another consultant, stated this was often done by making 
‘references to’ or reinforcing certain behaviours management expected. 
 
Similarly, Lewis a technology infrastructure contractor who has worked at a number 
of banks over his twenty-year career in the industry, stated: 
 
‘All of the organisations I worked with, irrespective of breaking down ﬁnancial 
services; pride themselves on their mission, their mantra, and every single 
organisation had a set of principles which they abide by and tried to abide 
by…a lot of financial service organisations do make a big deal of 
communicating this information. I think investment banks do it more.’ 
 
The majority of employees felt that there was a relentless communication of such 
organisational values and beliefs:  
 
‘It’s kind of pasted everywhere to some extent, it’s in your face as you walk 
through the building, it’s in emails it’s even in job specs these days…they 
show you their values and beliefs, what they believe in and what they expect 
of you. So it’s drilled in from an early stage’. 
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Another aspect of these cultural communications is training, which a number of the 
banks enforce across the board. Training has become a key tenet in the banks’ 
cultural communication arsenal. It is made compulsory for all employees to complete 
training which contains a cultural element that conveys the organisation’s values 
and principles. Sonny, who is a junior analyst in quality assurance, explained: 
 
‘…core values is pretty much mandatory training as soon as an employee 
joins the firm whether permanent or temporary staff. It’s part of the mandatory 
training an employee would have to go through…Training is pretty much 
based on the values and what the firm stands for.’ 
 
Additionally, Jenson an executive director in the equity sales division at Goliath Bank 
 stated: ‘There are value statements and a broad variety of training to reinforce 
them; training to instill it into real life.’ Participants stated how there has been an 
‘emphasis’ (Jenson) on cultural training in the last two years where the banks have 
attempted to address the softer aspects of their conduct. This has meant that 
cultural forms of training have begun to include principles of ethical conduct, in order 
to instil a sense of integrity and honesty within employees. The data suggests 
delivery of this training is similar throughout the industry, with the majority of firms 
utilising online courses, where employees are asked to provide responses to value 
and ethics based scenarios and to assess whether their responses are in line with 
those communicated by the bank. Additionally, similar forms of training are 
conducted face to face where employees are involved in role plays regarding similar 
value and ethic based scenarios, as well as participating in discussions regarding 
the importance of the bank’s values and beliefs and how they impact the bank. 
Interviewees pointed out that participation in these forms of training are compulsory 
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or ‘strongly advised’ for all members of the firm, regardless how senior they are: 
‘every month we have training, some of them are compulsory or you get told off’. 
Participants discussed how culture is something that is conveyed right from the 
recruitment stages, with a strong emphasis on discussing the organisation’s values 
and beliefs. Karuhn, who is a graduate trainee at Cross Continent Bank, stated: 
 
‘It is communicated throughout the recruitment process, all of the questions 
they ask you are about behaviours and values, they weren't around 
competency. Culture comes in at all levels ever since there has been a shift 
in banking culture, a shift towards a value led banking culture’. 
 
Karuhn’s claim that there has been a ‘shift’ in banking culture indicates that he views 
the industry’s claimed cultural changes as fact and may have overlooked the 
continuing scandals and wrongdoing that contradicts such claims. 
 
This emphasis on culture continues as new recruits are welcomed to the firm, Toby 
who has worked as an analyst for the last two years after graduating, stated: 
 
‘When we joined, you are given a pack about the company, the culture, you 
are sent little refresher books about the culture they want to nurture the 
values they are looking to instil. For each team they have an appointed 
culture carrier, someone senior, sort of MD (managing director) level, who is 
supposed to encourage the correct culture within the team who is meant to 
embody and encourage the correct culture in the team and act as a check 
and balance and ensure things are done from the top down.’ 
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Banks also communicate their value systems to employees through events or town 
hall meetings and all participants without exception mentioned the occurrence of 
town hall meetings at their firms. These town hall meetings are often led by senior 
management, where employees are ‘strongly encouraged’ to attend. Participants 
described how these events are used as a way to communicate operational 
information to employees such as quarterly earnings or annual profits. These events 
also encompass cultural communications, increasingly so in the last few years. 
When asked how people respond to such events, Victor said that: 
 
‘…they take it seriously, but people don't talk behind people’s backs here, 
maybe once or twice I've noticed people have some reserved feelings about 
an event, but they don't necessarily express it openly… Maybe they have just 
become indifferent, they just come in, get on with their work without making 
too much noise, perhaps because they know making too much noise will get 
them into trouble.’ 
 
 
A large proportion of participants discussed how people would not express their 
feelings of dissent openly, although some participants felt that engagement with 
forms of cultural communication was good, with some describing it as ‘exceptionally 
high’. This may suggest that inferences regarding the effectiveness of cultural 
communications can be subjective and difficult to conclusively gauge, which adds 
further support to the notion that organisational culture is complex, capillary and 
multi-layered. However, all participants acknowledged that anything but 
engagement or adherence to organisational value systems, may be detrimental to 
an employee’s position in the firm. One participant suggested that: ‘if you didn't you 
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would stand out like a sore thumb and be answering questions’, with another 
participant stating ‘if you got angry or upset about it, you were singled out’ (Victor). 
Participants claimed that non-adherence or lack of ‘buy in’ could result in people 
being ‘managed out’ (Karuhn) or that it might hamper one’s career progression. On 
the other hand, when asked whether anyone would show resistance or non-
compliance with cultural communications or events, Sophie a front office analyst 
previously at Dressler Bank, said ‘yes, all the time’ and provided an example of 
someone who did not adhere: 
 
‘The leader of the team, he was very bold, he would bend his allowances, the 
rules, because of his attitude and behaviour, he was very open and very bold 
in what he thought, said and believed in. He got kicked out in a very nasty 
way, and to be honest, the whole business missed him, he was very well 
regarded, and got kicked out for something very minor, I felt that they just 
had enough of him…they kicked him out for such a minor indiscretion and he 
got sacked on the spot almost’. 
 
This intolerance to dissent of cultural values relates to the corporate cultures texts 
of the 1980s where rigid adherence to the prescribed cultural regime was enforced, 
where the phrase ‘the way things are done around here was’ coined (Deal and 
Kennedy 1982; Peters and Waterman 1982; Schein 1985). This phrase is still widely 
used in the banking industry especially regarding discussions around banking 
culture, with a number of senior banking leadership figures referencing the phrase 
in their speeches at The Banking Standards Conference 2016 held by the Banking 
Standards Board. 
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From the above accounts of the way organisational culture is communicated and 
disseminated throughout the banking industry it would seem that the banking 
industry still adopts a top-down perspective of organisational culture and its 
management, drawing heavily on cultural engineering texts of the 1980s, where it 
was argued that culture is a clearly identifiable entity, that can be defined and 
possesses a reality that is external to the social actors that operate within it. It would 
seem the goal of such culture communications, discussed above, is to aid in the 
development of a ‘strong culture’ (Peters and Waterman 1982). This may indicate 
that practitioners have seemingly failed to move beyond functionalist perspectives 
of organisational culture, sustaining the notion that organisational culture should be 
revisited utilising a critical perspective. 
 
The data presented above showed how banks have begun to introduce ‘new’ values 
and beliefs and the various ways in which they communicate them. However, the 
data also suggested that these ‘new’ cultural aspects and their accompanying 
paraphernalia that is produced and disseminated by the banks is very similar and 
not particularly unique across the industry. Norbert explained: 
 
‘…in general, it’s relatively similar and I think both the principles plus the 
communication isn’t hugely different between institutions, I do think the 
frequency of communication has gone up in general…I think the principles 
themselves hasn’t changed.’. 
 
Another participant felt that ‘It was pretty much the same message, just spun a 
different way’ and another mentioned ‘…they are good general human being values, 
they aren’t groundbreaking’. 
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The suggestion that the values and principles that many of the banking institutions 
communicate to their employees are quite similar in nature is interesting as it 
somewhat contradicts the managerial assertion that a clearly defined and strong 
culture that is unique fosters a competitive advantage for the organisation in 
question (Kelemen and Papasolomou 2007). Additionally, the majority of 
participants concurred that the core tenets centred around trust, integrity, honesty 
and putting clients ﬁrst, all of which have been ceaselessly communicated to 
employees since the financial crisis. Some institutions have set up specialised 
training academies to teach employees about how to comply with these values, 
evidenced by Barclays and their collaboration with Judge Business School to 
establish a compliance academy (Treanor 2014h). When asked whether training on 
such simple principles is required and whether it could be construed as patronising, 
Adrian an executive director at Ryman Bank asserted ‘You have to keep it simple, 
like the 10 commandments, they are pretty obvious but they work’. 
 
Much of the industry has attempted to introduce ‘new’ core values that are 
embedded in ‘everything that they do’ (Deutsche Bank 2013), which seems 
somewhat contradictory as if they are ‘new’ then how embedded can they be. This 
raises important questions surrounding the historical embeddedness of culture and 
the impact it has on the development of culture, as well as the role that such history 
plays in attempted cultural change initiatives. 
 
The next section will explore how top-down cultural communications are not always 
unambiguously received and interpreted by employees within the industry. It 
therefore provides an insight into how it is possible for alternative perspectives of an 
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organisation’s values and beliefs to exist, demonstrating that strong cultures are not 
necessarily universally accepted and therefore may not act as a panacea for 
problems in the banking industry. 
 
5.4 Cultural Communications Ignored 
 
A number of participants explained how the various forms of cultural communication 
are often overlooked and ignored by the majority of employees, particularly in the 
wake of the financial crisis. Daniel, who is an IT infrastructure consultant, stated: 
 
‘I’ve been in the industry for quite a long time so I get more sceptical about it 
when you walk into their lobbies and their mission statement is pasted on the 
walls. They try and communicate things across but I am generally not very 
engaged…I think initially in my career I bought into it quite heavily, the client 
comes ﬁrst, the integrity, but over the last 5 years we’ve had LIBOR, mis-
selling, the FX scandal brewing, you have had all sorts of other banking 
scandals, so I guess it all starts to seem a bit hollow. When they pipe on 
about integrity and the customer matters and you quite clearly see them rip 
the customers off it doesn’t really ﬁt that well’. 
 
Hemel, who works as a compliance contractor at a number of different banks, 
discussed a lack of adherence to values even at prestigious institutions: 
 
‘There was a bank that I worked at, they had a clear set of values, they were 
well regarded, they were one of the most famous banks in the world but one 
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of the functions I had was looking at performance evaluations and it was clear 
that some of these values weren’t being adhered to.’ 
 
This statement from Hemel introduces the contradiction between the managerially 
disseminated organisational culture and its accompanying sets of values and 
beliefs, as compared with the lived experience of employees, where profits, 
competition and performance take precedence. For example, Yusuf who is an 
analyst at an investment management firm discussed his experience working for a 
large investment bank shared similar views, stating: 
 
‘Big investment banks they say their culture is good, but when you work there 
you see another side…They had an employee handbook setting out the 
values they seek to follow, so it was there in principle but it wasn’t proactively 
pushed upon employees or directly held events or go out and tell people you 
should do this. It was there, but it was your responsibility, if you want to learn 
it, learn it, if you want to adhere to it, adhere to it, there were no strict rules 
in-between either…it was really just something in the background.’ 
 
Yusuf’s statement that cultural values were not ‘proactively pushed’, initially seems 
to contradict data discussed earlier in this chapter where other participants claimed 
that values and beliefs are ‘constantly’ communicated. However, upon further 
discussion of this point, Yusuf explained how the ‘values, principles and mission 
statements’ were all readily available at the investment bank he worked for but that 
there was a ‘disconnect’ between the communication of these values and enforcing 
and enacting them day to day in the organisation. He claimed that they were ‘written 
in handbooks and posters but not actually implemented’. 
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One of the most revealing statements regarding cultural communications within the 
banks and their adherence to the values they disseminate is provided by Phillip, a 
managing director with over twenty years experience in the industry: 
 
‘The banks are very diligent in having mission statements and core values 
and value statements. Since the crisis, and really since before the crisis 
regulation was starting to bite a bit more, generally there is a code of conduct 
that is published and you are required to be trained in it and signed off to say 
that you have gone through the training process. Typically, they will have a 
website which has got an online training course which has the core values, 
they might ask some rudimentary questions, and at the end of it, you are 
certiﬁed, that you know and have read the employee handbook and code of 
conduct. That will be reinforced with ﬂyers, with the internal website and with 
town hall meetings with more senior people about core values and the client 
comes ﬁrst and people are our most important asset blah blah blah. It’s all 
kind of bullshit when it gets down to making money but the story gets told a 
lot.’ 
 
Phillip’s claim that ‘it’s all kind of bullshit when it gets down to making money’ 
introduces the notion that cultural values and principles are overlooked in favour of 
making money and short term gain; this was something that other participants also 
mentioned and will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
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Hemel explains how cultural communications can begin to get ignored due to shifts 
in priorities at the bank, particularly when the remuneration appraisal period 
approached, saying: 
 
‘There were some priorities set on my table, and then all of a sudden the 
period comes around August/September time and priorities start shifting. I 
get told to do things which were lower priorities but more impactful to my 
bosses’ wages and I knew what I was doing was going to have less of an 
impact on the bank as a whole but you just have to do it because you don’t 
want to lose your own job…It prioritises someone’s income rather than the 
overall bank making money. Sometimes you don’t know where the line is, am 
I helping the company make money or my boss make money, as an 
employee what’s the difference anyway? I’m not exactly working for a charity 
or something that has a higher purpose.’ 
 
Yusuf commented on how he experienced a bending of rules for individual gain: 
 
‘…it was annoying when you see others doing what they aren’t supposed to 
be doing, it might make you think, but that’s not meant to be done right? so 
why? just because they are a senior manager why should they be able to get 
around it for short term gain and make themselves look good in the short 
term just because they are bending the rules slightly or going around the 
restrictions when they shouldn’t be.’ 
 
The accounts above indicate that top-down cultural communications are not 
necessarily received and enacted as they travel down the spectrum of the 
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organisation, despite strong assertions that this is the case. From the data it can be 
suggested that organisational imperatives of profits and performance can 
undermine cultural communications, leading to conduct and behaviours that 
contradict intended values and beliefs that are conveyed in cultural paraphernalia. 
This misalignment may contribute to the emergence of a different set of cultural 
rituals and artefacts, ones which emerge from the lived experiences of 
organisational members underlined by organisational imperatives. Furthermore, 
these accounts of how cultural values are communicated but not adhered to is of 
importance. The advocates of cultural management prescribe that if values and 
beliefs are communicated to employees, through training and rituals, then this will 
aid in the development of a strong organisational culture (Peters and Waterman 
1982). However, it can be argued from these accounts that this is not the case, 
reinforcing the idea that cultural management has been oversimplified (Martin 
2002). 
 
5.5 Culture has History  
 
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the banking industry’s 
attempts at initiating cultural change through various forms of cultural 
communication to varying degrees of success. However, this section presents data 
that would suggest that culture is more historically embedded and that employees 
respond positively to values, beliefs and cultural communications that are grounded 
in the firm’s traditions and history, as they become more closely related to the lived 
experiences of employees on a day-to-day basis. This may undermine the banks’ 
attempts to introduce ‘new’ values and beliefs (Deutsche Bank 2013) in an attempt 
to change their cultures. Out of the 10 organisations that are included in the data 
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where participants are currently working for or previously worked, only Goliath Bank 
received consistently positive feedback from participants. Participants were 
overwhelmingly positive regarding the organisation’s values and beliefs and how 
these are communicated; participants were positive about how the organisation 
enacts its values and beliefs, from senior management and throughout the 
management structure down to rank and file employees. Participants discussed how 
the general ethos at the firm created an excellent working environment that set it 
apart from others. References have had to be removed for the contextual 
information presented in this chapter to accompany participant data in order to 
protect the identity of the banks discussed. 
 
Jack discussed how when he moved to Whittards, the Goliath Bank ethos was 
noticeable by his new colleagues: 
 
‘Goliath’s internal branding, internal marketing, internal values is very 
strong…when I moved from Goliath to Dressler, people noticed that you were 
a really helpful guy, really interactive, very helpful, interested in what 
everyone else is doing, passing on information. A comment from someone 
who had been at Dressler for 10 years, she said “you Goliath guys are always 
really helpful and friendly.’ 
 
Jacob discussed his experience working at Goliath Bank:   
 
‘I moved to Goliath in 2005, they are a fantastic organisation to work for…I 
think there’s always an envy around Goliath because we’re in a very 
remunerative industry and its one of the biggest most successful firms. They 
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had a very strong corporate culture…they were like Manchester United, they 
never had the best squad of players but they always punched above their 
weight because they knew how to work as a team. As an organisation they 
have become a massive business and a very successful one, because they 
have really really managed everything right, that’s a testament to what good 
corporate management can do… When I went to Whittards afterwards it was 
completely the opposite, it was a bureaucracy, a hierarchy and it was 
impossible to breathe without someone telling you what you were doing 
wrong, it was like here’s an MD, what he says is gospel truth’. 
 
These statements about Goliath Bank suggests they project a corporate culture that 
is disseminated throughout the firm that captures their employees’ commitment and 
admiration. Jacob’s statement seems to suggest that at Goliath Bank the culture is 
not only imposed top-down but is something which emanates from throughout the 
organisation and mobilises a sense of teamwork which inspires employees to work 
hard and be committed to the firm and its clients. This notion is clarified by his 
comparison with the less trusting atmosphere at Whittards where whatever senior 
management says goes. 
 
Jack’s quote illustrates how people noticed that he was from Goliath Bank through 
his embodiment of the Goliath Bank ethos, which was so ingrained that it stayed 
with him once he had left the firm. What this suggests is that Goliath Bank cultivates 
its culture in a way that moves past surface adherence or passive compliance and 
inspires an espousal to the organisation’s norms and behaviours that become 
ingrained within the individual. Initially this could be taken to support the 
managerialist assertions around corporate culture and its management, however, 
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on closer examination of Goliath Bank and the data provided by participants, we can 
see an alternative emerging from the managerialist culture discourses.  
 
Goliath Bank was founded in the 1800s in the United States. In the past, it was 
ranked as the number one investment bank in the world and is seen as one of the 
most prestigious banks to work for. Over its 130 year history, it has forged strong 
ties with its clients and has always seen to have a ‘solid gold reputation’ which is 
founded upon its people and culture. Jacob provides an insightful discussion of the 
firm’s unique way of doing business that is grounded within its long-standing culture: 
 
‘As an organisation, I think that was fantastically run…people outside used 
to say that Goliath Bank was arrogant…Goliath Bank use to just sit there and 
say lets just focus on what we are good at, it's not arrogance its basically just 
saying we’re not going to be run like every other bank, we will do whatever 
we think is the right thing to do, I think that's actually quite a compelling 
culture. 
 
When I moved to Whittards I noticed it was like do you know Dressler Bank 
are doing this, do you know Goliath Bank are doing this, we should look at 
it…I thought Whittards was just insecure about what they were good at, can’t 
decide what it’s good at and I think that’s why during the credit crisis Goliath 
Bank did quite well out of it because it sat there and made its own decisions 
and said well we’re not just going to do it for the sake of it because everyone 
else is doing it in the market…before 2007/8 you would see Emerald Bank 
sponsored sporting events, you saw Moorland Bank all over the place, you 
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saw Whittards sponsoring, you never saw Goliath Bank doing that because 
it’s just a different mindset’. 
 
Here we can see how Goliath Bank’s longstanding values and beliefs contribute to 
the way the organisation is run and how it conducts its business. This seems to play 
a vital role in the way that employees such as Jacob view the organisation, as they 
feel that the organisation sticks to its core beliefs. These beliefs have always been 
part of the firm’s history and were not just introduced as part of a post-crisis culture 
change initiative. In fact, out of all the organisations discussed in this thesis, Goliath 
Bank is one of the few that seems to not have attempted to explicitly change its 
culture through the introduction of new core values or mission statements, as many 
of its competitors have done, such as Barclays and Deutsche Bank to name a few.  
 
What is most revealing about participants’ positive attitudes to Goliath Bank is that 
the same participants were not particularly positive about the wider industry or about 
other banks they had experience working for. However, when it came to discussing 
Goliath Bank and the way it does business, they were overwhelmingly positive. The 
history of the firm and its longstanding culture seems to play a big role in the 
continuity between its cultural communications and the way it does business. This 
is captured in Jacob’s discussion of the historic leadership of the firm: 
 
‘When I got my office in Goliath…the guy I was working with called me up 
and said don't laugh, but I'm going to send you a book called [Life and Culture 
at Goliath Bank (pseudonym)], and my wife at the time was like “this is 
ridiculous”. I got the book and I read it and actually, it was quite fascinating 
to read a bit about the background of the firm, but what it actually made me 
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do is realise where the firm has come from, that the guy who used to run the 
firm for 46 years. To me that was one of the great things about the firm is that 
it didn't matter who you were you were important…it had a certain culture 
about where it came from and what its origins were.’ 
 
Despite the positive opinions of the former and current employees that were 
interviewed for this research, during the unfolding of the financial crisis and its 
immediate aftermath Goliath Bank was seen by many in the media, politics and the 
general public as the root of all evil. Goliath Bank was portrayed by multiple sources 
as the key culprit of the crisis with their apparently unethical and greedy behaviour. 
Indeed some commentators described the firm as ‘a great vampire squid wrapped 
around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that 
smells like money’. The image that was constructed around Goliath Bank as the evil 
bank seems to be in stark contrast with the opinion employees and former 
employees hold of the bank, suggesting that the media may have overplayed the 
idea that Goliath Bank is public enemy number one. 
 
Multiple sources suggest that it is possible that Goliath Bank was an organisation 
that had a strong sense of history that ran throughout its organisation and shaped a 
value and belief system that imbued a strong sense of commitment from its 
employees. The firm did not hold any particular malice or was any less ethical than 
others in the industry but they were ‘just more effective’ in their business due to their 
embedded practice of doing what they thought was right and not focusing on what 
others are doing in the market. Jenson shares this view of how the firm has reacted 
to the media portrayal of themselves: 
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‘It really shook them that they became a big target for the public, before the 
public didn't really care about Goliath Bank and then it became public enemy 
number one and that was a big shock for the organisation and they have 
taken it to heart.’ 
 
However, it is important to note that the image that has been constructed about 
Goliath Bank being greedy and immoral should not be wholly disregarded as media 
hyperbole and abstraction as there are clear examples of unfavourable conduct, 
most notably the sub-prime mortgage fraud case that was brought forward by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Some argue that Goliath Bank were merely 
acting in accordance with the industry trend and the regulatory and political climate 
of that time. 
 
Developing on the theme of alternative and more critical understandings of 
organisational culture, the following section will be exploring the existence of 
subcultures, as an organisation and its social existence is not homogenous but 
fragmented (Van Maanen and Barley 1985; Laurilla 1997). Therefore, moving past 
functionalist perspectives of a strong homogenous culture, where ambiguity 
amongst interpretations does exist to a perspective that acknowledges and 
celebrates the fragmented and contentious existence of organisational culture, one 
that is continually constructed and reconstructed through the mutual participation of 
different social actors who possess different experiences and identities. 
 
5.6 Subcultures/Team Cultures 
 
   161 
Developing further on the notion that organisational culture has been oversimplified, 
advocates of cultural engineering often fail to acknowledge the existence of 
subcultures, arguing that organisations are homogenous entities. However, this 
thesis acknowledges that social groups are not homogenous and static but are 
shifting, diverse and contentious (Van Maanen and Barley 1985; Laurilla 1997; 
Morgan and Sturdy 2000; Kenny et al. 2011). The data collected from this research 
into banking culture seems to support the idea of the existence of subcultures. This 
is mentioned by a number of participants, who discussed how the day to day culture 
at the firms was defined by the team that you are working in. Jacob, who has worked 
in the industry from 2002 all the way through the financial crisis, working in 
structured credit, stated: 
 
‘It’s more to do with the boss you have, the team you have around you, on a 
micro level it's more defining on the day-to-day basis and I think a good firm 
is one where all of those micro cultures actually all seem to work on a macro 
culture level.’ 
 
Toby discussed how each team interprets the overarching organisational values and 
beliefs differently, pointing out that homogeneity is not likely to be achievable: 
 
‘how each individual team expresses those [values] is probably going to be 
slightly different, you are never going to have a completely homogenous 
cultural identity, but the broad touch points such as integrity, doing the best 
thing by your clients are pretty central and should come through regardless 
of what team you are in’. 
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Edward, who had joined the industry in 2007 at ‘the cusp of the financial crisis’ as 
an associate at Whittards, shares a similar experience, acknowledging that a 
differentiation of cultural interpretations amongst teams exists:  
 
‘Day to day culture is probably quite different from team to team…every team 
had its own quite distinct culture and there was a Whittards culture at a higher 
level but in the end, it was the team’s culture that was even more prevalent. 
When you were in that team you were following that team’s culture…there is 
a historical aspect to it, culture is built over time, some of these teams were 
sort of 20 years or more old and the culture sort of lives within the team…The 
culture at Whittards was aware of these differences so there was a sense of 
the overarching culture allowing a certain level of differentiation between 
teams because it was natural’. 
 
These statements demonstrate the acknowledgement of the existence of sub-
cultures within the respective organisation’s cultures. This then demonstrates a 
departure from the functionalist prescription of culture, which views fragmentation 
of normative beliefs as dysfunctional (Riley 1983; Van Maanen and Barley 1985; 
Laurilla 1997; Morgan and Sturdy 2000; Kenny et al. 2011) and which needs to be 
smoothed over providing a ‘one best way’ approach. Participants’ perspectives 
contrast this functionalist perspective of fragmentation by suggesting that the 
organisations which acknowledge and accommodate differentiation (Martin 2002; 
Riley 1983) amongst interpretations of the organisation’s culture are desirable and 
‘natural’. For example, Edward’s discussion of the historicism of the team sub-
cultures introduces us to the notion that culture is something which is constructed 
over time through the mutual participants of multiple actors. Therefore, it creates 
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something which cannot be prescriptively managed or changed but is something 
which is embedded and enacted day-to-day and not just written on a poster on a 
mouse mat. 
 
The next section will be discussing how the amalgamation of top-down cultural 
communication, misaligned cultural realities and industry operational imperatives 
are combined within the context of the financial crisis, resulting in potentially toxic 
cultures. The section will build upon the notion that top-down formally 
communicated mission statements, values and beliefs are overlooked by 
employees and alternative artefacts and rituals come to the forefront of 
organisational life, shaping conduct and behaviours. They in turn become the 
dominant experience for the majority of employees on a day to day basis, resulting 
in them becoming organisational norms, becoming ingrained in the fabric of the 
organisation meaning they are overlooked and become taken for granted. 
 
5.7 Toxic Cultures 
 
While many commentators have described banking culture as toxic (Treanor 2014a; 
Spicer et al. 2014; Moore 2013; Alloway et al. 2012; Smith 2012; Moore 2012), the 
majority of participants say they would not necessarily describe the environment at 
banks as expressly toxic. However, some of their statements and anecdotes about 
their experiences within the industry are quite revealing and can be seen to 
contradict their claims that refute the cultural toxicity of the banking industry. These 
contradictions that seem to be present within participant accounts may exist due to 
certain forms of behaviour or conduct being normalised and taken for granted, 
thereby becoming ‘invisible, natural and normal’ (Candrian 2013: 57). 
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Phillip, for example, provides some accounts of his time at Whittards: 
 
‘I just hated the culture, it was very selfish, it was sort of chaotic, it was 
unpleasant, nasty, selﬁsh people, for whom honesty was a stretch goal. The 
treatment of people was appalling, we had a COO (Chief Operating Officer) 
who, I used to sit in meetings with him, we had this thing called the 
performance curve. It is one of the most toxic HR strategies ever invented. It 
says 10% of people are five's and they get ﬁred, 20% are four's and they get 
put on a warning, 40% of people are three's and they get a bit of a bonus, 
20% are two's and get an average bonus and 10% are one's and they get 
the bonus pot. You have to force rank your teams and you get these peculiar 
laws of unintended consequences hitting, where anyone who had a decent 
team gets penalised so you need a mix of good and bad in your team 
because 10% have to get ﬁred every year. You get a chunk who don't get 
any bonus and get a warning, so to protect your good people you are almost 
incentivised to bring in a couple of duffers who can ﬂoat around for a year so 
you can whack them and they don’t really impact your operations.’ 
 
Phillip’s discussion of the ‘performance curve’ is an insight into the types of 
behaviours that exist at a senior level within Whittards and are comparable to the 
behaviours that were discovered to be prevalent at Enron before its collapse. These 
included practices such as ‘rank and yank’, where the bottom fifteen to twenty 
percent of employees would be fired after a process of annual performance reviews 
(Sims and Brinkmann 2003: 57). It is difficult to see how such an environment where 
employees are reviewed in this way would be conducive to an ethical and cohesive 
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work environment, where employees can ensure ‘they are doing the right thing’ and 
acting with integrity, which much of the cultural paraphernalia circulated by the 
banks communicates. It could be argued that the threat of being poorly ranked may 
evoke unfavourable behaviour. 
 
Phillip a managing director, went on to discuss how at Whittards the hierarchy was 
not always respected: 
 
‘If someone hadn’t done their job and they hadn’t delivered, they would get 
called out, didn’t matter how senior you were, you would get called out…I 
have sat in a meeting when someone at Whittards has said: “you are fucking 
useless, I’m going to take you to the top of the building, shoot you in the head, 
throw you off and run you over with my SUV, and then I’m going to get you 
revived by the paramedics so I can do it again” and that was a typical meeting 
with your boss.’ 
 
When asked why it is acceptable within the industry to behave in these ways and 
how this may impact other conduct, Phillip responded: 
 
‘It’s kind of groupthink to some extent as your behaviours are reinforced by 
the feedback loop of the people around you. For example, if you swear a lot 
and all of your friends swear then swearing in your everyday conversation is 
completely normal to you, like it is in the city. But I come back and I live in 
sleepy little village and the language which you would use in your daily life, 
the way you spoke, my friends at the school gates would turn around horriﬁed 
“your language is appalling, we’re at the school gates, there are children 
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around you” and I’m thinking "for fuck’s sake" I’m just on the phone saying 
“listen, motherfucker, you get that deal done or I’m going to kick your arse" 
and they look at you horriﬁed. It’s a trivial example but when you are in that 
environment, that atmosphere, like sailors on ships it becomes a norm and 
it’s the same for the super competitive behaviour.’ 
 
This statement demonstrates the significance of normalised behaviour within an 
organisation and this has some significant consequences for organisational culture 
and its management. Phillip’s discussion demonstrates how the common 
behaviours amongst organisational actors forms part of the taken for granted fabric 
of the organisation that in turn can be described as its culture. Therefore 
communicated values and beliefs that are not reinforced by behaviours of 
organisational actors whether management or not, struggle to become salient 
normalised behaviours and can fade into the background. However, other unspoken 
behaviours that are enacted on a day to day basis become normalised and taken 
for granted. This means that certain behaviours that would be regarded as 
misbehaviour or toxic to external stakeholders are not expressly acknowledged by 
internal actors to whom such conduct has become normalised. 
 
Lewis shared similar experiences of the accepted language and conduct within 
some parts of the industry: 
 
‘I have been called a F'ing C**t plenty of times in my early days you just kind 
of accept it, people just accept that.’ 
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However, Phillip did point out that at his current organisation Midwest Bank the 
atmosphere and the behavioural norms are in stark contrast to what he experienced 
at Whittards. 
 
‘…you have to tread incredibly sensitively with, the language, the swearing, 
the personal abuse that went on at the other banks, you would just get fired 
instantly at Midwest Bank for that stuff… so it’s a completely different culture, 
feels much more sleepy, much more respectful of people, much more, like 
the managers are almost really reading out of a textbook. “Let’s start every 
meeting with a celebration of the team and go around and I want everyone 
on the team to recognise someone who has done an extraordinary job in the 
last week, I think Dave has done a great job because he helped out a 
customer on XYZ, rather than singling anyone out I want to recognise the 
whole team because we are awesome”, you expect them to start playing 
guitars and start singing Kumbaya. At Whittards you start out the meeting 
with who are we going to ﬁre today!’ 
 
Moving on to discussions of the actual conduct of employees and management, 
which may have become ingrained within the industry and perpetuated leading to a 
toxicity of cultures; Hemel discussed his experience of how potential incidents of 
wrongdoing are informally discussed but not necessarily followed up: 
 
‘I would say that you ﬁnd out a lot of things when you get to these corporate 
drinks and people get a bit drunk and mention things that they probably 
weren’t supposed to mention. You don’t know if it’s true because you aren’t 
on their team, you can’t say it’s actually going on, it’s just hearsay.’ 
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Rather revealingly Phillip recounted his experience of a more explicit instance of 
wrongdoing during his time at Whittards: 
 
‘The COO (chief operating officer) said “Ok we’re never ever going to pay 
redundancy money ever again. I want to change the curve to ﬁt the market 
conditions, if we need to shed 10% of our staff this year, the bottom of the 
curve will be 10%, if the market conditions are bad and we need to get rid of 
20% and once they are in the bottom 20% you have to put them on a PIP 
(performance improvement plan). Make it so tough that it’s impossible for 
them to meet the criteria and then terminate them with cause, in which case 
we don’t have to pay them any redundancy money, their vested stock gets 
terminated, we can summarily dismiss them”. That was the management 
strategy, pay the guys at the top lots of money to retain them, stop paying 
the middle bracket…it was all about how do we keep as much proﬁt as we 
can and screw our employees and all the bullshit of “we have to dig deep, 
we’re all in this together, our employees are our most valuable asset” was 
utter, utter rot because we screwed them over again and again, it got to the 
point that I’d sit with the HR people and they would be in tears and saying 
that if they complain about this I’ll get ﬁred, but it’s wrong and it is illegal.’ 
 
Interestingly, Phillip’s account of the wrongdoing present within Whittards 
contradicts Norbert’s claim that he has ‘not found systematic unethical behaviour’ 
and that unethical behaviour ‘hasn’t permeated the institutions’. Importantly Norbert 
and Phillip both held managing director status at Whittards but seem to have very 
different perceptions of the culture. This therefore suggests that the cultural 
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landscapes differed from department to department and Norbert now a managing 
director at Quartz Bank, alludes to this by saying:  
 
‘I have not been involved in credit, so maybe there is a different culture there 
but certainly, in my areas I haven’t seen that people have tried to get around 
risk limits or regulations on purpose…So I haven’t seen that, I might be in the 
wrong areas to see that’.  
 
Nonetheless, the forms of wrongdoing that have been discussed, whether or not 
they permeate every corner of the institutions in question may still be destructive 
enough to have a significant impact on the behaviours and perceptions of 
organisational actors. This could result in an ultra-competitive environment where 
everyone is fighting for their survival within the firm and will do anything for self-
preservation. 
 
Yusuf an investment management analyst, felt that people personally benefited from 
the misbehaviour he witnessed during his time at Emerald Bank: 
 
‘Yes, in the short term especially, for example, they might take a bigger 
position than they are allowed to, bend the rules slightly, or use the 
information that they had to their own advantage and put it in their own 
accounts for example, as they aren’t supposed to. So, people were 
personally beneﬁting financially in their own lives and they look good on 
paper and amongst their peers as well in the short term, but not in the long 
term.’ 
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He then went onto to talk about how these types of behaviour became normalised: 
 
‘I think people, other people, the senior managers had that same view as 
well…but then it becomes the norm, people think “oh he’s got away with it” 
so other people start doing it as well…People felt it was ﬁne, it was the norm, 
people would, because it was just the done thing, over time people get 
ingrained into that culture. So even though at ﬁrst they think they shouldn’t 
be doing it, but as everyone is doing it, it becomes the norm, people adapt to 
it as well. Everyone views it in the bad light but sometimes it changes their 
view and makes it more ingrained in the culture over time.’ 
 
Susanne, a Director in Commodities at Legion Bank provided an example of an 
instance of wrongdoing or ‘unethical behaviour’ that she witnessed: 
 
‘A senior manager asked me to do something which was unethical…he said 
that certain things didn't apply to him for particular reasons and it was just 
wrong, he wasn't behaving in line with treating customers fairly. It was to do 
with some pretty inappropriate rules around client suitability and how we were 
defining investment advice, and the bank had an internal definition that was 
so broad so anything that anyone did could pretty much be regarded as 
investment advice. His response to this was that they just didn't put anything 
down in writing, made everything verbal and then it would just be the client’s 
word against theirs. I think that’s wrong, if you are giving advice you are giving 
advice whether that’s written down or not, and you shouldn't be saying it's 
fine to do just because no one can prove it.’ 
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As a result of these forms of wrongdoing/misbehaviour and the apparent 
dysfunctionality of their cultures the banks have tried to implement cultural change 
initiatives in an attempt to remedy the toxicity of their cultures and promote more 
cordial and cohesive behaviours (Treanor 2014a; 2014g). Behaviours which are 
more compatible with the paradigm shift in the socio-economic environment, 
particularly the regulatory demands placed upon the banking and finance industry. 
These cultural reforms have become a central component in the endeavour to 
reform the sector with a shift to the softer aspects of the industry’s management and 
regulation, as mentioned earlier communication, trading and cultural events are 
carried out in to achieve this. 
 
In contrast to the claims that the industry has taken positive steps towards a 
balanced and more ethical culture, as well as a remodelling of the workforce, Daniel 
maintains that not much has changed: 
 
‘I think the people they attract in, the messages are still the same, I don’t think 
they have really dealt with things in the way things should be changing…I 
was actually very optimistic when the crisis happened believing it was a 
massive opportunity to change things, to shake things up, for the better. I 
think you could watch the excess really build up in the early 00s, it just got 
bigger and bigger and bigger and then exploded and that was the opportunity 
to take a pause, regroup and structure the industry better. And then I got 
more and more depressed to see these scandals come out, and they aren’t 
dating back to the frothy years either, they are more recent as well which is 
even more depressing.’ 
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These discussions surrounding the accepted language and conduct within the 
industry acts to reinforce the stereotypes of the industry that is often portrayed in 
the media. It allows industry actors to be illustrated as bad and unscrupulous, if they 
are able to behave in this manner what else are they capable of? Such forms of 
behaviour would be seen as unacceptable in other industries. More importantly, is 
the impact of such normalised language and conduct; it may act to construct an 
environment where other forms of misbehaviour are justified. These taken for 
granted behaviours can then become part of the construction of banking cultures 
causing a further disparity between the enacted behaviours of managers and 
employees and the curated values and beliefs that are disseminated by the 
organisation. This may result in a toxic environment as on the surface an 
organisation may be communicating positive sounding virtues but the reality of the 
behaviours of employees are in stark contrast. They are so ingrained, however, that 
they are overlooked, becoming pervasive and driving the direction of the 
organisation. 
 
The next section will be exploring the intent behind such forms of conduct and 
behaviour. Many analysts have commented on the industry’s aversion to 
responsibility for the events that lead to the crisis (Tourish and Hargie 2012; Whittle 
and Mueller 2011) which has often lead to a denial of systemic issues and the 
suggestion that it is a small minority of ‘bad apples’. The following section will be 
exploring these discussions potentially providing an alternative unravelling of events 
and adding to the narrative of the financial crisis, additionally, we will begin to 
explore how these narratives may have perpetuated forms of bad behaviour and 
wrongdoing potentially substantiating claims as to the systemic toxicity of banking 
culture. 
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5.8 ’A Few Bad Apples’  
 
The purported cultural toxicity of banking culture (Treanor 2014a) is said to be linked 
with wrongdoing and bad behaviour, with research (CIPD 2013) showing that bad 
behaviour and bullying is prevalent within banks, and two thirds of participants 
agreed that bad behaviour is rewarded (Moore 2012, 2013). The responses to the 
prevalence of wrongdoing or misbehaviour within the industry varies amongst 
participants with many claiming they have not personally witnessed any 
wrongdoing, that there was no particular intent or malice behind such conduct or 
that it was a ‘few bad apples’ (Karuhn) and not a systemic issue.  
 
Norbert discussed how he felt that unethical behaviour was not the driving force 
behind the financial crisis, however, he did acknowledge that there was some 
misbehaviour present within the banks, but felt it was limited to a minority, stating: 
 
‘My view is that the crisis did not come from unethical behaviour, parts of it 
did and certainly there were some through the ﬁnancial crisis, there were 
some parts of unethical behaviour by certain people. For example, I 
remember the selling, just when the ﬁnancial crisis broke, of obviously, all of 
the securities quickly, that I would say is unethical behaviour. Where you kind 
of use clients to offload securities. I am sure you remember the senate 
hearing of Goliath Bank for the Timberwolf asset-backed securities package, 
where obviously people internally knew it was not that great but they sold it 
anyway. That’s what I would say was typically unethical behaviour, but really 
I would say that normally was limited, it hasn’t permeated the institutions. 
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I do think that at least in principle banks always tried to behave ethically, that 
has always been my experience through various parts of the institutions, I 
don’t think in any of the major banks that I know of that there was a culture 
of unethical behaviour, I haven’t seen that. At Whittards, Quartz Bank and 
Goliath Bank I have not found systematic unethical behaviour.’ 
  
Norbert’s claim that unethical behaviour ‘was limited’ and ‘hasn’t permeated’ 
institutions may indicate some forms of denial or minimisation to the extent of the 
issues present in the banking industry in the face of a number of ongoing scandals 
and the ever increasing fines issued by regulators to the industry. Other participants 
shared similar perspectives with Karuhn a graduate trainee at Cross Continent 
Bank, stating that it was only a ‘handful of individuals’ who engaged in unethical 
behaviour. Similarly, Adrian claimed it was a ‘very small minority who overstepped 
the mark’ and Lewis said it is ‘the minority of people in financial services that are 
bad eggs’. However, Daniel shared the perspective that ‘they are a minority’ but 
acknowledged that ‘they are a significant enough element, which is why these 
scandals keep happening’. 
 
Adrian pointed out that often the choices made by individuals within the industry can 
in retrospect be seen as wrongdoing but in reality were ‘poor decisions’, but at the 
time they were made without ‘any malice’ and may have seemed like the ‘right thing 
to do’. 
 
‘…a lot of the things that have gone bad economically were not illegal and 
they weren’t necessarily irresponsible at the time…what we are dealing with 
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in some cases is the aftermath of some poor decisions, consequences 
economically from decisions that were made four, five, six or ten years ago. 
So in some cases, you look back and think that was a bad decision but it’s 
not necessarily one that was driven by any malice it's just poor decision 
making and circumstances change. In some cases you might look back and 
think my God, how did anyone make that decision’. 
 
Nico seemed to share a similar sentiment to Adrian stating: 
 
‘There’s a huge culture or bubble mentality, everyone thinks it’s working and 
everyone is happy and no one thinks about it at the time, there’s no evil 
motivation…Only in hindsight that people can look back with a bit of 
detachment that you can realise that what you were doing was stupid or 
wrong.’ 
 
Daniel an IT infrastructure consultant working in the sector, expressed a similar 
perspective, however, pointing out that the element of wrongdoing present within 
the industry is sufficient enough to have a detrimental impact on the industry. 
 
‘I don’t think people in banks deliberately go out to cheat but I think they do 
cut corners at times, greed comes in and the messages get ignored. Maybe 
it’s the kind of people they employ’. 
 
These statements illustrate how members of these banking institutions do not feel 
that the behaviour of individuals before the financial crisis was motivated by 
particular malice or intent to cause detrimental outcomes for the industry and its 
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wider stakeholders. Instead, these were decisions that were perceived to be 
acceptable at the time according to market sentiments and the regulatory, political 
and consumer environments of that time. It is only in retrospect and with more 
information available to us post financial crisis that we have the ability to examine 
the crisis from a macroscopic perspective. However, the argument that bad 
decisions were made without malicious intent should not necessarily ameliorate 
arguments that there is or was not systemic shortcomings within the banking system 
and that these were isolated incidents from a ‘few bad apples’ as some participants 
have described it. There are multiple examples of wrongdoing within the industry for 
it to be brushed off as rogue individuals or poorly framed decisions. Jacob, who is a 
former derivatives analyst, may provide an explanation for how such behaviour 
became normalised within the industry: 
 
‘With the crisis, people started stretching the boundaries of what I think were 
sensible deals…I could see on a micro level where everyone was making 
their decisions, that was the problem, you had to step back and see that 
actually this was all a bit mad. Everyone on a micro level would have done 
what everyone else would have done, it was kind of this systemic thing, this 
snowball that just gained momentum and no one was able to take a step back 
and say stop it, and then all the stuff around 2008 happened. When you are 
in a massive tidal wave and you are riding it and a voice is telling you to sit 
on top of it then trying to swim against it, it is basically like committing suicide, 
you might as well not work in the industry’ 
 
This idea of swimming against the tide was mentioned by a number of participants 
and it is interesting on an individual employee level but also on an organisational 
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level. It alludes to the internal and external pressures that the employees and 
organisations are subject to from colleagues, managers, investors, politicians and 
the general public. Additionally employees might feel that the financial products 
being sold are reinforced by the market demand and that not selling the products 
would be detrimental to their career or bonus and have little effect as  ‘if we don’t do 
it somebody else will’.  
 
Additionally, here we can begin to see the forming of competing power relations 
(Foucault 1977). On an organisational level, it may have been difficult for a single 
banking institution to refuse to partake in the securitisation of assets and the selling 
of Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), Asset Banked Securities (ABSs) and 
Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and other derivative products. They would have been 
subject to pressures from shareholders who would have been seeking a healthy 
return on their investment and would have seen anything but engaging in these 
nascent markets as over conservatism from the bank’s management. In addition to 
shareholder pressure, the industry was under intense pressure from the government 
and politicians to engage in sub-prime lending in order to increase the availability of 
consumer credit and home ownership (Deloitte 2013; Wolf 2015; Roubini and Mihm 
2011). The availability of consumer credit and 100% mortgages fuelled a 
consumption of such products from the general public, who bought into the 
materialism of having new cars, expensive holidays and home ownership. This 
exerted more pressure on the banking industry to free up lending and further their 
stake in securitisation, as without it such unencumbered lending this was not 
possible. 
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5.9 Genuine Change or Public Relations 
 
The industry changes that have been implemented since the financial crisis and the 
subsequent scandals that have emerged have been questioned by some 
commentators as merely discursive devices (Whittle and Mueller 2011) executed as 
PR tools to improve the public image of the banks and convince regulators and 
governments that they are now good corporate citizens who are interested in ‘doing 
the right thing’. From talking to participants it was unclear whether the cultural 
changes introduced are there to make a genuine change. Jack a technical architect 
at Goliath Bank explained how he felt that the way it is executed and the amount of 
investment his organisation has made into these cultural changes and their 
communication is an indicator that they are attempting to make a genuine change: 
 
‘They spend an awful lot of money on it and you have to come away and say 
you know what I think they are serious about it…when you have the chairman 
say this is important and it’s on the homepage of the Internet you know it's 
being read by every team in the world, it's a global thing, it's not just London’. 
 
Jack went on to talk about how if he were a new recruit to the firm he would initially 
be cynical about the communication of values and beliefs, viewing it as a ‘sales 
pitch’. However, he felt that once you are in the organisation and experience the 
value system in action you realise it is ‘so heavily backed and promoted and you 
see they actually believe it and it's a big thing’. 
 
In contrast, Susanne who is a Director in Commodities at Legion Bank, when asked 
how her organisation communicates its values and beliefs said:  
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‘It’s going to sound stupid but is written on the walls, having said that, what 
they say the values and culture are isn't really visible apart from the walls, it 
isn't really reflected in the way that people and in particular the way senior 
management behave’. 
 
And when asked what effect she thinks this lack of continuity and enactment of the 
firm's values has on employees she said: 
 
‘I think they find it quite annoying actually because they spent a lot of money 
on this Team Spirit advertising campaign. Every time you walk out of the 
office you see a massive advert, you see this thing and it's not reflected in 
the culture of the organisation so I think that many people find that annoying 
and demoralising’. 
 
The statements provided by Jack and Susanne illustrate the diversity of perceptions 
towards organisational culture that exists within the industry. Some participants see 
some consistency between communication values and beliefs and the day-to-day 
behaviours, whereas other participants think that their organisation may be lacking 
continuity and fail to enact the values they communicate to staff, which can have 
negative effects on the workforce and can be demotivating. However, it is important 
to note that even within the firms, where there are supposedly higher levels of 
continuity and multi-level enactment of the cultural system the data would suggest 
that there are still dissenting voices who do not feel that firms behave in a way that 
is in congruence with what they communicate. This suggests that the subjectivity of 
actors should never be overlooked when researching organisational culture and 
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highlights the importance of conducting critical research in this area. This being said, 
these statements along with the wider data collected demonstrate that organisations 
and their management must be seen to be enacting the values they disseminate 
and simply writing them on a wall or the company intranet is not enough to inspire 
acculturation.  
 
Dev, a director who has worked in the industry for 8 years as senior legal counsel 
to some of the largest investment banks, explained: 
 
‘The world is old, it is so old and people haven't changed for thousands or 
years, we still behave in the same way, we will have the same desires to 
become rich, to become successful. The only thing that has changed is that 
more information and more frameworks have been imposed on certain types 
of behaviour in the industry’. 
 
This postulation from Dev is interesting as it suggests that some of the behaviours 
that were a contributory factor in the crisis are in fact part of human nature and not 
necessarily ingrained into us through contemporary society or through the 
disciplining discourses of the institutions we are members of. This suggestion may 
undermine the argument that banking culture was the root cause for the behaviours 
which spurred the crisis, as Dev argued that the systemic failures behind the crisis 
are actually spurred by human nature, suggesting that culture management may not 
provide a remedy to these issues. 
 
Nico who has spent 25 years in investment management roles including managing 
director and chief investment officer, discussed how the preoccupation with the 
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banking industry will become less salient as more time elapses, leading to a 
reversion of behaviours: 
 
‘we’re still in the immediate aftermath where bankers are still evil and they 
need to  be banged on the head all the time, that will probably last for another 
5 or so years, and then gradually we will forget the reasons why we all hated 
bankers and they will slowly go back to their old ways in another 20-30 years 
we will have another crisis’. 
 
When asked why he felt this reversion is inevitable he responded saying: ‘because 
it makes so much money, amazing amounts of money’. Nico’s claim that we will 
gradually forget the problems within the banking industry seems to be coming to 
fruition earlier than he anticipated, as recent shifts in governmental policy have seen 
an easing in the regulatory burden on the banks. These shifts towards ‘the end of 
banker bashing’ (Parker et al. 2015) can be evidenced by the recent concession by 
the Bank of England on ring-fencing rules, thus allowing banks to transfer capital 
from their retail divisions to other parts of their business (Binham and Dunkley 2015). 
The political shift in favour of the banks is also evident in the FCA deciding to scrap 
its cultural review of the banks (Treanor 2015b) and the Treasury’s recent decision 
to abandon their rules on accountability of senior managers. Who under this rule 
would have been held individually accountable for organisational failings with the 
threat of a fine or a ban (Binham 2015).  
 
Victor a management consultant currently at Whittards, mentioned how these 
shortcomings in behaviour have not been expelled from banking culture and how 
some of the cultural changes may be undermined by the industry’s focus on profit: 
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‘I don't think the culture has gone, if a CEO says we need change, be more 
responsible, etc etc but he isn't going to expect his traders to make any less 
profits, then there is a bit of a disconnect there. They still expect to make 
profit, it doesn't matter what they say in the media, how they make it, you 
keep finding all these issues, they are at it all the time, either with or without 
the blessings of senior management, that culture I don't know whether you 
will ever be able to shake it out of banking.’ 
 
Victor went on to provide his perspective on how long term change can be achieved 
which shift the locus of change away from the banking industry and focuses on a 
deeper societal change: 
 
‘In the long run you are talking about educating the masses, more of a 
societal, cultural change to capitalism as a whole…People expect to have 
bigger houses, cars, more flashy cars, they expect their kids to follow that 
path but they don't realise that they are adding to that, making people 
greedy…I think generally the idea has to be long-term societal change and 
how we set the expectations for ourselves and our kids’. 
 
Adrian an executive director at Ryman Bank possesses a more positive outlook on 
the banking reforms stating: 
 
‘I don't think this is a transient change, and I don't think there will be a return 
in the foreseeable future…Realistically I think the changes this time are fairly 
severe. I think you are going to see a signiﬁcant change in culture, change in 
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expectations. I think the changes will stick, also I suppose with the inﬂux of 
new generations which think differently, I think it will be a better industry for 
that…I don’t think you can revert back to that sort of behaviour culturally 
because you want to get an outcome’. 
 
The statements above suggest that participants are pessimistic about whether the 
industry will be changed in the long run. Participants openly acknowledge and 
discuss the changes that have occurred in the aftermath of the crisis both on a 
regulatory and cultural front. However there seems to be a sense that although there 
is an abundance of regulatory demands and cultural initiatives, these may only be 
fleeting, ones that banks initiate and adhere to for public relations purposes, but that 
as the regulatory and political environment changes surrounding the industry, so will 
the industry’s focus. 
 
Much of participants’ concerns around the inability for the industry to change long 
term is centred around money and profits. Money and its accumulation seem to be 
a leitmotif within the pre and post-crisis banking industry. Money seems to be the 
inciter of all wrongdoing within the industry and the industry’s obsession with it may 
fuel yet more scandals and promote more wrongdoing. 
 
5.10 Summary 
 
This chapter was the first of two data chapters presenting data gathered from 
interviews with participants from various banking and investment institutions. From 
the data presented there is evidence to suggest that the industry is leading its culture 
by attempting to set the ‘tone from the top’. This is done through the implementation 
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of mission statements and core principles. The data shows that employees are 
subject to continual cultural communication through cultural paraphernalia, events 
and training, with the express function of reinforcing and reminding employees of 
their organisationally prescribed values and principles. This indicates that the 
industry continues to adopt a view of organisational culture that is in line with the 
cultural engineering texts of the 1980s advocating the top-down communication of 
clearly defined organisational values and beliefs, with the aim of developing a 
‘strong culture’. Further evidence that suggests that the cultural guru literature of the 
1980s is a source for the industry’s attempts to manage its culture is the intolerance 
of dissent in managerial-constructed cultural regimes. 
 
The data presented in this chapter also demonstrated that top-down cultural 
communications are not necessarily received by employees as intended by 
management, as ambiguity and contestation are present amongst cultural 
communications. This leads to the development of a multiplicity of potentially 
competing and contradictory cultural interpretations, which emerge through the 
inferences made from actual conduct and behaviour between the mutual 
participation of organisational actors. This reinforces the suggestion that cultural 
management has been oversimplified (Martin 2002) and serves to undermine the 
strong culture claims. 
 
Additionally, the industry consists of norms and rituals that could be described as 
dysfunctional or toxic, cultivating an ultra-competitive environment that necessitates 
individual performance and stimulates self-preservation to the detriment of the 
industry’s cultural change initiatives. These initiatives have attempted to curtail 
wrongdoing or misbehaviour and promote cordiality and cohesiveness, with the 
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aims of encouraging employees to ‘do the right thing’. Across the industry ‘new’ core 
values and beliefs have been introduced, however, from the data, there are 
suggestions that managerially introduced values and beliefs often bear no relation 
to organisational members’ lived experiences. Furthermore, this chapter presented 
data that supports the existence of sub-cultures within organisational culture, 
demonstrating a further departure from the functionalist prescriptions of culture. This 
thesis acknowledges that social groups are not homogenous and static but are 
shifting, diverse and contentious (Van Maanen and Barley 1985; Laurilla 1997; 
Morgan and Sturdy 2000; Kenny et al. 2011) suggesting that the existence of sub-
cultures is inevitable. 
 
The data in this chapter would suggest that there seems to be a lack of consistency 
and continuity between communicated values and beliefs and those enacted by 
employees. This lack of congruence can have demotivating and detrimental effects 
on the productivity of the introduced cultural changes. The accumulation of money 
and the expansion of profits seems to play a central role in the industry’s perceived 
inability to change long term. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Emerging Cultures 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to explore the cultures which have emerged from the banking 
industry. These are not necessarily the ‘strong cultures’ that the banking institutions 
have attempted to engineer. They are instead constructed through the mutual 
interaction amongst employees based upon their interpretations and experiences of 
the artefacts, rituals and discourses that the industry has attempted to instil and 
perpetuate in their attempts to manage the industry’s culture. From the discussions 
below we will see from participants how there are multiple and sometimes 
contradictory and contested interpretations of these cultural attributes. The three 
sections explored in the chapter pertain to the themes of excess, elitism and hard 
work which form the key attributes of performance discourse, which this thesis 
developed in order to make sense of this empirical data. 
 
The chapter will begin with an exploration of the role greed, money and profits play 
within the industry, looking at how these themes impact upon the behaviours and 
interpretations of industry actors, which ultimately developed a culture of excess 
within the industry. It is being constantly redefined and reconstructed with each 
individual’s account, but is something that is entwined with the operations and ethos 
of the industry and which also moulds other cultures within the industry. The next 
section will explore the culture of elites that emerges from the industry, which is 
closely related to the culture of excess and simultaneously moulded by it but also 
moulding it. The culture of elites explores the themes of prestige, smartness and 
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competition in order to gain an insight into how the industry constructed and enacts 
its power relations; what empowers bankers to do what they do and behave in the 
manner that they do. We will then explore the dysfunctions of such cultures and how 
this can again impact industry actors’ conduct and behaviours, while also 
demonstrating how seemingly unambiguous concepts such as prestige and 
smartness can result in multiple interpretations. 
 
This chapter will then move on to a discussion of participants’ data regarding work-
life balance. The theme of work-life balance runs through both cultures of excess 
and elites, as we will see from the data, the intensification of work within the industry 
is often excessive, but engaged in as an imperative in order to generate revenue. 
Additionally, the theme of work-life balance is an integral ingredient in the 
construction of a culture of elites, as it distinguishes industry actors from industry 
outsiders. It is seen as an attribute of the elite banker, who must engage in long 
hours in order to remain competitive and be successful. Finally, the chapter will 
close with an extended quotation from Phillip who provides a personal and detailed 
account of his perspectives, which ties together all the themes discussed throughout 
this chapter by demonstrating how they play a significant role in a bankers’ identity, 
sense of self-worth and identification with their organisations. 
 
6.2 Culture of Excess 
 
Since the financial crisis, bankers and the industry as a whole have often been 
described as greedy and deceitful (Randall 2012; FT.com 2014). Bankers of the last 
couple of decades have been portrayed as greedier than past generations and are 
focused on ‘accumulating treasure’, as Phillip put it. This apparent hunger for money 
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has been satisfied by the remuneration structures that were rooted in the short-term 
perspectives of the industry (Roubini and Mihm 2011; Kerr and Robinson 2012; 
Tourish and Hargie 2012). Many feel that in order to reform the way the banking 
sector is rewarded, the industry’s unhealthy relationship with money must be 
addressed. 
 
Some participants supported claims about the existence of greed within the industry, 
with Nico declaring: ‘The worst people end up as traders and investment bankers, 
most of the greediest and most willing to rip other people off are the front office guys 
in investment banks’. Here Nico makes some clear claims as to the way he views 
the morality and integrity of front office investment bankers. 
 
Jacob stated: 
 
‘At Goliath Bank, it was good to be greedy but long-term greedy because 
when you made money for your clients you made it in the long-term, because 
if you look after them they will pay you more’. 
 
The theme of money and profits within the industry is seen not only as something 
that is fundamental to the business operations of the banks, but is also seen as 
something that is deep-rooted in the industry’s culture: ‘banks are all about making 
money’, as one participant put it. The theme of money can be seen to present a 
number of tensions within the industry as it plays a central role in economic, political, 
organisational and individual competing interests, which adds to the notion of the 
existence of a web of competing power relations. An example of such tensions can 
be seen from Jacob’s distinction between making money for the client and making 
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money himself or the firm. This is an important distinction as it raises the question 
of under what circumstances do the interests of clients, the firm or the individual 
take precedence over the another and one way of understanding this could be 
through power relations (Foucault 1977). 
 
Participants stated that prior to the crisis, excessive behaviours became prevalent 
spurred by an abundance of money, Victor stated: 
     
‘People were more outgoing, spending a lot of money, we used to have lavish 
Christmas parties, lots of company sponsored do's, Friday evening beer 
trolleys…I think people were in party mode, we were working hard but playing 
very hard, people on bonus day, were coming back at lunchtime with big bags 
of shopping that was pretty much in your face…they weren't shy about 
showing off their newly acquired symbols of prosperity’. 
 
Additionally, Phillip stated: 
 
‘They were the boom days, everyone was making money, clients were 
making money, you could throw a dart at a list of stocks and you could make 
money on it, we were making big bonuses, we were constantly getting 
poached by other ﬁrms. No one believed the gravy train was going to 
stop…Everyone was almost high ﬁving in the corridors, as you had found a 
way of de-risking these huge portfolios that could then be traded and 
everyone was making money hand over ﬁst.’ 
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Adrian suggests that the abundance of money resulted in the relaxing of robust risk 
analysis (Roubini and Mihm 2011) in favour of a continued effort to make more 
money, even if such decisions were not sustainable in the long-term. As Adrian 
stated: 
 
‘…one of the issues with the culture was people were needing to or wanting 
to continue to make money. So people would take additional risk beyond 
which was sensible in some cases, as we have seen across the 
industry…There was perhaps a momentum of continuing to push certain 
products and certain areas of the market that were proving very proﬁtable to 
the point where it became oversaturated and became a bubble and it was 
going to go, and it did’. 
 
Jenson, who is an executive director in the equity sales division at Goliath Bank, 
discussed how before the crisis, as long as it made money not much else mattered: 
 
‘…before the financial crisis, it was almost anything goes…by and large it 
was a lot more open laissez faire, if you could make money out of it then 
perhaps we should do it, barring it doesn't go too far, and granted there were 
places it went too far.’ 
 
 
Many participants, however, expressed acceptance to the fact that it is inevitable 
that the industry is focused on making money and staying profitable as they are 
publicly listed companies. Adrian explained:  
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‘…ultimately banks are companies with shareholders, any private Bank is a 
commercial company so ultimately they are driven by share price and share 
price is driven by proﬁts, growth and sales….’  
 
Jenson shared a similar sentiment stating ‘we’re a business and at the end of the 
day we do what makes money.’ 
     
Similarly, Hemel a compliance contractor currently at Cross Continent Bank, stated 
on the topic of the importance of money to the industry: 
 
‘…everything else, whether they say it or not is secondary, they want to make 
sure they can make the most money with the regulations and whatever 
framework is given, ultimately the money is sort of married to them’. 
 
He went on to say: 
 
‘At some point, people do realise that the purpose of a bank is to make money 
so some of them instead of thinking about the higher purpose and higher 
cause and what they are doing on a daily basis and how it contributes to 
society. They think I’m going to earn some money and have a family and 
invest that money at a later stage and do something for themselves. Some 
hit the age of 40/50 and think what the heck have I been doing, all I have 
been doing is earning money’. 
 
Hemel’s use of the term ‘money is married to them’ has some interesting 
connotations for the wider context of the role that money plays in the industry and 
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to individuals within the industry. If we use marriage as a metaphor for the industry’s 
and bankers’ relationships with money, it can reveal some interesting concepts. 
Marriage and its fundamental purpose have been a historic subject of contention 
with some suggesting that its primary purpose is to create an economic pact (Wilcox 
et al. 2015). It has also been viewed as an expression of romance and love. This 
contention can translate to the industry’s relationship with money; is it founded upon 
the fulfilment of passion and desires or is it an economic necessity? 
 
Participants spoke about how regulatory burden upon the industry saw a shift in a 
bank’s capacity to make money in certain areas such as securitised products. Toby 
a graduate analyst at Dressler Bank, stated ‘there’s a huge amount of money which 
could be made if the regulatory environment were just a little more efficient’ in terms 
of the financial products they are now able to sell and the administrative burden to 
demonstrate compliance with with regulations, with Toby claiming his team lose up 
to ‘5,200 hours of productivity a year.’ 
 
The importance of profits to the industry is highlighted by Jenson’s discussion of 
how there is a pressure to seek out regulatory ‘grey zones’, which are areas of 
conduct that are not clearly defined or covered by existing rules: 
 
‘They are always going to be pushing the grey zone, that is where the profit 
is, the question is how outrageous are you with it…If the regulators say you 
can’t do that anymore then you can’t do it. But if the regulator hasn't carved 
it out people are trying to figure out what they should do and a lot of it tends 
to be the opening of the boundaries, a thin slice in the middle, which is 
allowed and profitable and these are the things which are shaping what 
   194 
business banks do and don't do and how they do them as opposed to any 
personal guilt.’ 
 
Jenson gave Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) as an example of regulatory ‘grey zone’ 
as they were unregulated (Augustin et al. 2016) but hugely popular in the years 
before the crisis with the CDS market estimated to be worth $57 trillion by 2008 
(Stulz 2010). This pressure to push the ‘grey zone’ emerges upon the individual in 
order to remain competitive and generate revenue. Employees are not the only 
subjects of this pressure, however, as the organisations themselves are subject to 
the pressure to generate shareholder value. 
 
Jenson went on to discuss how working in the grey zone can easily lead to issues 
of potential misconduct: 
 
‘You push the boundaries, you make money but, the problem is that as we 
saw with the subprime market it became self-perpetuating because it was 
just such good business, and that’s where it just blew out. If someone had 
stepped in and said this is probably not a good idea, we have probably 
exceeded the reasonable boundaries for this…Rather than just completely 
pushing it over the edge, that good business sense was just lacking…’ 
 
 
Phillip a managing director with 20 years’ experience, also discussed how the 
industry will continue to push boundaries and seek out loopholes within legislation 
and how it is only a matter of time until unethical behaviour resurfaces: 
 
   195 
‘I expect that people will find ways of getting around risk controls and 
regulations in order to help people generate an above market rate of return 
and then it will go pear shaped again because so many people will pile into it 
and you will get the crooks as well.’ 
 
From Jenson’s and Phillip’s statements, we can see the emergence of a culture of 
excess where regulatory boundaries are explored and potentially exploited in order 
to create and sustain profits. From their accounts they make a connection between 
the ‘grey zone’ and profits, suggesting that they view pushing the boundaries of 
regulation as a necessity in order to ‘make money’. However, Jenson and Phillip 
note how the exploration of regulatory boundaries can become excessive due to 
their profit generating potential leading to forms of misconduct and unethical 
behaviour. Therefore the assertion that the industry is ‘always going to be pushing 
the grey zone’ suggests that the cycles of ‘boom and bust’ will continue to occur as 
long as banks proceed along these lines of conduct and fail to take a longer term 
approach. Additionally, Jenson contends that issues of excessive regulatory 
avoidance can be resolved with a ‘strong culture’ indicating that strong cultures are 
still seen as a solution. 
 
The above discussion regarding excessive exploration of regulatory boundaries or 
pushing the ‘grey zone’ introduces the concept of short-termism, where there is an 
excessive focus on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests. These 
were particularly prevalent before the crisis. A number of participants discussed how 
they thought that this was still an issue within the industry, one which is compounded 
by bonus structures. Daniel an IT infrastructure consultant who has worked at 
Emerald Bank and Whittards stated: 
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‘It’s the culture, it’s still very bonus led, even though there are bonus caps 
they ﬁnd other ways of paying equivalent to bonuses. At the moment they 
[regulators] try to scrabble around to stop them paying bonuses, but they ﬁnd 
other vehicles that look like bonuses but aren’t bonuses. I think that culture, 
that whole target-driven, reward driven culture hasn’t really changed and 
that’s incentivising the wrong behaviours…There is quite a lot of short-
termism around, people think I’ll come in, make my fortune and leave quite 
quickly and cash out. They don’t really look at things medium to long term.’ 
 
The concerns Daniel explains regarding the skirting of bonus cap rules further 
demonstrates the industry’s affinity for working in the grey zone. It also illustrates 
that reformation of the industry cannot rely solely on regulatory frameworks as there 
are many examples where rigorous regulation and law passing does not necessarily 
resolve the root causes of a problem, evidenced by recent scandals surrounding tax 
evasion and avoidance (Parker and Houlder 2016; Arnold and Barrett 2015). 
 
Susanne explained how she felt that the issue of short-termism does not originate 
with bonus structures but instead is driven by the pressures imposed on 
organisations by shareholders: 
 
‘…it all comes back to the shareholder’s expectations because your share 
prices go up and down based on the value your shareholders perceive you 
to have and that is going to be based on your published results…You come 
up with a figure that says we made this much profit and the shareholders will 
respond to that and so the more profit you make the more cash you make the 
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better the share price…Your interests are in maximising those numbers in 
the short-term basis so the way bonuses typically worked was, did you make 
money yes or no? if you made money then great and you will get a bonus 
and if you didn't then you don't. So the whole set up was geared towards a 
short-term outlook’. 
 
Susanne’s statement regarding shareholder expectations further develops the 
notion of external pressures imposed on individuals by other parties. Susanne’s 
statement suggests that an individual’s pursuit of revenues stems from shareholder 
expectations that are placed on the organisation, which in turn is foisted upon the 
employee, generating competition in the form of bonuses. Through a Foucauldian 
(1980) understanding of power relations, these pressures are an enactment of 
power by the various competing parties, such as governments, regulators and 
investors. This constructs a complex web of competing interests and power relations 
which in turn lead to the development of banking cultures and discourses. The idea 
of the web of competing power relations that influences the direction of banks and 
the wider industry was touched upon in Chapter Two and will be explored further in 
the analysis chapter. 
 
The centrality of money to the banking industry and its operation may lead to 
assumptions regarding the role money plays in motivating bankers and prospective 
bankers. Daniel noted that some attempt to make their ‘fortune’ and ‘cash out’. 
However, Susanne attempts to dispel this notion by asserting that money cannot 
act as a motivator for individuals within the industry, stating: 
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‘The people who are motivated by the money fall away quite quickly because 
the money isn't as good as it used to be and the stresses are higher so no, 
you need to be motivated by the work you are doing and the people that you 
are doing it with.’ 
 
Sam who works in equity sales, shares a similar perspective, stating: 
 
‘I think there is an element where people who ended up working in financial 
markets who will have had money as a motivating factor before they joined. 
But there is no one I have known in the last 10 years where money is their 
sole motivator. The rewards in the industry are much lower than they used to 
be. 
 
Susanne and Sam discuss how remuneration within the industry is no longer high 
enough to warrant it being the sole motivation of employees. However, this claim 
may be relative to their experience of remuneration levels within the industry, as 
many people may still view the industry as highly paid with an average starting 
salary of £30,000 to £40,000 (Prospects.ac.uk 2016). Phillip suggested that they are 
‘all overpaid, a bit less so now but still overpaid’. Toby provides a slightly different 
perspective of why money cannot be the primary motivator for an individual within 
the industry, stating: ‘There is no amount of money that would make you want to 
work those sorts of hours unless you had some element of enjoyment for what you 
are doing’. 
 
However these accounts are quite explicitly contradicted by Sophie previously an 
analyst at Dressler Bank, when she was asked whether remuneration is a motivating 
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factor for her, she replied: ‘Yes, it’s the one sole reason I am there. I think people lie 
if they say otherwise’. On this point, Sam stated how: ‘That sort of mentality would 
certainly upset the culture of any team or organisation’. 
 
Nico’s account would suggest that this is an inherent factor in the industry and the 
organisations that operate within it, as they have an inseparable relationship with 
money, which permeates the industry, suggesting it is a systematic flaw: 
 
‘Banks are inherently very capitalist institutions and capitalism is all about 
making money and banks are all about making money. So I think all of the 
time you have that, you are going to attract the sort of people who are looking 
to make money, so the employees and the senior management are really 
only interested in making money for the bank and themselves and I don’t see 
how you are going to change that.’ 
 
The role that money plays within the industry is quite significant: money is at the 
heart of the industry. This focus on money is perpetuated throughout the industry 
and the wider system it sits within, including ownership structures. This then trickles 
down to employees, acting to develop an organisational imperative of ‘making 
money’, potentially normalising behaviour and conduct that is associated with 
making money and generating profits, whether or not these behaviours are in line 
with cultural communications surrounding ethics and integrity. Although some 
participants explained how they are almost trapped by the financial freedom that the 
industry’s remuneration affords. This constrains their ability to seek fulfilling work, 
with Sophie stating: 
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‘I did a lot of soul searching to decide where I go next, what do I want to do, 
because I do want to do something different where I feel I am making a 
difference, but my issue is the finance. It seems to be the rule that if you want 
to divert somewhere more meaningful you end up getting paid less so, I 
guess it’s a personal choice. Do you reduce your expenses and way of living 
or do you bite the bullet and maintain your lifestyle but not necessarily feel 
fulfilled in your career?’ 
 
Sophie’s statement could be seen to suggest that the theme of money may 
contribute to the development of forms of disciplinary power (Foucault 1977; 1980), 
one which centres around an individual’s material desires and maintenance of a 
certain ‘lifestyle’. Therefore it can be suggested that the attainment of money results 
in a control over employees, such as Sophie, that emanates internally guiding her 
ambitions, desires and conduct. However, it should be noted that this effect is not 
totalising (Foucault 1977) as money can also be a tool for empowerment through 
the attainment of sizeable remuneration packages. Additionally, Sophie 
demonstrates her capacity to resist such forms of control through her more critical 
comments on the banks she has worked for. Although attempts to obtain money 
may result in the application of disciplinary power, its propagation emanates via 
external mechanisms. Where certain imperatives have been instilled into the 
individual through societal pressures; education, popular culture, marketing and 
organisations, to evoke certain material desires which ensures our financial 
dependency, so that one can maintain their ‘lifestyle’. 
 
Phillip provides a perspective that may suggest their attainment of money may not 
simply be for the purpose of lavish consumption, but may be linked to something 
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more intricately related to their sense of self. Phillip provides an insight into what 
these underlying reasons may be: 
 
‘…nobody ever says thank you to you and nobody has to because your worth 
is measured by what does my bonus look like at the end of the year. That 
deﬁnes my existence and sense of self, actually putting a number on my 
value as a human being and it's in dollars, that envelope I get in January.’ 
 
Phillip’s declaration provides a more nuanced perspective of the role money plays 
to a banker. Phillip’s assertion that ‘nobody ever says thank you’ suggests that he 
may believe that there is cause for bankers to be thanked for their work, possibly 
stemming from the economic importance their roles play in providing capital to 
markets and individuals. Additionally Phillip seems to be accepting that his ‘value 
as a human being’ is quantified and reduced to a number. This may have wider 
connotations as such a quantification of human life which could potentially result in 
clients, shareholders and the general public also being reduced to a numeric value 
that is entered into revenue projections. 
 
Phillip went on to provide a very revealing account of his time as a front office 
managing director (MD) evaluator: 
 
‘I was evaluating and promoting 28 year olds to MD with £5 million bonuses, 
they were hippies, hired out of universities with sandals and beards and rohan 
trousers and they weren’t what people would think of as a banker. To be 
honest, they weren’t the rapacious capitalists that you would think they would 
be, they were computer geeks, they were pretty left wing, vegetarians, real 
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sandal wearers some of them. So for them, money was a means of 
measuring… you got the sense that how much they earned was a validation 
of themselves which they hadn’t got elsewhere and I don’t think they really 
cared about the money, what they cared about was that they were getting 
paid more than the next guy, because that demonstrated how brilliant they 
were, I know for a fact that some of them gave away much of what they 
earned anyway.’ 
 
This suggests that the relationship that some people within the industry have with 
money is more complex. Money plays a symbolic role and can be used as a 
measure of self-worth and a demonstration of their abilities rather than a medium of 
exchange. Although this realisation may indicate that they possess little personal 
attachment to the money as a currency but instead as an abstract representation of 
their superiority over their colleagues and competitors; it is the quantification of their 
‘greatness’. This therefore, may divorce them from the potential ramifications that 
their actions may have on the wider populous. 
 
Interestingly Zara, who works in fixed income at a US based investment 
management house, expressed a more personal perspective on money and profits 
within the industry: 
 
‘…we are in the business of taking care of someone’s future savings that puts 
a huge responsibility on the shoulders of everyone who works in my industry.  
Personally, I take that on because at the end of the day the people that I am 
selling these funds to and the underlying people that are buying these funds 
are exactly like me, working hard, putting money away, saving it because 
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they want to have something when they retire. So I can never remove myself 
from anything I do in my industry, because anything I am encouraging 
someone to buy I should be comfortable with buying it myself, so I am a 
fiduciary in these things. I do feel we have to take a huge responsibility for 
everyone within the industry, these were essentially people’s lives and their 
children’s [lives] that we were throwing away by not doing our jobs’. 
 
Nico also shared a similar perspective, saying: 
 
‘I have always felt that if I am running investment funds I am running other 
people’s money, their savings and trying to do the best I can so that they 
have more in retirement or to pass on to their kids. If I can do my job well 
their savings will be boosted, I have always tried to see it in the light of the 
end client, and what they actually want, an actual human being’. 
 
When Zara was asked whether others in the industry shared her perspective, she 
laughed and replied: 
 
‘No, I think a lot of people are very removed from the process, I don't think 
they see it that way, to them they are just doing it for a job, getting paid, and 
then they go home. In my industry to them it’s just a job, they don't really think 
about it, that this could be their savings some cowboy could be investing…’ 
 
Zara and Nico’s perspectives contradict many of the assumptions made about 
people who work within the investment industry. Zara and Nico demonstrate that 
they take a more personal view of the money involved in the industry and empathise 
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with those that their actions may effect.  Zara’s and Nico’s accounts demonstrate 
that we cannot draw overarching and totalising conclusions regarding banking 
culture and that the various themes and rituals that contribute to its development as 
alternative perspectives can exist despite the existence of normative frameworks 
and taken for granted assumptions. Instead, such data can be understood 
perceptually and illuminate the complexities of social phenomena such as 
organisational culture. 
 
6.3 Culture of Elites 
 
Elitism is the platform upon which bankers view themselves, the world and what 
they do. They believe that they possess a particular blend of intellect, ambition and 
hard work (Ho 2009). Through the data, there are indications that the industry 
attempts to construct a culture of elites, the first aspect of this is through establishing 
the prestige of the industry. The majority of participants said that ‘there is deﬁnitely 
an element of prestige’ (Adrian) of being part of the industry. Lewis a technology 
infrastructure contractor with twenty year’s experience in the industry, explained his 
sense of pride of working for particular organisations within the industry, which 
stems from their prestige: 
 
‘I do feel proud to work in ﬁnancial services and I am probably arrogant a bit 
with it to be honest…The pride is not because they are ﬁnancial services, it’s 
because they are so hard to get into, Goliath Bank is the Google of ﬁnancial 
services. My interview for Goliath Bank was 18 interviews over 6 months, I 
have them on my resume it’s the ﬁrst bullet point’. 
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Sophie provides a revealing account of the perceived prestige of the industry: 
 
‘It has the label of prestige but the pride is at a very fake and at a shallow 
level, but I didn't feel proud personally, it isn't like you were working for a 
charity… I felt that these guys were out there to get their own agenda, so I 
didn't feel proud to work there but there is some level of prestige. You get 
looked at differently just because you work there, and in some magical way 
your self-worth rises with it.’ 
 
From Sophie’s and Lewis’s discussions of the prestige of the industry, it seems to 
add to their sense of self-worth and the way they perceive how people view them. 
This may suggest that they see their sense of self-worth increasing and intimately 
related to being part of the industry, creating a distinction between the worth of those 
within the industry and those outside of it. This is developed on further with Sophie’s 
discussion of what drew her towards the industry: 
 
‘My fascination was, I’m coming from a poor background, so it wasn't until my 
internship I realised there was another world out there, and that’s why I stuck 
around longer. I realised there was a different lifestyle, people with ambition, 
people with a different lifestyle, it was a whole package, because a lot of 
people there are very smart and educated and it was fascinating. I guess in 
the beginning I was very impressed and felt I would like to be one of them.’ 
 
Sophie’s account reveals how individuals can be drawn in towards the normative 
attributes of smartness, ambition and hard work. However despite the apparent 
prestige that Sophie and Lewis mention, the accounts of other participants would 
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suggest that the events of the financial crisis have had an effect on how employees’ 
view the industry and their roles within it. A number of participants stated how they 
felt embarrassed to openly state that they work within the industry. For example, 
Nico explained: ‘For a while, I didn't tell people I was in investments because 
2009/2010 you were a social leper really.’ 
 
Toby also stated: 
 
‘You feel embarrassed to say you have worked hard, got a good degree and 
gone to work for a financial institution, my friends will say, I work in the city 
rather than say they are a banker’. 
 
Similarly, Jack who currently works at Goliath Bank mentioned how: ‘There is a bit 
of a backlash at the moment, a bit of a tarnish, which means you don't necessarily 
talk about working in the industry’. 
 
This suggests that although the industry is imbued with an image of prestige, it is 
possible that employees possess differing perspectives regarding the relative 
prestige of working for their organisation or the banking industry. Participants’ 
accounts of their embarrassment to disclose their membership of the industry 
demonstrates the importance of organisational image (Hatch and Schultz 1997), as 
a negative image can be detrimental to employee identification causing deviation 
from the prescribed norms. This also contradicts the notion that membership of a 
prestigious organisation increases the likelihood of strong identification (Dutton et 
al. 1994; Van Maanen 2010; Hatch and Schultz 1997; Ashforth and Mael 1989; 
Martin 2002). 
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Smartness was a theme referred to by a number of other participants and when 
asked whether bankers thought they are the smartest people in the world, the 
responses from participants were mixed. Daniel agreed with the notion, stating: 
 
‘It’s completely true, I was in a graduate programme at an investment bank 
and we were consistently told that we were the brightest and best, after a 
while, I think you tended to believe the hype yourself and I don’t think that’s 
very healthy…it was a fairly constant stream of you know you are the 
brightest and best’. 
 
Lewis expressed agreement stating that some people can build up ‘a bit of a god 
complex’. 
 
Nico responded: 
 
‘Yes, the worst are the investment bankers, their job is to make money day 
by day…I think investment bankers are very smart at finding ways to get 
paid…to prove that you are smart you make lots of money and that’s how 
they prove it’. 
 
In response to the same question Roger a business analyst at Iron Bank replied: 
 
‘…they are not elite, they are not smart…it’s just money, money makes 
people think they are elite, it's not representative of who they are…I would 
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not necessarily consider them smart just winners I guess, they have got a 
car, a good looking wife and lots of money to blow.’ 
 
Jacob a former derivatives analyst also agreed with this sentiment, saying: 
 
‘I do think they think they are smarter than others in the world, I think out of 
those that are successful and are getting paid serious money are the ones 
who think they are smarter than the world as a whole. I think that’s also an 
element of persona…when they are in a work environment they just click into 
that work mode and they also have to portray, in the banking industry part of 
it is perception. You do want to make it seem like you are the smartest person 
in the room at times, and that’s a persona that I think a lot of bankers 
take…There is a certain element of arrogance or ego that they have, maybe 
that’s what you need to succeed in the industry, you have to have that bit of 
nastiness’. 
 
 
Jacob suggests that the idea of bankers being the smartest people in the world is 
simply a persona that many bankers adopt in the workplace. This relates to the idea 
of employees developing an ‘organisational self’ (Kunda 2006: 167) that arises due 
to pressures to conform (Ezzy 2001) spurred by an anxiety regarding group 
acceptance. In the case of bankers, this would relate to the pressure to conform to 
the attributes defined by the culture of elites, one of which is adopting the ‘persona’ 
of being the smartest people in the world. Additionally, the theme of money is 
introduced as playing a part in the construction of the culture of elites, with Jacob 
suggesting that the individuals earning ‘serious money’ view themselves as smarter. 
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This is a sentiment that is shared by a number of participants with Victor a 
management consultant in the sector stating: ‘they think they are “masters of the 
universe” because of their salary package, they think no one can touch them’. 
 
From these accounts, money would seem to play a prevalent role in the image of 
smartness within the banking industry. The centrality of money was discussed in the 
previous section, developing the notion that a banker’s self-worth may be attached 
to how much money they make for themselves and their firm, which enables them 
to view themselves as smart, although some feel that this is unwarranted. The 
apparent synonymity of smartness and one’s ability to generate money for one’s 
firm may act to legitimise certain forms of conduct that may fall within the ‘grey zone’ 
or even beyond, through promoting the desirability of being seen as intuitive or smart 
because this may yield large profits. Roger’s use of the term ‘winners’ marks out the 
field of play for those engaged in the competitiveness of the industry; in order to win 
one must make money. 
 
Susanne and Jenson share a slightly different perspective. They refer to smartness 
as an imperative for one to survive in the industry, almost resembling a Darwinian 
natural selection. Susanne stated: 
 
‘I think bankers do think they are the smartest people in the world and on 
average they are probably correct. If you are not good, you get weeded out, 
unsuccessful bankers tend to get weeded out, there tends to be a lot lower 
tolerance for incompetence then there might be in some other industries. I 
think there is a recognition that there are some incredibly smart people in 
academia but the size of your IQ and your intelligence is not necessarily the 
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same and so why bankers think they are smarter than everyone else is to do 
with the whole package.’ 
 
Susanne mentions how the notion that bankers are the smartest people in the world 
is somewhat justified due to the high calibre of intellect required to remain within the 
industry. This however, seems to contradict Phillip’s assertion made in the previous 
chapter that you have to keep a ‘couple of duffers’ on your team. Susanne also 
mentions the idea of bankers possessing the ‘whole package’, which can be seen 
as a distinguishing mechanism. For example, she argues that academics are smart 
but not as smart as bankers, as they do not possess the ‘whole package’. This 
furthers the bankers’ perceived exclusivity as they believe only a select few can 
cope with the burden of work, and they believe that they possess a rare blend of 
intellect, ambition and hard work (Ho 2009). 
 
Jenson an executive director in equity sales, discusses smartness in a similar 
manner to Susanne, and he also introduces the idea that this can result in 
dysfunctions, stating:  
 
‘…we recruit from the top universities in the world and we’re competing for 
the smartest guys in the world. A lot of people know they are smart, have a 
lot of ego and hubris, you are in a business where success and failure are 
pretty apparent, if your idea is right then money is made. I think it does create 
a gap with the ordinary person on the street, you get these guys who are 
really really smart but they are completely dysfunctional human beings. They 
don't know how to hold a conversation or understand the guy on the street…I 
think the industry amplifies that, just as people who graduate from elite 
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universities are detached from life, they come from good families and are told 
all their life that they are the smartest people in the world, you tend to start to 
believe your own press. So people who are already disposed towards that 
tend to come into the industry’. 
 
Susanne shared a similar perspective stating: 
 
‘…some of them are obviously arrogant and unpleasant and they see their 
intellectual capacity as making them superior to other people and that sort of 
mindset is one which leads to unethical behaviour. Once you start seeing 
yourself as better than the next person then you care less if you don't treat 
them very well and that leads to some of the behaviours that you have seen’. 
 
Here we can see that although Susanne and Jenson feel that to some extent the 
assertion that bankers are the smartest people in the world is justified, they also 
discuss how this can lead to dysfunctional and detached individuals, which can have 
detrimental consequences. Jenson actually referenced this detachment from the 
‘real world’ when discussing the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and volunteering within the industry: 
 
‘This will probably come out wrong but, it helps make you more human, our 
job is a bit divorced from reality, and depending on what part of the bank you 
are in you can be very divorced from reality, I think it helps you tie back into 
the real world, instead of thinking ‘we’re masters of the universe, moving 
millions of dollars around, I'm the smartest guy in the room, it gets very 
divorced from the average man on the street. I think it helps keep everyone 
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more human, sane, the further divorced you get from reality and the more 
you get sunk into this business, the less happy you become…you can’t be 
happy just sitting there all day just doing your job, there’s got to be something 
else’. 
 
Jacob's attempts to explain this idea of detachment, which adds support to claims 
that bankers were passive observers, watching the events of the crisis unfold 
(Tourish and Hargie 2012): 
 
‘I think from the big picture level there are things that come to the fore in 
hindsight, at that time and place they were in, they just couldn't see it. If you 
are in a boat and you are in the centre in an arcade playing an arcade game 
you are desensitised from the possibility that the ship might hit an iceberg, 
you can’t see it, you can’t feel it, you don't know it's going to happen. I don't 
think they are desensitised but they are removed.’ 
 
Phillip a managing director currently at Midwest Bank, provides a revealing account 
when asked whether he believes bankers are detached from the real world: 
 
‘I think it's the opposite of detachment, I think it's an attachment, because you 
are constantly vulnerable, if you are in the bottom half of the performance 
curve, your bonus is going to be crap…So you are constantly under threat 
from the competitiveness of the place, it's not a detachment from the real 
world, it's a fear of having to join it. If I don’t make money, guess what, I’m 
going to go and live in a semi-detached [house] on an executive housing 
estate in Northampton and be the CFO at a shoe manufacturer because what 
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else can I do with my skill set and I’m going to earn £100k a year and drive a 
Ford Focus and my kids will go to the local comp and I’m going to sit at the 
back of the plane and walk past my former colleagues, who are going to wave 
at me from business class and this lifestyle for which I have aspired and 
worked 100 hours a week is going to be taken away from me. I don’t think it’s 
detachment, it's a fear of failure and of having to rejoin the real world.’ 
 
Phillip’s account demonstrates how the culture of excess that is prevalent within the 
industry can become deeply rooted and change an individual’s perspective of the 
world and their sense of self-worth within it. Furthermore the inherent 
competitiveness of the industry that feeds into the culture of excess and elitism 
evokes a fear that causes the individual to conform to the industry’s discourse of 
performance; something that will be returned to in the analysis chapter. 
 
Phillip was unsure whether there is a culture of elitism within the industry, expressing 
that the elitism manifests itself in a way that may be different to what many people 
perceive: 
 
‘I don’t think it’s elitism, I don’t know, it’s strange, maybe it is, but it's a different 
type of elitism from what people think, people wandering around the place in 
evening dress or something, white tie and tails quafﬁng champagne and 
that’s what they think it is’. 
 
He went on to say: 
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‘There might be an intellectual elitism…you see your average banker in the 
street, and they aren’t going to be wearing a three piece Saville Row suit, the 
wealthiest people at the banks were the scrufﬁest people I’ve ever seen, 
shambling along in a battered old suit because they never left the ofﬁce…in 
a way, it did seem to be more of an intellectual pursuit than anything else, 
people genuinely worked really hard, were really smart and tried to ﬁnd 
solutions to problems. They didn’t see it as their place to determine whether 
it was a good thing or a bad thing, their place was to solve a really 
complicated ﬁnancial problem for a client because if they didn’t Goliath Bank 
would. So there was a sort of culture of elitism if you think about the sort of 
behaviours and expectations, but I don’t think people sat there and thought 
"I’m lord of the manor”. You are pretty ordinary in the commuter belt if you 
buy a house for £2m now…I don’t know how to describe the elitism I think it’s 
more of a groupthink, it’s just a way people behave, the only times you saw 
people’s personal moral compass spin out of control frankly was Asia, which 
was a toxic cesspool, anybody with too much money and too much time in 
Asia is going to lose their moral direction at some point in time.’ 
 
From Phillip’s discussion, it can be suggested that forms of normative behaviours 
are developed that reduce ethical considerations to non-issues, transforming them 
into taken for granted assumptions through the exercise of disciplinary power 
(Foucault 1977). The panoptic mechanism in the case of bankers is competition and 
the necessity to perform under these competitive circumstances. Phillip mentions 
how these behaviours have developed into a ‘groupthink’, which can result in an 
individual’s desire to conform to organisational norms. Kunda (2006:15) describes 
it as an identification with the organisation that ‘overrides all else and leads to the 
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inversion of means and ends. A preference for conformity, a predilection for 
groupthink, a fear of creativity and initiative, and a dearth of ethics’, demonstrating 
the potentially destructive effects of groupthink. The perils of groupthink are 
illustrated in the case of Enron where their ‘strong culture’ initiated by poor top 
management created a ‘self-destructive ethical climate and that a well-filled CSR 
and business ethics toolbox can neither stop nor compensate for’ (Sims and 
Brinkmann 2003: 253). This somewhat contradicts Jenson’s assertions that CSR 
and volunteering can resolve some of the dysfunctions of the industry. 
 
Norbert a managing director of quantitative strategy at Quartz Bank, disagreed with 
the idea that banks were inherently elitist. He pointed out how diversity and 
meritocracy were a key component of the industry, thus undermining the notion of 
elitism: 
 
‘I don’t think there is a culture of arrogance…I haven’t noticed that…I do think 
it’s quite interesting that the hiring process in banks is extremely fair. I am 
always surprised that both on a non-discrimination and also on an actual 
ﬁtness for the job…I have chatted with people in other industries where the 
whole hiring process is much more of a muddle and much more opaque. I do 
think it's much fairer and that people regardless of their background, ethnicity, 
religious beliefs are treated really fairly and that’s kind of the culture. So I 
can’t see that it is a culture where people hire other people of the same origin 
and I think it's therefore not that elitist. Just in my team, I have 7 different 
nationalities, different languages, different educational backgrounds, it is 
incredibly diverse, it doesn’t lend itself to elitism.’ 
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Phillip shared a similar perspective regarding diversity and meritocracy of the sector: 
 
‘It's a very diverse culture, it’s very meritocratic, they will hire anyone who is 
really really smart and works really really hard. If you look at the LGBT awards 
the markets are always winning awards for LGBT for employees because 
frankly a lot of the desk heads were gay because they didn’t have a family 
and they had a lifestyle that meant that one day you are told we need you to 
go and fix this problem in Singapore and you are going to be there for 6 
months.’ 
 
Participants seem to attempt to dispel the suggestion of elitism and exclusion 
through discussions of diversity and meritocracy. The diversity and the meritocratic 
dynamic of the industry is something that a number of participants have referenced 
and feel that this is an area where the industry is at the forefront. They acknowledge 
that with time it will improve further and we will begin to see more diversity in the 
upper ranks of banking institutions. However, Norbert and Phillip’s claims that the 
industry is diverse and non-discriminatory is contradicted by Sophie who explains:  
 
‘I have female friends in the investment banking side, and they tell me they 
are so nasty to females in little ways, sheer discrimination and bullying 
towards the girls, that doesn't even get looked into at all even though they’ve 
complained’. 
 
This not only contradicts claims of diversity and non-discrimination, it shows that the 
whistleblowing policies mentioned in the previous chapter, which were introduced 
under regulatory changes brought in after the crisis to reduce certain unwanted 
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types of conduct and behaviour, have not necessarily been successful. Additionally, 
large banking institutions have come under pressure to improve diversity (Dunkley 
2015b; British Bankers’ Association 2015). As a result, banks such as HSBC have 
begun introducing measures to address the lack of gender equality amongst senior 
management (Treanor 2015c), suggesting that there is some level of diversity 
issues present within the industry, particularly around gender equality. 
 
6.4 Long Hours and ‘Hard Work’  
 
When discussing the elitism of the banking world whether actual or perceived the 
one ingredient that is always present is hard work (Kemp 2013; Ho 2009), adding to 
the heroic picture the bankers paint of themselves, separating them from the rest of 
the ‘civilian’ world, as they are the ‘whole package’. The long working hours are 
seen to create a bond between them and cement them as ambitious, successful 
individuals, who work on a higher plane than the rest of us. However, the working 
hours of the industry, particularly for junior members, has come under fire. This 
came to the fore after the death of banking intern Moritz Erhardt in August 2013 
(Kennedy 2013). It is relevant to explore the effects of the construction of this cultural 
ritual of long working hours has on the individual and the industry. 
 
Toby explained how as a junior employee: 
 
‘It’s not uncommon to work more than 110 hours a week since Christmas I’ll 
have worked over 100 hours a week including weekends. So whenever you 
look at the salary and do the math it actually works out a little bit above 
minimum wage.’ 
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Edward shared Toby’s assertions discussing his time as a junior member at an 
investment bank: ‘A bad week, 100 hours, a normal week 60-70, probably closer to 
70.’ 
 
Daniel explained how the ‘stupendous’ working hours created a sense of 
‘camaraderie’ and ‘togetherness’. When asked what the work-life balance was like 
he laughed and replied ‘there wasn’t one’ and went on to say: ‘I have never 
understood what the fascination was with working 14-15 hour days but it seemed to 
be endemic in the culture’. Adrian an executive director at Ryman Bank, also felt 
that there was little work-life balance within the industry and that it was not really 
discussed, but that it was implicit that you would work long hours and be paid 
handsomely for it: ‘…institutionally it’s just not discussed really, I think implicitly you 
know when you join this industry that you will get well paid but that you will work 
bloody hard’. 
 
When asked why there seems to be an emphasis on working long hours, Susanne 
who is a Director in Commodities at Legion Bank responded: 
 
‘Part of it is culture, there is an expectation that people should be working 
long hours, part of it is that it is shared by clients and so clients expect 
something doing, and clients can have some unrealistic expectations, and as 
you become more senior you get able to push back on that stuff, you should 
manage your relationship with clients so that they aren't imposing unrealistic 
expectations… junior staff aren't able to do that and aren't able to do that with 
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bosses, but senior staff can and you get to a stage when you can say that 
will be done by the end of the week and no it won’t be done by tonight’ 
 
Norbert maintained that his work-life balance was quite flexible and was not subject 
to organisational pressures: 
 
‘I am relatively free, for me personally, if I come late I come late, if I leave 
early I leave early, there isn’t a huge amount of scrutiny on these minutiae. 
There is a lot of work so I still stay for roughly the whole time because there 
is a still a lot to do but I don’t feel that I have any pressure on me, my boss 
understands my situation. I have two children and I like to spend time with 
them and I think that he knows that I will. If I take some extra time, that’s ﬁne, 
we don’t even talk about it, that’s kind of up to me. There is a lot of work, I’d 
rather work a bit less but you can’t have everything, but I do feel it’s ﬂexible.’ 
 
Although it should be noted that Norbert holds a managing director position, so the 
extra flexibility for more senior employees that Susanne discussed may be 
exercised here. 
 
Jack and Victor, although not as senior as Norbert, discussed how their roles are 
quite ‘flexible' in regards to them balancing work with their private lives. Jack went 
on to talk about how his organisation has been proactive in ensuring employees 
have a healthy work-life balance, stating: 
 
‘…at Goliath Bank they want to encourage people not to work very long 
hours, being more flexible in the workplace with people’s time and hours. So 
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because they are trying to counter some of the cultures, we would have 
discussion groups where we talk about how you feel about it, if people are 
taking time off and working from home.’ 
 
Both Victor's and Jack’s discussion centred around the ‘flexibility’ their organisations 
provide them with, however, much of this flexibility was the ability to work from 
home. This ability to work from home is not necessarily conducive to a good work-
life balance and could in fact be seen as an intensification of work and the 
disembodiment of disciplinary power through the use of technology resulting in a 
more pervasive power structure (Nealon 2008). 
 
Hemel, a more junior member working as a compliance contractor at Cross 
Continent Bank, stated how the long working hours are not in line with his personal 
values and beliefs: 
 
‘It's not under my value system to work 8am-9pm, I’d rather have more of a 
work-life balance…For me, it’s less about money and more about work-life 
balance, it varies from bank to bank. In some of them you can create a work-
life balance and in others, it’s just impossible, you are working stupid hours 
and at the weekend you are sleeping to catch up, you don’t really get to enjoy 
the success and money they give you. It varies from manager to manager, 
some managers will be better with work-life balance and they appreciate it 
more, some of them have worked so hard to get this far for so many years, 
that they don’t really care if you suffer as well, its kind of a bit soulless but it 
is like that’. 
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Hemel’s statement that it is not in his ‘value system’ to work long hours contradicted 
Jack’s claim that the industry ‘naturally hires people who have tendencies towards 
being workaholics’. Additionally, Hemel’s comments regarding how work-life 
balance often depends on your manager undermines suggestions of organisation 
centric work-life balance initiatives. From Hemel's perspective, any perceived 
prestige or elite status from being part of the industry is irrelevant due to the 
deprivation it causes upon his personal life. 
 
Phillip provided an extended discussion that incorporates all the themes discussed 
throughout this chapter, from the culture of excess and elites to the intensification 
of work. Phillip’s detailed account provides an insight into the thought processes of 
a senior banker, when faced with questions regarding their work and their 
motivations to work within the industry, highlighting the competitiveness that is 
constructed within the industry that results in a deepseated anxiety, even in 
someone of Phillip’s status. The competitiveness that stems from the cultures of 
excess and elitism becomes internalised to the point that the individual becomes 
trapped and self-disciplining (Foucault 1977) in order to suppress any conduct that 
would cause them to fall outside the industry’s definition of success and ‘winning’. 
 
‘The intensity of what you do and the competitiveness which is about creating 
self-worth, like the Blackberry culture, you’re sent an email 24 hours a day 
you are expected to respond within 20 minutes…if my boss sent me an email 
at 10-11pm at night they would absolutely expect me to reply within 20 
minutes. You go out for dinner with your family and that’s all you do, so in 
principle, you sit in the cinema or something you would be constantly 
checking your blackberry…when I left Whittards they shut my Blackberry off, 
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even though it isn’t connected I checked it every half an hour because I didn’t 
feel like I was a human being if I didn’t, it felt like nobody wanted you. 
 
…there is this constant thing about performance and achievement and I think 
that attracts a certain type of person, you sort of get sucked in. It becomes 
more important than family life, you don’t spend any time with your kids or 
whatever, you are checking your Blackberry and worrying and fretting that 
you aren’t doing something, maybe it's an adrenaline or stress addiction. I 
jacked it in January…what I do now is advise Midwest Bank on large 
contracts…I’ll go and negotiate a big deal for them and then I won’t have 
much to do for a week or two and then I’ll be back on another deal, but I found 
it actually very very stressful, I keep looking at my emails, no emails, it makes 
you feel like "fuck, am I going to get ﬁred, am I being ignored”, or are people 
going around me, are they talking to my team directly and are they now 
starting to see me as overhead, how can I be involved? I need to go to every 
meeting, I need to copy in 30 people on every email so people know I’m 
working at 3 am in the morning. 
 
The guys who get promoted work every weekend. You get 5 weeks nominal 
holiday, I think I never took more than two. I don’t think it was said, “oh you’re 
taking another day off, another holiday, you like to work that 5 weeks don’t 
you”…the behaviours are reinforced by the people around you and become 
normal. You are in this bubble and look on the rest of the world as civilians, 
they don’t actually know what hard work is, they don’t know what the 
aggression of what real corporate politics is like, you work for a local council 
and you go off with stress, try doing my job where you have worked 2 months 
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straight 7 days a week probably 18 hours a day and you feel like you are 
going to die of a heart attack because you need to get a project done! 
 
Your travel schedule would be meetings in Sydney on Monday and then ﬂy 
overnight to Tokyo for a couple of days and then off to Singapore, over to 
Hong Kong for a couple of days, maybe take Sunday off, you didn’t have time 
to think. It made you feel important and good and even though you were 
exhausted most of the time and popping sleeping pills so you could sleep on 
the red eye, it was almost like you had read that it was a glamorous lifestyle, 
so it must be even though most of the time you are sat on your own at a 
crappy hotel bar somewhere drinking yourself to death with Herman the 
German ball-bearing salesman, who is the only other person at the bar. It’s 
almost an expectation, you are almost preconditioned that this is a glamorous 
lifestyle, and it must seem so if you are a regular civilian working in a regular 
job. I think it's difﬁcult because it’s about status and about the fear of losing 
that status, and it's almost like if you don’t have an unhealthy attachment [to 
work] you aren’t stepping up and the difference in productivity between the 
people that work really hard and those that don’t are really marked…do you 
deserve the money? Maybe not, I don’t think so really, but we were all 
overpaid, a bit less so now but still overpaid.  
 
It will attract people who are willing to exchange their lives for money, the old 
adage no one ever said on their deathbed, they wished they’d spent more 
time at work and less time with the children, you probably live to regret it but 
at the time you feel that you are meeting expectations, your own, your 
parents, your family, it's very hard to go backwards. That’s what I’m struggling 
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with now, I make a lot less money now, I work from home, I have a much 
better quality of life, I am scared shitless about the fact I owe the bank £800k 
for the house I bought in 2007 that I have no actual means of paying off now. 
I’m never going to earn enough money to pay my mortgage off, so can I 
actually bring myself to sell and downsize, it’s really tough, your friends and 
neighbours don’t really care, if they love you they want you to be happy, but 
from a self-worth standpoint when you have been so driven for 20-30 years 
how do you turn around and say you know I’m going to go and live in a semi-
detached house in a regular town driving a regular car and take a regular 
holiday once a year rather than live out on a farm in the country and drive a 
Range Rover and be in my own mind, important, high status because there 
are visible signs of how brilliant I am, it's the going back that is the problem.’ 
 
When asked whether the ultra competitive and unrelenting environment of the 
industry provides individuals with a sense of belonging to something greater which 
ultimately results in them being trapped in the image of their own success, Phillip 
replied: 
 
‘Yes, whether they enjoy it or not, it's not as good on the inside as it appears 
because you are working yourself to death because you are constantly afraid 
of failure and of not getting paid and of getting ﬁred and of causing some 
arcane compliance problem…It's not actually that enjoyable, but you feel that 
you are part of the elite. Elite, not in the social elite but in terms of you are 
part of a cadre of people that knows what hard work is and you are a citizen 
of the world. You aren’t really a citizen of the UK.’ 
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Phillip’s discussion of the intensity of his working life illustrates the profound impact 
that the combination of money, elitism and intense workloads can have on an 
individual. Phillip illustrates how the construction of what a banker is and should be 
through various cultural rituals can influence an individual’s identity. Phillip’s sense 
of self-worth is so tied up with the image of being a banker, the money, the prestige 
and the belonging to an elite group, means that he struggles to see past the cultural 
rituals, sacrificing time with his family, his health and even financial well-being in the 
pursuit of becoming a ‘master of the universe’. Additionally, the anxiety to conform 
and merge one’s sense of self-worth with his achievements within the industry, 
results in Phillip becoming the personification of the narcissistic self (Ezzy 2001) 
reduced to an egotistical shadow of their former self through the neglect of their 
‘personal history, friends, family and a sense of place’ (Lasch 1984: 15). This as  
Ezzy  (2001: 636-637) states: ‘engineered culture encourages a narcissistic private 
individualism facilitated by the demise of social relationships outside of the 
corporation’. This narcissism causes one to be so occupied with one’s image as a 
successful banker, who is smart, wealthy, ambitious and hard working, that they 
become divorced from all other relations and disengaged ‘from the man on the 
street’. Thus giving rise to the normalisation of unethical or toxic behaviour, 
demonstrating that culture management is not a straightforward endeavour as the 
attributes and artefacts chosen to be perpetuated and disseminated can be 
interpreted and enacted in multiple ways producing outcomes that may be counter 
to management’s intentions. 
 
6.5 Summary 
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The chapter explored the cultures which are present within the banking industry, 
moving beyond the examination of managerially defined ‘strong cultures’ but sought 
to investigate cultures that have been constructed through the mutual interaction of 
organisational members based on their interpretations and experiences of the 
artefacts, rituals and discourses that pervade the industry. 
 
The data shows that money and profits are central to the industry and are deeply 
rooted within the industry's cultures. The centrality of money introduces a question 
about the greed of the industry; the data indicates that the industry has an unhealthy 
relationship with money contributing to the development of a culture of excess, 
which was particularly prevalent during the pre-crisis years. During the years leading 
up to the crisis, the execution of due diligence was relaxed in favour of pursuing 
opportunities to make more money in the short-term, where regulatory boundaries 
were stretched and loopholes exploited in order to sustain profits. The exploration 
of regulatory limits became excessive and resulted in various forms of misconduct 
and unethical behaviour. The data also suggest that the industry is cyclical and 
forms of profiteering will once again emerge, leading to cycles of ‘boom and bust’. 
 
A significant contributory factor in the industry’s incessant need for profit arises 
through external pressures from interested groups and parties. In part, the pursuit 
of profits arises from shareholder expectation; in order to meet these expectations 
individual performance is aligned with these objectives. This creates competition 
amongst employees which is represented through the size of an individual’s bonus 
package, although it is important to note that individuals are not subjugated by the 
theme of money. Under theories of Foucauldian (1980) power relations, these 
external pressures are part of an enactment of power by competing groups such as 
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governments, regulators, investors and the public. As discussed in chapter three, 
this proceeds to develop a complex web of competing interests and power relations, 
which then contributes to the development of banking cultures and discourses. 
These concepts will be examined further in the analysis chapter. 
 
Elitism emerged as another important theme from the data presented in this chapter. 
The data suggest that the industry develops a culture of elites, which emerges via 
the normative attributes of smartness, ambition and hard work. These attributes 
contribute to a series of inclusions (Foucault 1970), which act to distinguish industry 
actors from the rest of us. The culture of elites is underpinned by performance 
discourse, which permeates the industry and is established through normative 
frameworks and the historicism of the industry, referred to in chapter three. 
 
In addition to the above attributes, the theme of money plays a role in the 
construction of the culture of elites, as the data indicates that a banker’s self-worth 
is attached to how much money they can generate in revenue and bonuses, which 
leads them to view themselves as elite. Furthermore, the intense competitiveness 
that is embedded within the industry is sustained by the cultures of excess and 
elitism, which simultaneously buttress performance discourse and shape them. The 
performance discourses that emerge have a profound impact upon the individual, 
coercing them to conform and internalise the industry’s discourse of performance 
due to the disciplining effect of the discourse (Foucault 1970). Performance 
discourse, a concept I have developed to interpret the empirical data, it will be 
defined and discussed in the analysis chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Analysis Chapter: Culture is Still a ‘Thing’ 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to interpret the data presented in the previous two chapters 
in order to understand how banking culture is developed, this is done by using the 
writings of Foucault (1977; 1978; 1980) on power and discourse. The chapter will 
begin by examining how culture is still viewed as a ‘thing’, a definable entity that can 
be designed and managed by leadership. This chapter will then discuss how this 
perspective of culture adopted by the industry is informed by the taken for granted 
assumptions of calculability and predictability. Moving onto examine how Foucault’s 
(1977; 1978) ideas on power and the productivity of power can be used to develop 
an understanding of organisational culture that acknowledges the mutual 
participation of organisational members and groups, leading to a perspective of 
culture that is bottom-up, capillary and organic. The chapter will move on to an 
exploration of the existence of the interconnected web of power relations between 
the various interested groups of the industry, which include governments, 
regulators, management, shareholders and employees. 
 
The chapter will then move on to a discussion of the development of the discourse 
of performance. The discourse of performance draws on some of the attributes of 
enterprise discourse (Du Gay 1996; McCabe 2008; 2009; Mangan 2009) but goes 
further by accounting for the intensification (Nealon 2008) of enterprise discourse 
within the banking industry. This arises from the necessity to perform, with pressure 
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placed upon employees to meet performance expectations producing various forms 
of disciplinary power (Foucault 1977). The discussion will then move on to an 
exploration of the elements which contribute to the construction of performance 
discourse, which are grounded in the cultural artefacts and rituals of the industry, 
including financialization (Beverungen et al. 2013; Knights and McCabe: 2015) and 
the construction of a culture of elites, both of which were explored in the data 
chapters. 
 
This will be followed by an analysis of post-crisis cultural discourses that draws upon 
the data from participants in the industry’s attempts at culture management post-
crisis. The analysis will draw upon Foucault’s (1977; 1980; 1990) work on 
power/knowledge resistance and discourses. This chapter will focus on discussions 
regarding cultural rituals and artefacts that are prevalent within the banking industry. 
Including a discussion of the contentions and contradictions that exist between the 
industry’s construction of performance discourses and post-crisis cultural 
discourses. 
 
In discussing the financial crisis and analysing the data gathered for this thesis 
Foucault’s idea of history provides us with a basis to understand the plurality of 
events. The financial crisis should not be understood as a fixed entity but in a state 
ongoing construction as with each new commentary or research our understanding 
of the crisis can shift. This means that multiple contradictory accounts or histories 
may emerge from participant interviews that can lead to a plurality of events that 
can both complement and conflict with one another or conflict with existing accounts 
of the crisis. Therefore we cannot assume that the accounts of the crisis can be 
documented as compatible and complementary that unfold the crisis in a 
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unproblematic manner, presenting us with a coherent and unambiguous narrative 
that tracks the linear progression of contributory circumstances. Instead, events 
such as the crisis should be understood to present contestable depictions and not 
as ‘grand and totalising’ narratives (Schirato et al 2012: 3). They continue to be 
constructed and reconstructed ceaselessly as each contribution to the account of 
the crisis alters the way the crisis is understood through overlapping, contradiction 
and substantiation. 
 
The chronicle of the crisis has evolved over the seven years since the crisis, shifting 
from an issue of financial innovation, mis-selling and remuneration structures, to 
contentions surrounding light-touch regulation and now the narrative has turned to 
the softer issues of corporate culture within the banks. This shifting tale of the crisis 
is evidenced in numerous media articles discussing how the issues now run deeper 
than a few rogue individuals to the ‘very heart of its culture’ (FT.com 2014). The 
shifting fault lines of the crisis can be seen by how participants suggested that there 
has been an exponential growth in regulation since the crisis and even just before. 
Their experience of the industry’s significant focus on cultural retraining and an 
increase in cultural communications is also evidence of the evolving chronicle of the 
crisis. 
 
Each narration of the crisis contributes to a discourse that aims to serve the interests 
of particular groups (Foucault 1980). Foucault understands discourse to involve 
‘unwritten rules and structures which produce particular utterances and statements’  
(Mills 2003: 53). Discourse should be viewed as a complex set of practices that 
maintain their relevancy by the displacement of other practices through creating 
distinction. The circulation of particular discourses are not perennial but contestable 
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and fluid (Foucault 1990). Discourses can produce and oppose power relations, as 
well as conceal and reveal power (Foucault 1978). Discourses do not simply 
interpret the realities of existence using comprehensible language, they provide the 
structure for how we perceive reality. Under this notion, discourses can be viewed 
as the mechanism for the regulation of our perceptions (Foucault 1977). From the 
data the themes of money, smartness and hard work act to provide a structure to 
organisational members of how they perceive themselves and the industry. An 
example of this can be seen from Phillip’s account on how he perceives earning a 
‘£100k a year’ as a ‘failure’. 
 
7.2 Culture is Still a ‘Thing’ 
 
Throughout the data there are strong indications that culture is still viewed as a 
‘thing’, a definable entity that can be designed and managed by leadership, this is 
supported by some of the research and literature discussed in chapter three. The 
continuation of this concept of culture strongly relates to the culture guru texts of the 
1980s (Peters and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982), with banking 
leadership still quoting the authors of these cultural texts (Treanor 2014h) despite 
these texts being over thirty years old and subjected to extensive critical debate. 
This demonstrates how little has changed within managerial perspectives of culture, 
the industry’s attempts to change culture post-crisis have employed the ‘strong 
culture’ ethos of culture management that is disseminated top-down. The industry’s 
reversion to this idea of culture may hinder the progress of industry changes as it 
suggests management fails to understand the significance of the mutual interaction 
of organisational members in the construction of cultures. A critical perspective 
views organisational culture as more complex (Martin 2002; Parker 2000) and not 
   233 
enforced or disseminated as an absolute, harmonious managerial mechanism, 
which commands hegemony and consistency (Kenny et al. 2011). Culture is instead 
subject to resistance, ambiguity and inconsistency. This is seen in participants’ 
discussions of the different interpretations of their organisation’s culture or ‘micro-
cultures’ discussed in the data chapters. 
 
In the years following the crisis a number of ‘experts’ (Strategy& 2016) have 
continued to develop knowledge on the financial crisis, the banking industry and 
banking professionals with the aim of making recommendations towards a newly 
reformed industry-wide banking culture, a discussion of some of these texts can be 
seen in the chapter three. Through an understanding of Foucault’s (1978) theory of 
knowledge, we can begin to see how these post-crisis discourses have become 
salient. For Foucault (1978), knowledge is embedded within the productions of 
power, when one endeavours to produce knowledge one is also making a claim to 
power; giving rise to the notion of power/knowledge. This suggests that power 
transpires from the possession of knowledge of one group over another but 
simultaneously power is created through the production of knowledge about a 
particular group, potentially marginalising that group (Mills 2003). However, we 
should not view knowledge production as the unfaltering pursuit for ‘truth’, instead, 
knowledge is a construction which utilises exclusionary practices in order to present 
‘facts’ that have been stipulated and ratified by authorised agencies. Therefore the 
development of knowledge around the industry and banking profession have 
allowed ‘experts’ to enact a claim to power constructing ‘truths’ that have resulted 
in the development and proliferation of post-crisis cultural discourses. These include 
concepts such as ‘do the right thing’  in an attempt to produce responsible subjects, 
evoking a form of disciplinary power (McCabe 2009). 
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The notion that the production of knowledge produces a claim to power (Foucault 
1975; 1978) can be utilised to understand how bankers constructed a power relation 
between them, governments, regulators and wider economic stakeholders, through 
their development of knowledge of the financial markets. Participants alluded to the 
complexity of the markets and the importance of knowledge within the industry, with 
Laura stating ‘finance is quite specific so it requires a lot of knowledge’. Similarly, 
Nico an experienced investment manager explained how ‘people don't understand 
it, it’s complicated, our society today can’t cope with the complexity’. 
 
However, since the financial crisis bankers who had once exercised significant 
power and influence are now widely criticised. This is prominently reflected in the 
data with a number of participants mentioning of ‘the whole banker bashing culture’, 
Phillip discussed how there was a public sentiment of ‘hang the bankers’. Lewis a 
technology infrastructure contractor working in the industry, also discussed how 
there is a ‘distaste for bankers’, telling an anecdote about how someone ‘unleashed’ 
on him and had a ‘huge go’ when he told them he worked for Dressler Bank. Toby 
who has been working in the industry for 2 years as an analyst at Dressler Bank, 
explained how he and his friends will tell people they ‘work in the city rather than 
say they are a banker’. These accounts are indicative of a shift in power relations 
against the bankers founded upon the production of knowledge (Mills 2003) about 
the bankers, the financial industry and their work. Jack a technical architect at 
Goliath Bank summed up this shift up stating how in the 90s there was a sense of 
prestige working in the industry and ‘you would name drop’ now there is an ‘anti-
prestige’. Equally, Nico stated during the crisis if you were working within the 
industry you were a ‘social leper’. 
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The industry’s continued adoption of a prescriptive functionalist perspective of 
organisational culture means that it fails to move beyond ‘strong culture’ discourses 
of the 1980s despite much of the claimed pre-crisis ‘toxicity’ of the industry arising 
from said strong cultures. Additionally, post-crisis culture management has become 
a site for power relations between the competing agendas of the groups discussed 
above through the development of power/knowledge (Foucault 1977). The 
industry’s functionalist understanding of culture causes it to rely on a technical 
rationality, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
7.3 Cultural Rationality and Calculability  
 
Industry leadership still adopts the taken for granted assumptions of calculability 
and predictability in making leading assertive proclamations that industry 
shortcomings will be resolved. Knights and McCabe (2015) provide a valuable 
analysis of the leadership discourses within the banking industry that shaped the 
materialisation of the crisis but it also orchestrated the post-crisis changes or the 
lack of them (Treanor 2014g). Knights and McCabe (2015: 199) discuss how both 
the causes and explanations of the crisis and the subsequent solutions are 
embedded within the same ontological and epistemological assumptions. They 
argue that these paradigmatic assumptions are ‘grounded in a taken for granted 
assumption about technical rationality that denies or ignores the social 
embeddedness of its programmatic routines and by doing so becomes wholly 
detached from the bodily, material and tangible aspects of lived experience’ .  
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This is important as it suggests that the credence of technical rationality that 
envelopes the industry contributed to the financial crisis but also continues to shape 
the post-crisis changes, tying in well with the industry-wide ‘cultural change 
initiatives' that have been discussed by a number of participants in the data, these 
initiatives have been conceptualised and implemented in a manner that assumes 
organisational culture to be a rational variable that can be controlled and changed 
to meet business needs. One that is moulded by leadership and trickled down to 
employees, with the ability to shape the direction of the organisation (Deal and 
Kennedy 1982; Peters and Waterman 1982).  
 
This technical rationality that is applied to the industry’s understanding of 
organisational culture viewing it as a ‘rational variable’ is evident within the data with 
a number participants discussing the indispensable role that leadership and 
management play in the formation of organisational cultures. Norbert discussed how 
culture change is ‘a top-down exercise’ within the industry, Karuhn expressed how 
‘things should be done top-down’. Roger a business analyst at Iron Bank with 13 
years’ experience in the industry explained how management need to ‘start 
deploying the culture’ with the help from external consultancy. The understanding 
of culture as a top-down exercise was shared by many participants demonstrating 
how there is a discourse of cultural rationality within the industry where the artefacts 
of culture are seen to be the design of management and taken for granted as fact. 
 
However, cultural management is a site for power relations to be enacted and 
contested, and similar to power, organisational culture is not something that can be 
imposed on individuals through a top-down schema (Mills 2003; Smircich 1983). 
Foucault’s (1980; 1982) theory of power relates well to critical perspectives of 
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organisational culture, where power follows a bottom-up model via its permeation 
throughout the organisation, its routine presence and its daily enactment and 
contention. Similarly to power, organisational culture is not a possession that 
management or leadership possess to wield as they will, instead ‘individuals are the 
vehicle of power’ (Foucault 1980:98) positioning every individual within the locus of 
power enactment and resistance as well as the construction and enactment of 
organisational culture. This would suggest that scientific stability that management 
and the financial industry lends to itself through its apparent calculability and linearity 
is somewhat more volatile once we account for the subjectivity that is present 
(Knights and McCabe 2015; Martin 2002).  
 
What this then means is that it is important for participants and the wider workforce 
within the industry to acknowledge their role in the construction of their 
organisation’s culture. Denial of their importance within this relation may act to 
continue the unfavourable behaviours within the industry as participants view the 
primary source of cultural formation and reformation as transpiring from the spheres 
of management. In viewing management as the locus of cultural control individuals 
are able to hide behind discourses of cultural rationality, through arguing that 
management needs to instil change and enforce moral behaviours and other 
desirable corporate values, thus perpetuating the assertion it was a ‘few bad apples’ 
that caused the crisis. 
 
7.4 Culture as Power 
 
Post-crisis cultural communications have been an important part of the industry 
since the financial crisis and from participants’ discussions, it would seem that the 
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focus on culture has been intensified over the last few years. In today’s banking 
industry adherence to corporate culture is seen to be an organisational imperative, 
non-compliance is frowned upon (Kunda 1992; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; 
Willmott 1993; Peters and Waterman 1982). Examples of this can be seen in the 
data as participants frequently mentioned that if you are not seen to buy into the 
culture then you ‘stand out like a sore thumb (Sam); you would be ‘singled out’ 
(Roger) and they could ‘put themselves at risk’ (Lewis). 
 
These cultural communications can be seen as sites where power relations are 
enacted. As mentioned earlier Foucault proposes a bottom-up model of power 
which concentrates on power’s permeation of the workforce. Thus power is no 
longer viewed as a possession, allowing individuals to be viewed as active subjects 
who negotiate their relations with others and with their organisation. Additionally 
Foucault asserts ‘where there is power there is resistance’ (1978: 95), examples of 
this can is seen in the data with Karuhn a graduate trainee at Cross Continent Bank, 
stating ‘there is some level of resistance to the new values and the new ways of 
doing things’ going on to explain ‘you have management who have been with the 
bank for say 15-20 years they are very ingrained in their way of doing things’. The 
majority of instances of resistance discovered in the data presents itself more as 
non-compliance to the banks communicated values and beliefs where cultural 
communications are ignored as discussed in chapter 5. Therefore, it is important to 
appreciate that resistance to forms of control occurs more frequently and that 
individuals are not passive recipients.  
 
Scott (1990) develops further upon the notion of resistance within power relations, 
showing how managers and subordinates will observe sanctioned linguistic and 
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behavioural rituals, however outside of one another’s presence they may behave 
differently, with Sophie  explaining: 
‘jokes would be in hiding, the little subcultures you develop among your 
people, there would be open jokes within the team but no outsiders or 
managers would hear them, it would be hidden because it would be flagged 
very quickly’.  
 
The data reveals how participants are not passive observers of these cultural 
events, they do not inertly receive the artefacts of such rituals, they maintain the 
capacity to rethink and resist the cultural discourses that are being presented to 
them signifying their engagement in these power relations. Managers are 
‘challenged’ at events with ‘people asking difficult questions’ causing them to 
become ‘defensive’ and ‘skirt around the topic or move on’ (Susanne). The assertion 
that management gets defensive when challenged on particular points reinforces 
the argument that power is not perennial but is fluid and shifting between actors and 
sites, as the challenges posed by employees can be seen as an exercise of power. 
Although such rituals require unequivocal adherence, the fluidity of power relations 
allows for such a departure, meaning that employees may ‘roll their eyes’ (Karuhn), 
‘make jokes’ (Sophie) and ‘show indifference through their body language’ (Victor). 
Additionally, participants demonstrated their capacity to resist or rethink cultural 
communications by not being ‘totally sold on the whole culture’, as Zara put it or 
describing it as ‘bullshit’ (Phillip), with Nico explaining ‘it’s not very clear to me that 
anyone actually takes it seriously and implements it day to day’. 
 
Power is fluid and circulates non-discriminately through a network or organisation. 
It is not innately repressive, meaning that power can shape and mould individuals, 
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both those that are perceived to hold the power and those perceived to be 
subordinated by it (Mills 2003; Schirato et al 2012). This conceptualisation of power 
is significant as it places every individual at the heart of the enactment and 
resistance to power. This is an interesting proposition when we apply it to 
organisational culture. It allows us to move past the prescriptive managerialist 
perspective of top-down engineered corporate culture, which sees culture as an 
unabridged entity. Through this understanding of power we can acknowledge a 
perspective of corporate culture that emerges through the mutual interaction of 
organisational members and views culture as an arena of contested meanings 
between different groups and individuals resulting in fragmentation and contention, 
which can result in the emergence of subcultures (Riley 1983; Van Maanen and 
Barley 1985; Laurilla 1997; Parker 2000). These elements of fragmentation within 
cultural spheres is supported by the data, with participants explaining how the 
culture is ‘quite different from team to team’ and how ‘micro cultures’ exist within the 
firms. Additionally, participants acknowledged that it is not possible to create a 
‘completely homogenous cultural identity’ (Toby). Discussions of the existence of 
subcultures demonstrates how cultural differences and inconsistency is inevitable 
and possibly desirable (Martin 2002; Van Maanen 1991; Riley 1983; Gregory 1983). 
 
Contestation within the areas of cultural production is also demonstrated in the data 
with a number of participants acknowledging the clash between the ‘laissez faire’ 
pre-crisis culture and the post-crisis cultures the banks have attempted to introduce. 
Karuhn discussed how they ‘pull in completely different directions’ and that he has 
observed them clash on a ‘regular basis’, Roger also noted how there ‘was a lot of 
reluctance to change’. From these examples, we can make inferences that where 
there are enactments of power there are expressions of resistance to these forms 
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of power (Foucault 1978). One of the ways that this can be understood is that the 
pervasive nature of its disciplining power circulates through a multitude of 
institutions, technologies and discourses generating an infinite amount of 
categorisations of people and behaviours to regulate action. Inevitably developing 
categories that are antithetical thus producing a ‘residue’ (Schirato et al 2012: 49) 
of people or behaviours that do not assimilate thus creating subcultures and culture 
clashes. This ‘residue’ is represented in the participants discussions of how cultural 
communications are ignored particularly Sophie’s example of her manager being 
‘sacked’ for bending the rules and not adhering to organisational norms and values. 
 
7.5 Web of Competing Power Relations 
 
This section discusses how the organic development of culture within the banking 
industry is influenced by power relations between interested groups leading to an 
interrelated and complex web of power relations. These interrelated powers 
relations contribute in part to the development of discourses through each claim to 
power or resistance to their enactment, as well as through the productivity of power 
relations, which can both reinforce and conflict with the managerially disseminated 
organisational culture. The presence of an interrelated web of power relations plays 
a major contributory role in the conduct of banking institutions and their employees, 
as each claim or exercise of power having an effect upon the other actors/groups 
within the network. They also aid in the construction of performance discourse which 
is a central theme discovered  by this thesis in the industry pre and post crisis. 
 
A Foucauldian perspective of power provides a framework upon which to 
acknowledge and analyse the multitude of power relations that engage in the 
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banking industry.  These emerge through interested groups and actors attempts to 
impose their interests upon the banks, negotiating the salience of their agendas. 
The different parties attempt to impose their agendas on the industry in addition to 
the industry’s own objectives, resulting in conflicting interests that lead to the 
development of performance discourse. Thus forming a complex web of power 
relations that play a contributory part in the conduct of banking institutions. For 
example, the enactment of the interests of governments and politicians would have 
an impact on stakeholders within the financial industry including bankers and 
investors, while similarly the validation of investors’ interests will impact 
governmental policy and public image. Additionally, validation or the encroachment 
of the public’s interests would have an impact on public perceptions of both the 
government and the financial industry. The banking industry is central to this web of 
competing power relations, this is not to say the banks are subjugated by these 
power relations, as the banks themselves are active actors within the web, with their 
own interests to exercise. Examples of these competing forces can be seen in 
governmental policies on home ownership and support for sub-prime lending in 
order to facilitate the dream of homeownership for all (Wolf 2015). Susanne stated 
how ‘the principle players were governments and policy makers who said everyone 
should own their own home’. Governments also played a large role in perpetuating 
the wisdom of the neoliberal rhetoric that the markets are self-regulating and will 
never fail (Castells et al. 2012). Adrian an executive director at Ryman Bank, stated 
how the government tried ‘very very hard to drive the City and this engine of 
success’ (Adrian). 
 
Additionally, pressure comes from investors to receive above market returns on their 
investments and as the data revealed, these returns are expected to materialise 
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quickly, thus accentuating short-termism. Zara a fixed income analyst for a US 
based asset management firm, explained how ‘investors are very focused on short 
term gain’. Similarly, Susanne stated that ‘shareholders evaluate you on a short-
term basis’ and as the ‘owners of the business’ it would not be reasonable for 
management at the banks to have a ‘different focus, you have to behave in line with 
what they want you to do’. Susanne’s assertion that they must act in the interests of 
their shareholders even when these interests focus on short-term gain reinforces 
the notion that banks are subject to external exercises of power which influences 
their behaviour. This pressure from investors, however, has not subsided since the 
crisis. Many participants expressed how this is ever present and possibly 
exaggerated since the crisis, as investors are ‘more nervous since the crisis and 
want to see returns materialise quickly’ (Yusuf), potentially providing an explanation 
for the seemingly endless discovery of banking scandals.  
 
Further examples of competing interests can be seen where participants strongly 
expressed how they felt that the general public necessitated the need for certain 
financial products and innovations in order to free up lending and bring liquidity to 
markets in order to satisfy the demand for increased borrowing. Jacob a former 
derivatives analyst, felt there was ‘a general addiction to credit’, Victor asserted that 
people ‘expected to have bigger houses and more flashy cars’, Susanne explained 
that people took out ‘105% mortgages’ and had ‘5 credit cards that were all maxed 
out’. Thus the public from their sense of ‘entitlement’ to bigger houses, nice cars 
and expensive holidays had a part to play in the proliferation of credit structures and 
securitised assets that engendered the crisis. Furthermore, the public exacerbated 
their exposure to the financial crisis by ‘over stretching’ their finances and 
‘irresponsible borrowing’. Adrian claimed ‘the general populace has a big chunk of 
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the blame’ for the crisis, Lewis explained ‘we’re all part of the system and it wasn’t 
just the banks’. It may appear that bankers are attempting to blame the public, in 
spite of them creating and selling the financial products. Additionally, the concept of 
over exuberant borrowing and spending can be analysed using Foucault's concept 
of disciplinary power (Nealon 2008; Foucault 1975) where consumer credit has 
become embedded within the functioning of modern society; an accepted practice 
that is instilled in us through various forms of communication to an extent where it 
forms government policy to increase consumer spending and borrowing to boost 
the neoliberal economy (Elliott 2014a; 2014b). 
 
This discussion of the competing power relations that occupied the arena of the 
financial industry demonstrates that political forces and power relations were at play 
creating a multitude of competing, contributory components. Within the network of 
power relations, the various groups in the network can become the subjects of 
multiple power relations simultaneously. However through Foucault’s (1978; 1980) 
concept of power we can appreciate that power is productive, therefore each actor 
within the network benefited from the competing power relations that they may have 
been engaged with. For example, although banking institutions may have been 
subject to pressures from the government and the public to free up lending to 
support consumer spending and home ownership. Banks benefited significantly in 
the form of increased profits, as well as the easing of regulatory burdens upon the 
industry to facilitate this. Additionally, governments may have been under pressure 
from the industry to ease regulation to allow for integrated banking institutions; the 
government was able to profess the brilliance of their economic policies that have 
facilitated increased prosperity and home ownership, as well as supporting the 
international importance of the nation's financial industry (Augar 2000), ultimately 
   245 
increasing their mandate. Furthermore, the public was seen to be subjugated by the 
banks and mis-sold credit products, becoming the victims of the credit crunch and 
the inevitable creditor for the industry’s bailout. This being said, however, the public 
benefited from the ability to borrow more and make purchases on credit, affording 
them material luxuries. Therefore, as mentioned in chapter three the proliferation of 
certain behaviours, conduct, and subsequent discourses interact through power 
relations and the productivity of power to construct banking cultures contributing to 
the development of performance discourse. 
 
7.6 Development of Performance Discourse 
 
Thatcherite economics gave rise to the 1986 "Big Bang” deregulation of the financial 
markets (Castells et al. 2012) and the dissemination of free market discourses 
founded on meritocracy and enterprise, causing a paradigmatic shift towards the 
‘cult of the individual’ (Gapper and Denton 1997: 110; Giddens 1991) in financial 
services. This began to normalise behaviours of self-promotion and short-termism, 
a decline in paternal bonds (McCabe 2009; Tempest et al. 2004) and the death of 
the gentlemanly banker (Augar 2000). The Thatcher era of political involvement in 
the City saw the emergence of a form of disciplinary power that began moulding 
bodies through regimes of training and surveillance, creating a ‘micro-society’ of the 
City, with its own experts, hierarchies, ranks and networks (Foucault 1978). It 
fashioned its own codes of conduct, discourses and procedures. Additionally, the 
disintegration of the partnership structures (Treanor 2006) meant that aspirations 
needed to be replaced and realigned creating an environment where the banks had 
to build loyalty and commitment to the bank’s objectives by developing shared 
values and creating a cohesive culture (Augar 2000). These changes within the 
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banking industry saw an intensification (Nealon 2008) of certain attributes of the 
industry, the data sections discussed in chapter six show how the themes of money, 
prestige, elitism, smartness and hard work have become central to the industry, 
combining to develop what this thesis has termed performance discourse.  
 
Here disciplinary power is understood to be the manifestations of power that are 
directed at the subject, as a form of control that emanates internally, guiding their 
linguistic expression, bodily functions, posture, time keeping, behaviour, ambitions, 
desires and emotions (Foucault 1977). Performance discourse acts to shift 
responsibility to the individual through what Rose (1990) calls responsibilization, 
encouraging employees to take initiative, innovate, put the client first and exceed 
expectations. This idea of self-disciplining subjects under performance discourse is 
expressed in the data where Phillip states ‘there is this constant thing about 
performance and achievement’ with another participant discussing how the 
pressure of working long hours and maintaining face-time emanates from the 
individual and is not explicitly ‘enforced’ by the organisation. This notion of the 
organisation not explicitly enforcing such behaviours was shared by a number of 
participants suggesting that the disciplining effect had been internalised (Foucault 
1982; 1975) resulting in compliance with the behavioural codes. Banks can be seen 
to ensure such norms by maintaining that hard work, ambition and commitment are 
desirable qualities (Mills 2003; Schirato et al 2012; Nealon 2008) through attempts 
to manage organisational culture. 
 
The proliferation of disciplinary power in the banking industry was spurred by ‘Big 
Bang’ where the financial services industry became a focus of attention for the 
government; as the government’s economic aspirations evolved under the free 
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market rhetoric a new power relation formed between the governments and financial 
institutions. The inception of Thatcherism which espoused free market economics 
is important when analysed through a Foucauldian lens as it symbolises the 
diffusion of power, where control was observed not through confinement but through 
instant communication, continual training and monitoring (Nealon 2008). The first 
element of this form of control was the technological infrastructure that was built into 
the City before Big Bang (Treanor 2006) creating state-of-the-art facilities fitted out 
with the latest telecommunications (Augar 2000). The data demonstrates how 
control through instant communication and technology is still relevant within the 
industry with participants expressing how banks are often described as ‘IT firms with 
banks attached’ (Jack). The disciplining function of technology is also illustrated by 
Phillip’s discussion of the ‘Blackberry Culture’, where he is expected to respond to 
emails 24/7 and if he does not check his emails every half an hour, he ‘didn’t feel 
like a human being’. Such statements demonstrate the extent to which employees 
can become self-disciplining to the point that their self-worth is attached to the 
technology that is a function of their work.  
 
Furthermore, the data reveals how disciplinary power continues to be exercised 
within the industry through regimes of training with Dev a Director at Emerald Bank, 
stating ‘every month we have training’ and Edward previously an associate at 
Whittards, expressing ‘they were quite into training and getting people aligned with 
culture’. In fact, every participant discussed how training plays a central role within 
their organisation for instilling core values and principles. This form of training has 
been intensified post-crisis with exponentially more regulatory and compliance 
training, and an increasing amount of cultural training. The intensification (Nealon 
2008) of training has been coupled with an intensification of surveillance within the 
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industry. An example of this is when Phillip a managing director at Midwest Bank, 
discussed how he implemented ‘voice recording systems and all kinds of 
surveillances on our employees’. Additionally, Dev discusses how there are 
‘mechanisms internally’ that surveil employee conduct using ‘software which 
monitors risky deals’.  
 
However, this only introduces us to a cursory understanding of the surveillance 
mechanism within the industry. In order to fully analyse the regimes of surveillance 
that are implemented it would be useful to employ Foucault’s (1977) idea of 
surveillance utilising the panoptic prison as a metaphor where individuals are led to 
believe that state or managerial observation is inescapable and omnipresent. 
Authorities’ gaze becomes diffused and pervading, so much so that individuals 
adjust their behaviour accordingly, making them amenable and docile, individuals 
within the panopticon are forced to internalise the disciplinary gaze. The notion of 
the disciplinary gaze is important in our analysis of the banking industry as it adds 
to the development of performance discourse, as employees internalise and 
discipline themselves to comply with organisational norms (Knights and McCabe 
2000), which are ‘routinely reproduced in mundane practices of organizing’ (Brown 
et al. 2010; 527). 
 
An example of the discipling gaze can be seen in the participants’ discussions of 
their work-life balances. Many participants stated that ‘there is definitely pressure to 
work late’ and another stating it is ‘endemic in the culture’. Participants felt that you 
must ‘be seen to put the hours in’ although it is acknowledged that this pressure is 
‘implicit’. Thus there are invisible coercions enacted upon the individual from ‘Just a 
gaze, an inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end up 
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interiorising’ (Foucault 1980: 155). Under this gaze, power’s intervention is subtle 
but no less potent. Managers may walk through the open plan offices and gaze over 
those who stay late and are seen to be working hard, reinforcing comments may be 
made acknowledging their commitment and implicit comments that show 
disapproval of those that are absent, such as ‘John is never around’ (Phillip). Thus 
very effectively adding to the elements of performance discourse. 
 
Although there is no material infliction on the bodies of the employees or an overt 
coercion, the panoptic gaze is part of the performance discourse that individuals 
encounter. Phillip's discussion of how ‘the guys who get promoted, work every 
weekend’ illustrates this; the normalisation of working long hours and linking it to 
meritocratic discourses meant that Phillip only ever took 2 out of his 5 weeks holiday 
entitlement, signifying the self-disciplining function of panoptic control. The 
disciplining function of the panoptic gaze can be seen to be intensified through the 
perpetuation of the notion that you are ‘constantly vulnerable’ and ‘under threat from 
the competitiveness of the place’. A number of participants discussed how they are 
under the constant threat of being made redundant with Lewis stating ‘I have 
constant fear I might lose my job’. Phillip explained how he constantly thinks to 
himself ‘fuck am I going to get fired’, additionally Susanne states ‘if you are not good 
you get weeded out, unsuccessful bankers tend to get weeded out’. This apparent 
‘fast paced’ and ‘competitiveness’ of the industry further intensifies the panoptic 
gaze and its disciplinary capacity as individuals feel that they need to constantly 
perform and adhere to organisational norms and cultures. However, although the 
functions of self-discipline pervade the industry it is important to note that ‘subjects 
have to be active participants in their own self-discipline whether that leads to 
consent, compliance or resistance’ (Knights and McCabe 2000: 426). 
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The cultural values and beliefs that are commonly communicated by the banks have 
come to include ethical conduct, morality, client centricity and ‘doing the right thing’. 
The term ‘doing the right thing’ was mentioned a number of time by participants, as 
evidenced in the data chapters. This notion builds upon the idea of enterprise 
discourses (McCabe 2008; 2009; Mangan 2009; Du Gay 1996; Rose 1989; Russell 
and McCabe 2015). Where attempts are made to mould individuals into responsible 
subjects through a personal identification with organisational objectives in order to 
engender competition via ‘active responsibility’ (Burchell 1991: 276). Additionally, 
the engendering of competition can be seen through the persistent pressure to 
perform that participants discussed. Karuhn spoke about how there is a ‘focus 
around performance’, Nico an investment manager with 25 years’ experience, 
discussed how banker’s performance metric is how much money they make – ‘that’s 
how they are managed, every day, every minute you can see how much money are 
you making’. Furthermore, Phillip’s discussion of the ‘performance curve’ shows 
how employees are ranked according to their performance and those who are in the 
‘bottom half of the performance curve are under threat’ and ‘vulnerable’. It is 
important to note however that the development of performance discourse can often 
lead to contradictions and contentions (McCabe 2009), which may be illustrated in 
the way the pressure to perform and generate value may undermine the assertion 
to ‘do the right thing’.  
 
This constant need for a certain level of performance suggests that there may be 
tensions between the performance discourse and post-crisis cultural discourses, as 
individuals may deviate from cultural principles in order to satisfy the criterion of 
performance discourse. This can potentially lead to misbehaviour, this premise is 
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supported by Victor’s explanation of how a CEO may communicate the need to be 
more ‘responsible’ but ‘isn't going to expect his traders to make any less profits’. 
This simple premise of performance may act to damage cultural change initiatives 
that have been implemented post-crisis and arguably be a significant factor in the 
multitude of scandals that have occurred in the seven years since the crisis. 
 
The locus of performance seems to have shifted from money and the individual’s 
ability to facilitate its production for their organisation to more behaviour and culture 
based metrics. This was a particularly prevalent claim amongst more junior 
participants, with Karuhn stating that they are ‘managed and judged according to 
the new culture’. Yusuf an investment management analyst, also discussed how 
performance reviews include a cultural compliance aspect and they have ‘quarterly 
ethics sign off to make sure we are adhering to the firm's code of ethics’. However, 
some more senior participants discussed the money orientated aspect of 
performance and ‘whether you will ever be able to shake it out of banking’. 
 
This section discussed performance discourse within the banking industry and how 
it was discovered through the empirical data collected, forming a key contribution of 
this thesis. Performance discourse draws upon some of the attributes of enterprise 
discourse that were introduced during the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the industry, 
which saw individualism, competition and short-termism become prominent within 
the industry. This section explored how the attributes of performance discourse 
became pervasive through forms of normative control. These normative frameworks 
were examined using Foucault’s concepts of power and surveillance. A new 
dimension to these normative mechanisms was introduced post-crisis, through an 
intensified focus on controlling behavioural and cultural aspects of work. The next 
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section will examine the various elements of performance discourse to gain a better 
understanding of how the discourse is produced, reproduced and maintained. 
 
 
 
7.7 Effects of Performance Discourse 
 
The notion that one’s sense of self and social relations have been subjected to 
financialization (Beverungen et al. 2013; Knights and McCabe: 2015: 200) and 
reduced to their economic utility transforming individuals into ‘financially self-
disciplined subjects’, is an important one. Financialization is a reoccurring theme in 
the data which can be seen in the discussions above regarding discourses of 
performance. Building further upon these discussions, the data reveals how several 
participants allude to the financialization of everything within the industry. Phillip 
expresses how ‘…your worth is measured by what does my bonus look like at the 
end of the year, that deﬁnes my existence and sense of self’. On a similar note, 
Hemel a compliance contractor, discussed ‘comp day’ where people receive their 
bonuses, with some becoming ‘pissed off’ and ‘handing in their notices’ if they have 
not received what they think they deserve. 
 
This financialization of the self is very significant as it underpins a number of 
important themes that were present in the data, the first being the culture of greed 
that has been widely covered in the media commentary on the crisis (Randall 2012). 
Recently Tom Hayes the banker at the heart of the LIBOR rigging scandal declared 
‘The point is, you are greedy… that's your performance metric.’ (Rojas and Mercer 
2015; Fortado 2015). The theme of greed is reflected in the data, however, 
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participants do not expressly call it greed but more an over focus on performance. 
Adrian claims that the ‘very short term incentives systems helped people not to think 
further’, Daniel asserted ‘I think it’s the culture, it’s still very bonus led’. Jacob 
interestingly stated ‘it’s good to be greedy but long-term greedy’.  
 
The theme of greed ties in well with the discursive discussions regarding 
performance and meritocracy. Within the industry, performance is measured by 
one’s ability to generate profits, particularly in the short term. This could imply that 
discourses of performance evoke behaviours of greed, however, discourses of 
meritocracy can be used to explain any accusations of greed. A number of 
participants stated that money cannot be the primary motivating factor of working in 
the industry, with Susanne saying ‘people who are motivated by the money fall away 
quite quickly’. Similarly, Toby stated ‘if you are in it for the money you very quickly 
leave’. Therefore, it can be argued that personal financial gain cannot be the primary 
driver behind short-termism, but instead, individuals seek monetary gain in order to 
comply with meritocratic discourses and being seen to be generating revenue for 
the firm. This also reinforces their sense of self-worth, Phillip summed this up by 
saying ‘what they cared about was that they were getting paid more than the next 
guy because that demonstrated how brilliant they were’. 
 
Financialization of all aspects of organisational and social life relates well to the 
themes of detachment that was present in the data. A number of participants 
discussed how being engulfed in the fiscality of the industry can be quite isolating 
on a social level resulting in detachment from the ‘real’ world, with one participant 
stating ‘our job is a bit divorced from reality…instead of thinking we’re masters of 
the universe, moving millions of dollars around’. This suggested that there may be 
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a tendency for individuals to become detached and potentially develop ‘a bit of a 
god complex’ (Lewis). Another participant stated ‘…if you are dealing with the 
numbers you are dealing within an investment bank, you become immune to what 
it actually means, it’s not a real number anymore’. These statements demonstrate 
how the ‘representational models of finance’ (Knights and McCabe 2015: 201) 
reduce individuals into economically rational actors in the maximisation of utility 
depriving them of empathetic social relations particularly within the spheres of work, 
where taken for granted assumptions are mobilised to constrain behaviours that are 
not economically rational. Through being immersed in the functions and discourses 
of financialization individuals begin to view the numerical data as abstract concepts 
that are no longer relatable to the social consequences that may transpire, making 
it increasingly easy to behave unethically: 
 
‘…you can get very divorced from what you should be doing if you don't stop 
and think why do we want to make money… if you remain client focused it is 
very clear what you should and should not do, and that keeps a lot of the 
misbehaving from happening’. (Jenson) 
 
It should be noted however that being ‘client focused’ does not necessarily equate 
to being ethical. In addition it is rather revealing that one of the participants in their 
discussion about detachment and the industry used the phrase ‘masters of the 
universe’ (Wolfe 1987); Knights and McCabe (2015) use this term to encapsulate 
positivist discourses that surround leadership within the industry, discourses which 
perpetuate the notion that leaders possess traits which elevate them above others, 
enabling them to predict and manage the future, ultimately leading their organisation 
to economic prosperity. This is often conceptualised as a rhetoric confined to the 
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leadership of an organisation. It can be suggested that such rhetoric exists in the 
industry, not only in their attempts to convey themselves as ‘masters of the universe’ 
but also in their post-crisis attempts to change the culture. The data suggests that 
within the banking industry such discourses permeate the banking profession 
particularly the front office ranks of investment banks, meaning that all members 
who are part of these divisions are led to believe they are the ‘best and the brightest’ 
(Daniel) and that each and everyone one of them possess a rare blend of intellect, 
ambition and determination. They believe that this unique blend is what allows them 
to calculate financial models and forecast economic patterns is reflected in the data. 
Susanne a Director in Commodities, for example, asserts that ‘bankers think they 
are smarter than everyone else is to do the whole package, not just one or two 
dimensions but multiple dimensions’. This discourse is disseminated through the 
construction of a culture of elites, a culture that is sustained through various rituals 
and artefacts that are normalised in the fabric of the profession (Ho 2009).  
 
This culture of elites is maintained through the creation of distinctions between those 
who fit within the categorisation of the elite and those who do not (Foucault 1970) 
This categorisation relates to what Foucault terms dividing practices where power 
develops categories in orders to make meaningful distinctions. These distinctions 
act to qualify or disqualify people as suitable members of society evaluating them 
against a scale of normality. From this, it can be suggested that the industry creates 
a distinction between bankers with their elite characteristics and those whom Phillip 
described as ‘civilians’. 
 
Banking institutions construct normalised perceptions and conduct through various 
mechanisms and authorised categories providing individuals with templates that act 
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to reduce the ways they understand themselves, others and the world. They are 
mobilised through the cultures that we are part of (Shirato et al 2012). It is at these 
locations which we are presented with images, ideas values and ambitions upon 
which we model ourselves. This is illustrated by Phillip’s statement ‘you are almost 
preconditioned that this is a glamorous lifestyle’. This creates self-disciplining 
subjects who buy into these images and devote their working lives to the attainment 
of these goals and define themselves as ‘masters of the universe’. The notion that 
individuals discipline themselves in order to attain these goals is demonstrated in 
the data from where Phillip states ‘it’s about status and about the fear of losing that 
status’. 
 
Individuals are presented with the inclusionary criteria of this culture of elites from  
very early on in their careers. Ho (2009:77) discussed this in her ethnography of 
Wall Street, where she discusses how banks only recruit from ‘world class’ 
universities for their most prestigious departments and those who do not fit this 
criterion, are given lower paid, back office roles, stating ‘for them, hard work was 
already severed from advancement and reward’. This idea of elites and being the 
smartest people in the world was reproduced by the majority of participants. For 
example, Jenson an executive director in a front office division, stated ‘we recruit 
from the top universities in the world and we’re competing for the smartest guys in 
the world’. 
 
A key tenet in the construction of this culture of elites is the notion of ‘hard work’ (Ho 
2009; Kemp 2013). The cultural ritual of long working hours is seen as a rite of 
passage (Right 2000), something which creates a bond between them, a sense of 
‘camaraderie’ as described by Daniel an IT infrastructure consultant working in the 
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sector. It is what separates them from ‘civilians’ who ‘don’t actually know what hard 
work is’ thus adding to the image of heroism that they construct around themselves 
that acts to sustain them. The very use of the word ‘civilians’ to describe those who 
do not work on the front lines of banking, suggests that they view themselves in 
some sort of military fashion, as warriors maybe.  
 
Their sense of self-worth is defined through these cultural rituals of long working 
hours and ‘facetime’ to the detriment of their social relations ‘It will attract people 
who are willing to exchange their lives for money’ stated Phillip. This discourse 
imposes a disciplining function upon them that is so strong that they feel the need 
to ‘meet expectations’, however, it seems that this disciplining functions internally 
(Nealon 2008). There is an invisible pressure to work longer and harder, however it 
is not explicitly communicated but instead ‘reinforced by the people around you and 
becomes normal’, suggesting that forms of normative control are imposed upon 
individuals through the dictation of symbolic action at a routine level (Grey 2009; 
Willmott 1993; Kunda 1992; Merton 1957; Parker 1997); they have been 
‘preconditioned that it is a glamorous lifestyle’ (Phillip). Interestingly the discourses 
surrounding bankers act to construct them as powerful individuals and leaders of 
industry.  
 
However, the data reveals an alternative perspective if we view it through the lens 
of a Foucauldian analysis of power relations and power’s synonymity with 
knowledge, where the production of knowledge constitutes claims to power 
(Foucault 1978). As discussed earlier, it is the bankers’ knowledge of the financial 
markets that provided them with influence and authority over investors, 
governments and regulators, all of which adds to their image of power and prestige. 
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Despite these portrayals of wealth, power and intelligence, some participants 
demonstrated a vulnerability and helplessness that is founded within their anxiety of 
being excluded from circles of discussion or not knowing what they should be doing, 
essentially an anxiety that derives from a perceived lack of knowledge about their 
status within the organisation and an uncertainty about their job security. This is 
reflected in the data with Phillip discussing how he constantly thinks ‘am I being 
ignored or are people going around me…are they now starting to see me as an 
overhead, how can I be involved?’. Similarly, Sam who has worked in equity sales 
for Midwest Bank and Iron Bank stated ‘I am very stressed, I have a constant fear I 
might lose my job’. 
 
This then demonstrates that power is not an immutable force to be possessed 
indefinitely but is unstable and vulnerable, power relations are being continually 
contested and in a permanent state of flux. This also demonstrates the intrinsic link 
between power and knowledge, giving weight to Foucault’s notion of 
power/knowledge (1980; 1977). These discourses that construct the culture of 
elitism have transcended the physical manifestation of the institution, disembodying 
previous disciplinary forms of control (Foucault 1977). Where the site of infliction 
transcends the physical institution due to the spatial reconfiguration of modern 
corporations via advances in technology and telecommunications. This form of 
power expands the remit of panoptic surveillance and control, intensifying its effects 
upon the individual. This form of power can be seen within the banking industry 
through an increase in modes of communication of cultural paraphernalia, but most 
noticeably the ‘Blackberry culture’ discussed earlier. Employees are provided with 
a Blackberry device to conduct organisational operations including emails and 
taking calls. The use of such devices is not confined to work premises or even during 
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working hours. Employees are expected to check and respond to emails ‘24 hours 
a day’. However this ‘expectation’ is not enshrined in any company policy but is an 
organisational norm which subjugates individuals to a point where the ‘Blackberry 
culture’ diminishes their social relations as they are ‘constantly checking [their] 
Blackberrys’. Their sense of self is channelled through this electronic device, the 
Blackberry is perceived as the gateway into their organisational self where they are 
‘masters of the universe’. This device maintains this status when they are away from 
the confines of their organisation– ‘even though it isn’t connected, I checked it every 
half an hour because I didn't feel like I was a human being if I didn’t’. 
 
From the above analysis of the banking industry, it may seem that the power 
relations that are enacted within it, are expressly oppressive. However, through a 
Foucauldian understanding of power, we can appreciate power to be productive– ‘if 
power was never anything but repressive…do you really believe that we should 
manage to obey it?’ (Foucault 1978: 36), through this understanding of power, we 
can begin to view the discourses surrounding the culture of elitism as producing 
individuals who view themselves as successful, influential professionals, who 
possess an astute knowledge that is economically and politically vital to the current 
governing regimes around the world. Individuals feel empowered to be part of this 
elite that enables them to feel that they are ‘masters of the universe’ and the 
‘smartest guys in the world’, thus bestowing them with a sense of accomplishment 
and prestige. They can take satisfaction in their involvement in high-profile mergers, 
acquisitions and initial public offerings (IPO), which many participants mentioned as 
being a source of pride being involved in work that has a ‘real economic impact’. 
Their job functions have a tangible impact on markets and businesses, which they 
are often well compensated for, affording them financial freedom and stability. This 
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then demonstrates the productivity that is inherent within power relations but also 
demonstrates the unstable nature of power relations but also that power relations 
are susceptible to. 
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7.8 Summary 
 
The data reveals how the discourses of meritocracy and enterprise continue to be 
perpetuated throughout the industry but have become intensified (Nealon 2008) 
leading to the discovery of performance discourse. These discourses within the 
banking industry emerge through the necessity for an individual to perform resulting 
in various forms of disciplinary power (Foucault 1977). The self-disciplining effects 
of performance discourse are shown throughout the data, there is a ‘constant thing 
about performance and achievement’. Performance discourse causes an 
internalisation of the performance imperatives sanctioned by the organisation, this 
is intensified through apparent ‘competitiveness’ of the industry and the fluidity of its 
employment relations, where employees feel they are ‘constantly vulnerable’ and 
‘under threat from the competitiveness of the place’ escalating the sense that one 
must constantly perform and adhere to organisational norms and culture. The 
discursive discussions regarding performance and meritocracy, demonstrates that 
performance is measured by one's ability to generate profits thus disciplining 
individuals  to seek short-term monetary gain in order to comply with performance 
discourses and establish their sense of self-worth, which for some, as seen in the 
data, is heavily invested in their image as a banker . 
 
Performance discourses are underpinned by the cultures of elites, which was 
discussed in the last chapter. These discourses lead individual’s to believe they are 
the ‘smartest people in the world’ and that each and everyone one of them 
possesses a rare blend of intellect, ambition and determination. Another gateway to 
achieving this elite status is through ‘hard work’, where the cultural ritual of long 
working hours is seen as a right of passage, which instils a sense of ‘camaraderie’ 
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amongst organisational members. The perpetuation of performance discourses 
necessitates the existence of tension and conflict between the post-crisis cultural 
discourses and the imperatives of performance discourses, as it may be difficult to 
act ethically and with integrity, whilst delivering above market returns in the short-
term, potentially resulting in misbehaviour. 
 
An important part of this chapter was the overlaying of these concepts with a 
Foucauldian lens which break the conventional view of organisational actors as 
eternally subjugated. Foucault's understanding of power appreciates power to be 
productive, thus individuals are not only disciplined by these cultural and 
performance discourses but simultaneously empowered by them allowing them to 
view themselves as ‘masters of the universe’. Additionally, Foucault asserts ‘where 
there is power there is resistance’ (1978: 95). Participants are not passive observers 
of these cultural events, they maintain the capacity to rethink and resist the cultural 
discourses that are being presented to them signifying their engagement in these 
power relations. 
 
From the discussions present in this chapter it is evident that culture is still viewed 
as a ‘thing’, a definable entity that can be designed and managed by leadership. 
Demonstrating that little has changed within managerial perspectives of culture, 
management continues to draw upon the cultural guru texts of the 1980s and the 
‘strong culture’ ethos of culture management. The industry continues to adopt a 
prescriptive functionalist perspective of organisational culture resulting in a failure 
move beyond ‘strong culture’ discourses in spite of pre-crisis ‘toxicity’. 
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Through the discussions of this thesis, it is emerging that culture management is a 
site for power relations to be enacted and contested, similarly to power, 
organisational culture is not something that is imposed on individuals through a top-
down schema (Mills 2003; Smircich 1983). Foucault’s work on power, discipline and 
discourse (1977; 1978; 1980) provides a framework that allows for an exploration of 
the complexity, ambiguity of culture and how organisational culture is mutually 
constructed. This led to the discovery performance discourse, performance 
discourse goes beyond the established dualism of organisational culture. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is a critical exploration of banking culture in the context of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. It has explored the contributory factors that led up to the event and 
how these factors played a part in the construction of the banking cultures that have 
often been described as ‘toxic’ (Treanor 2014a). In the last few years, the industry 
has become increasingly focused on banking culture possibly spurred by 
proclamations within the media that the causes were at the ‘very heart of its culture’ 
(FT.com 2014). Additionally, inquiries and surveys around the financial crisis have 
identified cultural failings as a root cause (Spicer et al. 2014; Salz 2013; Deloitte 
2013; CIPD 2013). This renewed preoccupation with culture management within the 
industry calls for a timely revisiting of the topic within an academic context, in order 
to explore how organisational culture is developed and how the banking industry 
has attempted to manage it. 
 
This thesis looked to critique mainstream perspectives of organisational culture that 
were founded within mainstream cultural engineering texts (Peter and Waterman 
1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982). Mainstream perspectives of culture were 
encapsulated by the notion that an organisation ‘has’ a culture (Smircich 1983), that 
can be shaped and modified by management in order to produce a ‘strong culture’, 
engendering the ‘right’ behaviours. Organisations were led to believe that 
organisational culture was a variable to be controlled in order develop a culture 
where employees would share their leader's beliefs, assumptions and vision (Martin 
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2002). Management Gurus promised companies increased commitment, 
productivity and profitability (Wiener 1988; Parker 2000; Kilmann 1985; Du Gay 
1996) provided they were able to create a sufficiently strong culture. We are now 30 
years on from cultural engineering’s initial introduction and although academic 
debate showed that culture cannot be managed yet it has remained an area of 
interest for the banking industry. 
 
Non-critical explorations of organisational culture have focused on selective 
accounts  from senior management with the omission of any dissenting examples. 
It could be argued that this represents a reduction of knowledge that falls outside 
disseminated ‘truths’. This demonstrates a construction of a ‘regime of truth’ (Mills 
2003:73; Foucault, 1980), where contradictory knowledge is not reproduced and is 
often marginalised and forgotten. It is, for this reason, that it was timely to re-apply 
a critical lens to the topic, where culture is understood to be a set of common 
characteristics, which are in a constant state of change and is at no point static or 
clearly definable, making it difficult to prescribe a universal remedy. This thesis has 
drawn upon critical ideas of organisational culture that are informed by 
constructionist literature (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This means that an 
organisation does not possess an external objective reality that is remote from the 
conduct and behaviours of the social actors that exist within it. Such a theory of 
organisational culture is moved forward through the utilisation of the work of 
Foucault. Foucault’s (1977; 1978; 1980) work provided a foundation upon which to 
develop a framework to interpret organisational phenomena in a way that moves 
beyond the dualism of understanding organisational culture either as a thing or as 
a metaphor, thus providing a more nuanced perspective on banking culture. A 
perspective that understands the contributory role that power and discourse play in 
   266 
the development of organisational culture. From a critical perspective, the 
suggestion that cultures can be manipulated from above is naive, and simplistic, 
while also failing to acknowledge that such endeavours are in themselves a cultural 
component (Smircich 1983) and form part of the fabric upon which culture is 
constructed or resisted. 
 
The chapter will present the main contribution of this thesis of how organisational 
culture is developed organically through mutual interaction, power relations and 
discourse. The power relations that emerged create a complex web of multiple 
power relations that support, conflict and resist one another. They also aid in the 
construction of performance discourse which is a central theme within the industry 
pre and post crisis. This section will then discuss the themes central to the 
construction of performance discourse, which includes the existence of a culture of 
elites and the organisational imperatives of hard work and financialization. 
 
8.2 Culture is Still a ‘Thing’ 
 
The empirical data and the wider context of the industry’s proposed cultural reforms 
indicate that banks have been convinced by the repackaging of past ideas (Stanford 
2010; Jackson 2001; Abrahamson 1991; Huczynski 1993) by management gurus, 
who claim they can ‘design their own culture’ (PwC 2016). Organisational culture is 
still viewed as a ‘thing’ in the banking industry, it is seen as a definable entity that 
can be designed and managed by leadership, this is supported by the findings of 
other research conducted into banking culture (see Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; 
Salz 2013; CIPD 2013). It can be argued that little has changed amongst industry 
interpretations of organisational culture since the 1980 culture guru texts (Peters 
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and Waterman 1982; Deal and Kennedy 1982; Ouchi 1981) as banking leadership 
continues to use the language of these cultural texts (Treanor 2014h). The data 
indicates that industry attempts to change organisational culture post-crisis have 
continued to draw upon mainstream managerialist literature, where organisational 
culture is a definable entity (Chatman 1991; Chatman and Jehn 1994) that can be 
managed from the top of the organisation to produce the right behaviours (Schein 
2004; Cooke and Lafferty 1989).  
 
The banking industry has in part adhered to the strong culture ethos communicated 
by mainstream texts. This can be seen in attempts to espouse consistent values 
and beliefs to employees through the development of new mission statements and 
core principles, which are communicated through various forms of cultural 
paraphernalia, training and events. However the strict cultural homogeneity 
advocated by strong culture advocates is evolved upon, the data indicates that some 
banks acknowledge cultural differentiation or ‘micro-cultures’ provided they are 
compatible with the organisations overarching culture or ‘macro-culture’. 
Furthermore, the empirical data and wider contextual information available on the 
industry following the crisis suggests that the industry’s cultural reforms have drawn 
upon other mainstream perspectives of organisational culture in addition to strong 
culture perspectives. This has emerged as attempts to develop a constituency 
focussed culture (Kotter and Heskett 1992) where managerial efforts are focussed 
on their constituent’s needs. The industry’s attempts to develop a constituency 
focused culture can be seen in the proliferation of phrases such as ‘do the right 
thing’ and core principles centred around client-centricity. 
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The industry believes that corporate culture possesses the capacity to resolve the 
industry’s issues (Banking Standards Board 2016: 5) by rebuilding ‘trustworthiness’ 
and ‘tackle behaviours and competence’ (Carney 2016). However, industry 
personnel, regulators and policy makers seem confused about what constitutes 
culture. Many of the reports discussed how cultural issues are centred around 
norms, assumptions beliefs and values, while in other instances remuneration 
packages, work-life balance, performance measurement and whistleblowing 
policies are regarded as cultural issues (Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; Salz 2013; 
House of Commons Treasury Committee 2011). This has led to multiple prescriptive 
points of transformation being identified and executed, including leadership, 
governance, training, bonus structures, recruitment and diversity to name a few, 
making cultural change seemingly sporadic, confused and overwhelming. 
 
Banks initiated their culture change initiatives with the introduction of ‘new’ mission 
statements or a new set of values and principles. Across the industry, similar sets 
of values, beliefs and mission statements are communicated, containing terms 
including integrity, morality, client centricity and ‘doing the right thing’. These can be 
found on banks’ lobby walls, posters and leaflets, also on mouse mats, screen 
savers and employee handbooks. The industry has intensified its communication of 
cultural principles in order to reduce misbehaviour and wrongdoing that were said 
to have been prevalent within the industry. The industry has attempted to manage 
culture towards establishing and ingraining key tenets centred around morality, 
integrity and ethics in an attempt to remedy the toxic cultures (Treanor 2014h; Spicer 
et al. 2014; Moore 2013; Alloway et al. 2012; Smith 2012; Moore 2012) that have 
troubled the industry pre-crisis. 
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This thesis identified training as a key tool implemented by the banks in the cultural 
communication of core values and principles; cultural training exercises have 
become a compulsory component for employees at the majority of banks, where the 
training centres around communicating the values and principles of the 
organisation. Training, along with other cultural communication discussed above 
has been intensified in the last two years triggered by the LIBOR rigging scandal, 
resulting in the inclusion of principles of ethical conduct, in order to instil a sense of 
integrity and honesty in employees. The data indicates that the approach to 
delivering cultural training is similar throughout the industry, with the majority of firms 
utilising online courses, face to face training or away days. Some banks have set 
up training academies in partnership with business schools to train employees on 
integrity and compliance (Treanor 2014h). Other banks within the industry have 
established ‘culture carriers’, where a senior member of staff who embodies and 
encourages the ‘correct culture’, to ensure ‘things are done top down. Additionally, 
the data shows that all banks researched utilising town hall events led by senior 
management to address cultural issues, disseminating core values and beliefs to 
employees. Also, banks across the industry have placed additional importance 
since the crisis on establishing cultural principles throughout the recruitment 
process, with interviews being focused on behaviours and values and 
demonstrating to prospective employees what is expected of them in a cultural 
capacity. 
 
However, in spite of this intensification (Nealon 2008) of cultural communication the 
data indicates that neither the lived experience of employees nor how their 
performance is actually measured is consistent with the principles and 
communications of these training programs and their accompanying paraphernalia. 
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The data showed that the generation of profits often takes precedence, reducing the 
notion of client-centricity and other ethically grounded cultural principles to 
managerial rhetoric. This results in the various forms of cultural communication to 
be overlooked and ignored, becoming background noise to the majority of 
employees. Therefore cultural communications and training have become a source 
of frustration and conflict for employees, causing the proposed cultural changes to 
have little effect on the cultural direction of the banks. 
 
Advocates of cultural management proclaimed that if values and beliefs are instilled 
into employees, through training and other reminders then this will establish a strong 
culture, and result in numerous benefits (Peters and Waterman 1982). However, it 
is evident in the data that there are challenges to viewing organisation culture in this 
way, reinforcing the idea that cultural management has been oversimplified (Martin 
2002). Instead, conduct and behaviours are developed through inferences made by 
employees of reinforced and normalised conduct, which in the case of banks often 
hinges on the creation of wealth and its authority over all other endeavours. This 
then informs employees through normative frameworks (Foucault 1978) of what is 
important and what is not to the organisation, influencing the way employees behave 
and the way they interact with these new mission statements, core values and 
beliefs. 
 
Additionally, the new cultural change initiatives that the industry has attempted to 
introduce often overlook the significance a firm's history plays in the development 
and sustenance of an organisation’s culture. As mentioned in chapter 2, the 
‘excellent’ companies discussed in Peters and Waterman’s (1982) book actually 
developed their cultures organically throughout their history and not from a cultural 
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change programmes (Stanford 2010). The data indicated that employees 
responded more positively to cultural artefacts and rituals when they are embedded 
within the organisation and developed over time through the mutual interaction of 
organisational members, shaped and directed by the history of the organisation. 
When values and beliefs are actively enacted throughout the organisation 
employees feel that this feeds into the ethos of the organisation, creating positive 
working environments, mobilising a sense of teamwork, which inspires employees 
to work hard and be committed to the firm and its clients. The data demonstrates 
that it is possible to cultivate but not design a culture which moves past surface 
adherence or passive compliance and inspires an espousal to the organisation’s 
norms and behaviours. Such claims may come across as advocating managerial 
assertions of corporate culturism, however, the data shows that through the 
embodiment of longstanding values and beliefs through the day to day conduct of 
its business, employees feel a higher level of affinity towards their organisation. 
When their organisation sticks to its core beliefs which form part of the firm’s history 
and not just introduced as part of a post-crisis culture change initiative. 
 
The industry has demonstrated a strong interest in attempting to reform the 
industry’s culture, however, this may change and their attentions may shift 
elsewhere particularly if these changes are perceived to be taking too long or to be 
interfering with profitability. The success of such preventative measures lies in 
whether these changes have the capacity to make a lasting impact upon the industry 
and induce genuine change within banking. The data showed varied responses as 
to whether these changes were long term or superficial, with suggestions that the 
markets and the industry are cyclical and future crashes will occur and behaviours 
will revert back to those which were prevalent before the crisis. Therefore there was 
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a sense that these changes may only be fleeting and that these changes may have 
been introduced to appease the current regulatory and political environment 
surrounding the industry, but as these shift, so will the industry’s focus. Concerns 
about the industry’s inability to change long term are grounded within the industry’s 
necessity to generate profits. This necessity for profits may cause shareholders to 
apply pressure in order to see a return to ‘normal’ returns on investments, risking a 
return to short-termism. As discussed in the context chapter these pressures are 
already beginning to emerge, which can be seen through the removal of Barclay’s 
CEO Antony Jenkins due to his failure to restore profitability at Barclay’s investment 
bank division (Arnold 2015b; 2015c). Thus, the commitment and sincerity of these 
changes have been questioned with suggestions that they are merely discursive 
devices (Whittle and Mueller 2011) introduced for PR purposes. 
 
8.3 Performance Discourse as Culture 
 
This section will discuss how organisational culture is developed organically and 
apart from managerially led culture management or change initiatives. A key 
contribution of this thesis is the development of the idea that organisational culture 
develops organically through the themes of power and discourse. This thesis argues 
that the existen 
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ce of multiple power relations within banking organisations and the banking industry, 
these overlooked power relations exist forming a web of interrelated competing 
power relations, which through the productivity of power (Foucault 1977) can lead 
to the development of banking cultures. In order to make sense of the themes 
emerging under these various power relations, the idea of performance discourses 
was developed. Performance discourse develops through the multiple power 
relations, but also emerges through the mutual interaction of organisational 
members, normative behaviours, taken for granted assumptions and organisational 
imperatives, these themes will be discussed in turn below. 
 
This thesis builds upon the notion that an organisation ‘is’ a culture (Smircich 1983) 
suggesting that organisational culture is more capillary and is developed through 
the mutual interaction between organisational members. This organic development 
of culture within the banking industry is influenced by power relations between 
interested groups which leads to an inter-related and complex web of power 
relations. These interrelated powers relations can be interpreted through 
performance discourse, which can both reinforce and conflict with the managerially 
disseminated organisational culture. 
 
These power relations can be seen in the way banking institutions were subject to 
governmental pressure to open up streams of consumer credit to support consumer 
spending and home ownership through subprime lending (Wolf 2015). The 
government utilised this opportunity to proclaim how their policies had increased the 
country’s economic prosperity and boosted the nation's international business 
standing as a financial capital. Additionally, investors expected and continue to 
expect above market returns on their investments and as the data indicates, these 
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returns are expected to materialise quickly, accentuating short-termism. A further 
example of the competing interests that are present in the industry is how in the 
aftermath of the crisis the public were seen to be the victims through mis-selling and 
funding the banks’ bailouts. However, participants strongly expressed how they felt 
that the general public necessitated the need for certain financial products and 
innovations in order to open up streams of lending and bring liquidity to the markets 
to satisfy the ‘general addiction to credit’ as one participant put it. Participants 
viewed the public as having a sense of ‘entitlement’ and therefore played a part in 
the proliferation of credit structures and securitized assets that engendered the 
crisis, with participants expressing that the public holds ‘a big chunk of the blame’. 
The presence of an interrelated web of power relations that plays a major 
contributory role in the conduct of banking institutions and their employees, each 
claim or enactment of power having a causal effect on the other actors/groups within 
the network. 
 
Power and its fluidity, play an important role in the struggle for hegemony amongst 
interested parties within the industry through attempts to exercise their authority in 
order to disseminate their beliefs. A key power relation present within the banking 
industry in the context of managing organisational culture is the relationship 
between banking leadership and employees. However, as seen in the data and 
analysis chapters this purported authority, whether legitimate or not, does not 
necessarily guarantee acceptance, as subordinate groups possess the power to 
resist. As Foucault (1978: 95) asserts ‘where there is power there is resistance’. 
Organisations are arenas for resistance to be enacted, where beliefs values and 
behaviours can be challenged as individuals are not passive recipients 
demonstrated by participants discussion of cultural change programs. It is for this 
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reason that this thesis utilised perspectives that acknowledge an organisation’s 
multi-cultural nature, departing with functionalist research’s pre-occupation with 
managerially disseminated cultures (Van Maanen and Barley 1985). 
 
This thesis adopted a Foucauldian (1977) model of a bottom-up theory of power, 
one which concentrates on power’s permeation of the workforce, as industry 
members are active participants in the negotiation of their relations and position 
within their organisation and not subjugated ‘dupes’ or passive recipients (Mills 
2003: 34). This was demonstrated throughout the data when participants shared 
increasingly critical discussions against the industry and their organisations, 
acknowledging the active attempts to influence their conduct and behaviours 
through cultural training and normalisation of certain behaviours. The data has 
demonstrated how organisational members are not passive observers of cultural 
events or inertly receive the artefacts and rituals. They maintain the capacity to 
rethink and resist the cultural discourses that are being presented to them signifying 
that they actively engage with power relations. 
 
Organisational cultures can develop through normative frameworks (Kunda 1992; 
Wilmott 1993). This thesis has attempted to understand these normative 
frameworks using Foucault’s (1977) concept of discourse. Discourses can 
constitute a way of understanding and experiencing the world (Kenny et al. 2011) 
they can be used as mechanisms for the regulation of perceptions and what is 
known to be described as ‘truth’ (Foucault 1980). Discourses can encourage 
individuals to think in a particular way through the normalisation of rules, causing 
practices to become taken for granted and commonsensical (Candrian 2013; 
Schirato et al 2012). This thesis identifies the development of managerially-led 
   279 
discourses that aim to control or engineer a bank’s organisational culture. However, 
discourses are not totalising (McCabe 2009) and the data shows how managerially 
disseminated cultural communications can be ignored and overlooked. This would 
then indicate that the cultural changes and the values, beliefs and mission 
statements that are encompassed by these changes do not represent a bank's 
organisational culture. The acknowledgement that resistance is an integral part of 
the existence of power relations (Foucault 1980) results in the inevitable formation 
of categories, groups or cultures that are antithetical to dominant discourses. This 
results in a ‘residue’ (Schirato et al 2012: 49) of people or behaviours that are 
counter to ‘the way things are done around here’ (Deal and Kennedy 1982; Peters 
and Waterman 1982; Schein 1985) resulting in the development of a mutually 
constructed culture and the emergence of culture clashes. 
 
This thesis developed the idea of performance discourse, which is founded upon 
the themes of excess, elitism, competition, hard work and performance that have 
become embedded and reinforced through the conduct and behaviours or 
organisational members, as well as being influenced by interrelated power relations 
mentioned above. Such themes are not part of cultural communications or post-
crisis culture change initiatives; they have emerged through taken for granted 
assumptions and normative behaviours that are ingrained in the lived experiences 
of banking employees. Performance discourse represents the organisational 
cultures constructed through the mutual interaction and lived experiences of 
organisational members. The underlying themes may contradict the values, beliefs 
and mission statements communicated by management, but this is not to say that 
these discourses are not in some way influenced by management and their 
behaviour of reinforcing certain organisational imperatives, such as profits.  
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Performance discourse is constructed from a number of themes that were explored 
in the analysis chapter, which emerged through the data, these themes construct 
and reinforce performance discourse but are simultaneously developed and shaped 
by performance discourse. This thesis established that an aspect of performance 
discourse is the culture of elites. This thesis argues that under the culture of elites 
members are led to believe they possess a desirable combination of intellect, 
ambition and determination causing them to view themselves as the ‘smartest 
people in the world’. The culture of elites is sustained through mechanisms of 
normalisation which include various rituals and artefacts (Ho 2009), as well as 
creating distinctions between those who fit within the industry’s definition of elite and 
those who do not, something which Foucault (1970) terms dividing practices. The 
industry has constructed a template for an individual’s conduct to adhere to and 
reduce the way they can understand themselves, others and the world. 
 
Through the research, it also emerged that the attribute of ‘hard work’ (Ho 2009) 
contributed to the development of a culture of elites. The research indicated that a 
member’s sense of self-worth can be defined through the cultural ritual of long 
working hours and ‘facetime’. There is an expectation to work longer and harder, 
the data suggested that this expectation emanated internally within the individual 
(Nealon 2008) as such expectations are not explicitly communicated. It is instead 
reinforced through a symbolic promotion at a routine level of intellect, hard work, 
ambition and commitment. (Willmott 1993; Kunda 1992; Merton 1957; Parker 1997; 
Mills 2003; Schirato et al 2012; Nealon 2008) even though these attributes do not 
form part of the new values and beliefs that the banks have introduced in the wake 
of the crisis and in some cases may conflict with the new corporate culture.  
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Foucault’s (1977) work on disciplinary power is used to understand such forms of 
internalised discipline, where an individual’s conduct, linguistic expressions, 
behaviour, ambitions, desires and emotions (Nealon 2008) are guided towards 
fulfilling organisational imperatives. Foucault’s (1980) concept of the disciplinary 
gaze has been central to this thesis to the analysis of performance discourse, as 
employees are inflicted with a gaze which causes them to internalise and discipline 
themselves to comply with organisational norms. An example of this is seen in the 
data chapters where participants discuss working long hours and their work-life 
balances, demonstrating how reinforcing comments are made to those who stay 
late and are seen to be working hard; implicit comments that show disapproval of 
those that are absent. 
 
Another attribute of performance discourse within the banking industry that emerged 
throughout this thesis is ‘financialization’ (Beverungen et al. 2013; Knights and 
McCabe 2015: 200). Which is the reduction of things to their economic utility, 
essentially how much money an individual can make for their bank, thus having the 
potential to transform individuals into ‘financially self-disciplined subjects’ (McCabe 
2016: 200). Financialization understood through performance discourse provides an 
explanation to the popular commentary on the banking industry possessing a 
‘culture of greed’ (Randal 2012). The necessity to perform and generate profits was 
sustained through discursive practices and normative behaviours, which individual’s 
disciplined themselves against could have caused the intensification of short-
termism and incentivised bankers to ‘bet the entire bank on astonishingly reckless 
investment strategies’ (Roubini and Mihm 2011: 32; Kerr and Robinson 2012; 
Tourish and Hargie 2012). 
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The development of a culture of elites acts to construct bankers as powerful 
individuals and leaders of industry. Power relations flowed between bankers and 
governments, regulators and wider economic stakeholders through their purported 
knowledge of the financial markets (Foucault 1977; 1978) adding to their image of 
power and prestige. However despite these portrayals of wealth, power and 
intelligence the data demonstrated how participants still held a vulnerability and 
helplessness that exists from their anxiety of being excluded, an anxiety about their 
status within the organisation and uncertainty about their job security; participants 
felt they are ‘constantly vulnerable’ and ‘under threat’. The performance discourse 
executed within the industry provides individuals with an image to live up to that 
purveys smartness, ambition and hard work but simultaneously is the root of anxiety, 
vulnerability and apprehension, demonstrating that performance discourses are not 
an end-state (McCabe 2009). Additionally, the immutability of power and the 
purported power that bankers held is contested, demonstrating that power relations 
in any guise are unstable, vulnerable and in a permanent state of flux (Foucault 
1980; 1977). 
 
It is important to note that although much of the discussion surrounding bankers 
throughout the thesis may at times suggest they are oppressed by the power 
relations that are enacted within the industry, this is not the case. Through a 
Foucauldian understanding of power, we can appreciate power to be productive 
(Foucault 1978), meaning the discourses surrounding the culture of elitism 
facilitates an individual’s view that they are successful, influential, knowledgeable 
and playing an intrinsic role to the functioning of the global economy, something that 
seemed to be a source of motivation for participants. They are empowered by the 
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membership of this elite cadre enabling them to view themselves as ‘masters of the 
universe’ and the ‘smartest guys in the world’. 
 
McCabe’s (2009) research into a UK bank concluded that enterprise discourses 
provided both a source for control and resistance, this can be evidenced in the 
findings of this thesis. The performance discourse that was developed creates 
tensions with the post-crisis cultural discourses that have been central to the 
industry’s agenda in the years following the financial crisis. Central to these cultural 
initiatives is ethical conduct, morality, client centricity and ‘doing the right thing’, 
although these principles contain significant margins for subjectivity these principles 
are in contrast with the attributes of performance discourse. Therefore this 
contention may cause a continuation of misbehaviour in order to satisfy the 
economic necessities of the performance discourse. 
 
8.4 Summary 
 
To summarise the banking industry has been plagued with a number of issues 
following the 2008 financial crisis. Many of these problems have centred around 
inappropriate business practices, which resulted in multiple scandals such as 
LIBOR rigging and Forex. This shifted the focus away from regulatory and 
procedural issues, moving the spotlight on the softer aspects of the industry namely 
culture. The industry has attempted to initiate cultural change programs to instil 
higher levels of ethics and morality to combat claims of the existence of toxic 
cultures. However, there is confusion throughout the industry about what culture is, 
however regardless of what they understand culture to be across the industry there 
has been a default to prescriptive methods of culture management founded upon 
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the cultural guru texts of the 1980s. What has emerged through this research is that 
such methods are not a panacea, they have not resolved the cultural issues that the 
industry is purported to be struggling with. The top-down prescriptions have not 
resulted in universally, unabridged strong cultures that have alleviated the industry 
of any wrongdoing or misbehaviour. 
 
The industry has failed to acknowledge that culture is a much more complex, 
capillary and contested phenomena, where there is no silver bullet or universal 
remedy. Organisational culture develops organically through the mutual interaction 
of organisational actors as culture is more embedded. This develops the 
organisation's cultural artefacts and normative behaviours, which are then enacted 
and reinforced over time, these can form in spite of managerially disseminated 
cultural change initiatives. Additionally this thesis discussed how historical events of 
the 1986 deregulation of the industry played a part in certain norms, behaviours, 
conduct, assumptions and organisational imperatives, such as enterprise and 
performance becoming prominent. Performance discourse draws upon some of the 
ideas of enterprise discourse; these discourses are predicated on competition, 
financialization of the individual, internalising responsibility, intensification of work 
and elitism. It can be argued performance discourse played a contributory part in 
the development of the financial crisis and continues to map the future direction of 
the industry as they are still very much prominent attributes of the industry. The 
historic development of performance discourse has shown how progressive and 
embedded cultural artefacts and attributes can be, the behaviours that led to the 
crisis and subsequent scandals did not transpire spontaneously in a cultural vacuum 
and then consume the industry. Instead, these aspects of the industry developed 
over decades creating norms and behaviours centred around them, which were 
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reinforced as time progressed. It is for this reason that the introduction of ‘new’ 
mission statements and core values and principles are a failure to acknowledge the 
historic and organic development of organisational cultures. The emergence of 
embedded and organically developed organisational cultures that are shaped by 
power relations and emergent organisational discourses can result in contention 
and conflict with managerially communicated cultural values, beliefs and mission 
statements often rendering cultural change initiative ineffective. 
 
It could be argued that a more textured and layered understanding of culture would 
be beneficial, it is for this reason that this thesis provided a critical exploration of 
banking culture in the context of the financial crisis. The writings of Foucault were 
utilised as a framework to drill down into the complexity, ambiguity and 
contradictions that exist within organisational culture. Foucault’s work on power, 
discipline and discourses provided the foundations of analysis, which has 
understood that the development of organisational culture is a site for competing 
power relations and discourses. Foucault is used to move beyond the established 
dualism of understanding organisational culture, with culture being a thing and 
culture being a metaphor. 
 
However, the idea that culture is still a ‘thing ‘and a tool for managerial manipulation 
continues to dominate industry perceptions. Through the findings of this thesis, 
though being cautious not to provide prescriptive remedies, it would be beneficial 
for organisational members to acknowledge the role they play in the construction of 
organisational culture. As currently from the data gathered, MBA discourses of 
functionalism and managerialism continue to dominate participant language and 
understandings of the structure of their organisations, everything is seen as 
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management led or top-down. Through acknowledging their role and the bottom-up 
concept of organisations they may become conscious participants in shaping and 
moulding banking culture bottom-up. Through the current status quo the mutual 
integration of all organisational members in constructing cultures is omitted, 
potentially resulting in the continuation of wrongdoing and misbehaviour due to 
employees feeling frustrated and disengaged as participants viewed the primary 
source of cultural formation and reformation as being led by management. When 
organisational culture is seen as management centric it results in cultural 
communications being seen as rhetoric as the tenets are often not enacted at a 
routine level, as the managed culture conflicts with the actual organisation’s culture, 
that is experienced by members on a daily basis. 
 
It should be noted that the general premise that culture can provide a competitive 
advantage is not baseless, there is evidence to suggest that culture does have the 
capacity to galvanise an organisation and provide them with some sort of 
competitive edge. The issue lies within the idea that this can be designed and 
fabricated into an organisation, evidence suggests that this is not the case. 
Furthermore the assumption that ‘strong cultures’ are inherently a good thing needs 
to be dismissed, a strong culture can have a negative impact as seen in the case of 
Enron (Sims and Brinkmann 2003). This being said the notion of strong cultures can 
be a source for positive outcomes, there is not a necessity to refute the strong 
culture label just because this is a critical piece of work. The strong culture school 
of thought should undoubtedly be approached with scepticism, as it is should not be 
viewed as a panacea or an end goal. An organic development of culture can lead to 
positive outcomes one which acknowledges the importance of power relations,  
resistance, sub-cultures and the participation of mutual actors. 
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To conclude this thesis contributes a critical analysis of organisational culture in the 
context of the financial crisis utilising the work of Foucault to provide a framework to 
analyse the complexities of this phenomena. Although research of banking culture 
has been undertaken (see Spicer et al. 2014; Deloitte 2013; Salz 2013) these have 
provided a positivist account of the phenomena taking managerial orthodoxy as 
truth, in an attempt to provide prescriptive solutions to the industry. This thesis has 
attempted to engage with the many layers of organisational culture, through a critical 
lens leading to the discovery of the importance that power relations and 
performance discourse plays in the construction of banking cultures. The main 
theoretical contribution of this thesis was the development of the idea of 
performance discourse, which influences conduct and behaviour at a taken for 
granted routine level, it can provoke a disciplining effect on the individual, one that 
can materialise internally (Foucualt 1977). Performance discourse provides a way 
of interpreting normative behaviours and taken for granted assumptions that are 
enacted on a day-to-day basis within the banking industry as mutually constructed 
cultures that emerge organically in contrast to managerially led cultural 
communications. The themes that performance discourse is developed upon are 
embedded within the industry and include the themes of excess, elitism and hard 
work as explored in chapter six. These themes are often initiated through the 
industry imperatives or profits, competition and performance, which are then 
enacted and reinforced by the behaviours and conduct of organisational members. 
Through the development of performance discourse, this thesis contributes 
something new and different that goes beyond the binaries that view culture as a 
‘thing’ or as a metaphor. 
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In addition to the development of performance discourse, this thesis exposed the 
multiple competing power relations that exist within and upon the industry that also 
played a contributory role in shaping performance discourse and ultimately 
contributing to the development of banking cultures. Furthermore this thesis has 
revealed that very little has changed or progressed in the realm of culture 
management, much of the same techniques, approaches and language of the 
1980s texts are still employed. Yet despite the reverent commitment to cultural 
engineering, very few of the promises advocated by these texts have been delivered 
to the banking industry. This thesis was a timely revisiting of a topic that seems to 
have been forgotten within academic circles but remains popular amongst 
practitioners; culture management is still a very popular tool utilised by managers, 
thus it should afford continued examination from critical scholars. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Example of early invitation sent to potential 
participants 
Hello, 
 
My name is Hussan Aslam, I am a doctoral candidate in the School of Management 
at Keele University. I am conducting a research study as part of the requirements of 
my PhD in Management, and I would like to invite you to participate. 
 
This is an exciting opportunity to participate and contribute to an important and 
relevant piece of academic research. The aim of this research project is to explore 
organisational culture within the banking industry through the perspectives of 
employees, by understanding how employees interpret and interact with their 
company’s culture. As part of this research, you will not be asked any confidential 
or sensitive information about your organisation or your work. If you do decide to 
take part your participation will be completely anonymous. 
 
If you have any questions or would like further information regarding the research, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. 
  
   290 
Appendix 2: Example of updated invitation sent to potential 
participants 
 
Dear X, 
 
I am carrying out a research project as part of my PhD and I would like to invite you 
to participate. 
 
This is an exciting opportunity to participate and contribute to an important and 
relevant piece of academic research. The aim of this research project is to explore 
banking culture from the perspectives of employees. Since the financial crisis, there 
has been a lot of media attention surrounding banking and I want to hear your views. 
I am interested in hearing your perspectives and experiences of the organisation 
you work for.  
 
As part of this research, you will not be asked any confidential or sensitive 
information about your organisation or your work. If you do decide to take part all 
that you have to do is agree to be interviewed. I would like to add that your 
participation will be completely anonymous. 
 
If you have any questions or would like further information regarding the research, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Regards 
Hussan Aslam 
h.m.aslam@keele.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3: Example of research invitation sent to CEOs and 
senior management of banks 
 
Dear X 
 
My name is Hussan Aslam, I am a doctoral candidate in the School of Management 
at Keele University. I am conducting research into the banking culture of UK banks 
and how it has changed since the financial crisis. Cross Continent Banks as always 
had a reputation of possessing a strong culture, therefore I feel that it would be 
beneficial to your organisation to participate in my empirical research which will be 
exploring banking culture. 
 
This is an exciting opportunity to participate and contribute to an important and 
relevant piece of academic research. The aim of this research project is to explore 
organisational culture within the banking industry through the perspectives of 
employees, by understanding how employees interpret and interact with their 
company’s culture. I am interested in hearing your employees perspectives and 
experiences of the organisation they work for. As part of this research, they will not 
be asked any confidential or sensitive information about their organisation or work. 
Their participation and company’s identity will be completely anonymous. 
 
I feel that this research project will provide you with some insightful information 
about your organisation and its culture from an external and impartial perspective. 
 
If you have any questions or would like further information regarding the research, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely  
 
Hussan Aslam 
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Appendix 4: Interview guide 
 
Question Guide 
 
• Tell me me a little about your current position? 
 
• How does your company communicate its values and beliefs to employees? 
• What sorts of materials are there around the office reminding you of the 
company’s values and beliefs? 
• What do you think about them? 
• How do you think your colleagues respond?  
• Does the company hold any employee events? 
• How do people respond? 
 
 
• Do you think people “Buy In” to different degrees 
 
• What is the atmosphere like at these events? 
 
• Does anyone make jokes about the company or its leadership? 
 
 
 
• How were things before the financial crisis? 
 
• How do you think things have changed since the financial crisis? 
 
• How has your perception changed, if at all since the financial crisis? 
 
• How has the financial crisis changed the way you work? 
 
• Do you think there is a culture clash? 
 
• Do you think there moral reason for the changes? 
 
• Do you think that people within the industry feel a sense of responsibility? 
 
 
 
• How are whistleblowers supported? 
 
• How was any wrongdoing doing dealt with before the crisis? 
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• How has it changed? 
 
• Was wrongdoing discussed? 
 
• Would you say there was a culture of silence? 
 
• Do you think people within the industry saw the crisis coming? 
 
• Was there too much of a focus on short term gain? 
 
• How do you think the bonus structures influenced the way people behaved?  
 
 
 
• Do the values and beliefs of your organisation change the way you work? 
 
• How do you apply your company values in your day to day life? 
 
• Do the company's values, beliefs and objectives interfere with your own? 
 
• Do think the way the organisation sometimes conducts itself contradicts 
your own values and beliefs? 
 
• Do you react to and view things differently since you started working for the 
company? 
 
• Do you feel the company conducts itself in a way that fits the image of itself 
that it provides to clients? 
 
 
 
• What is the relationship like between departments? 
 
• Do bankers mix with employees from other roles and departments? 
 
• What is your relationship like with your colleagues? 
 
• Would you say bankers believe they are the smartest people in the world? 
 
 
 
• Do you feel proud to be part of the company? 
 
• What sense of commitment do you feel to the company? 
 
• In what ways, if any have you found yourself defending the company to 
family or friends? 
 
• How does your organisation make sure you maintain a healthy work-life 
balance? 
   294 
 
 
 
• How do you find your work empowering or fulfilling or satisfying? 
 
• What motivates you to do your work? 
 
• How do think the company is committed to you? 
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Appendix 5: Participant List 
 
Name Previous/Current Banks Positions Held Years in 
Industry 
Susanne 
 
Legion Bank 
 
Director of 
Commodities 
12 
Victor 
 
Whittards 
 
Management 
Consultant 
9 
Lewis 
 
Goliath Bank 
Whittards 
 
Technology 
Infrastructure 
Contractor 
20 
Jenson 
 
Goliath Bank 
 
Executive Director in 
Equity Sales 
10 
Karuhn 
 
Cross Continent Bank 
 
Graduate Trainee 2 
Daniel 
 
Whittards 
Emerald Bank 
 
IT Infrastructure 
Consultant 
25 
Hemel 
 
Cross Continent Bank 
Iron Bank 
 
Compliance 
Contractor 
2 
Yusuf 
 
Emerald Bank 
 
Investment 
Management Analyst 
5 
Phillip 
 
Midwest Bank 
Whittards 
Quartz Bank 
Managing Director 20+ 
Norbert 
 
Quartz Bank 
 
Managing Director of 
Quantitative Strategy 
Dept. 
20+ 
Adrian 
 
Ryman Bank 
 
Executive Director in 
Non-Core Division 
15+ 
Nico 
 
Midwest Bank 
 
Managing Director in 
Investment 
Management 
Divisions and Chief 
Investment Officer 
roles 
25 
Sam 
 
Midwest Bank 
Iron Bank 
 
Managing Director 
and Director 
positions in Equity 
Sales 
12 
Jacob 
 
Whittards 
Goliath Bank 
 
Derivatives Analyst in 
in Structured Credit 
17 
Roger 
 
Iron Bank Business Analyst 13 
Jack 
 
Goliath Bank 
Whittards 
 
Executive Director 
and Vice President 
positions in Technical  
Architecture 
5 
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Toby Dressler Bank 
 
Graduate Analyst 2 
Dev 
 
Emerald Bank 
Dressler Bank 
Goliath Bank 
 
Senior Legal Counsel 8 
Zara 
 
Emerald Bank 
 
Fixed Income Analyst 
in Asset 
Management 
5 
Sophie 
 
Dressler Bank 
 
Front Office Analyst 3 
Edward 
 
Whittards 
 
Associate 3 
Sonny 
 
Whittards 
Iron Bank 
Credit Risk/ Quality 
Assurance Analyst 
4 
Reece Paisley Banking Group Director Private 
Equity 
11 
Mitchell Whittards 
 
Associate Consultant 10 
Carl Dressler Bank 
Emerald Bank 
 
Technology 
Infrastructure 
Consultant 
18 
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